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  A B S T R A C T  
Since 1999, multi- and bilateral donor agencies have based their development cooperation 
with heavily indebted poor countries on the elaboration of poverty reduction strategy papers 
that should be ‘country-owned’. This thesis explores this concept of ownership and analyses 
the power relationships between aid donors and recipient governments involved in efforts to 
promote ownership. It employs a political sociology perspective and draws on institutional 
theories and theories of organisational change to argue that ownership is a normative, not an 
analytical concept. Using the two ‘model recipient’ case studies of Bolivia and Ghana, it 
analyses two different tools of development cooperation: direct budget support mechanisms 
and the fostering of civil society participation in national policy-making. It places these two 
cooperation tools in their socio-political context to investigate in how far informal political 
processes represent factors that determine national politics, and ultimately the likelihood of 
success of political reform. The empirical research is centred around 140 qualitative semi-
structured interviews with donor agency, governments and civil society representatives in 
both countries.  
The dominance of ownership questions in current development debates are 
explained with reference to the historical evolution of development cooperation, particularly 
the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and the criticisms and revisions they 
evoked. The author argues that two different types of ownership should be distinguished: 
‘government’ and ‘national’ ownership. The thesis demonstrates that direct budget support 
mechanisms are  intended to foster government ownership, while the promotion of civil 
society participation is aimed at fostering national ownership. Donors’ attempt to foster 
ownership of formalised reform agendas is an almost impossible task because informal 
political processes largely shape the realm of national politics at the state level and determine 
the type and degree of societal participation in national policy-making. The thesis concludes 
by suggesting that international donors, pursuing these policies, risk destabilising 
representative democratic systems of recipient countries in undesirable ways. 
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C H A P T E R  1   –  D E V E L O P M E N T  
C O O P E R A T I O N ,  O W N E R S H I P  A N D  
P O L I T I C A L  C H A N G E  
Towards the end of the 1990s, the poverty reduction strategy approach was adopted central 
to multi- and bilateral donors’ country-level framework of international development 
cooperation with heavily indebted poor countries.1 A key principle within this approach has 
taken centre stage in current development debates: ownership. Generally understood as the 
appropriation of development cooperation programmes by the recipient, ownership has 
become a common-place term, yet it remains vaguely defined. Definitions of ownership 
usually come from practitioners rather than academics, as it is a normative rather than an 
analytical concept. Aid donors argue that the effectiveness of aid depends on the degree to 
which a cooperation programme is owned by the recipient.2 In a normative fashion, donors 
call for ownership in order to ensure sustainability of mutually agreed programmes:  
The recipient needs to define needs, prioritise activities, make policy 
decisions, direct the planning of activities and their implementation, allocate 
resources, facilitate effective utilisation of external and internal resources, 
and be responsible for the actual implementation.3 
In other words, donors want recipients to fully appropriate the mutually agreed cooperation 
programme or project, at least in theory. But are donors actually willing to relinquish 
ownership? If they were, why do programmes aimed at strengthening recipient ownership – 
such as the poverty reduction strategy papers or multi-donor funding mechanisms – continue 
to employ conditionalities like broad-based civil society participation mechanisms or 
elaborate trigger matrixes to determine aid disbursement? Directly or indirectly, donors have 
an interest in shaping the national debate in a recipient country as to where reforms should 
be heading in order to justify their engagement to their own constituencies. Indeed, donors 
come with a particular agenda on how to achieve poverty reduction and sustainable 
                                                 
1   For analytical overviews of this development, see Laure-Hélène Piron and Alison Evans (2004): "Politics and the PRSP 
Approach: Synthesis Paper", ODI Working Paper 237, London: Overseas Development Institute; International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank (2003): "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP): Progress in Implementation", Development 
Committee, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
2   See for example, Masud Mozammel and Sina Odugbemi (2005): "With the Support of Multitudes: Using Strategic 
Communication to Fight Poverty Through PRSPs", Information and Communication for Development, DFID, and 
Development Communication Division, External Affairs, The World Bank, London: Department for International 
Development; Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (1999): "Recipient Responsibility and the Practise of 
NORAD's Role as a Donor", Oslo. 
3   Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (1999): "Recipient Responsibility and the Practise of NORAD's Role 
as a Donor", Oslo. 
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development. Yet, they would like to see recipients back this agenda as if it were their own. It 
is curious that a concept like ownership – which is possibly in conflict with the donors’ own 
agenda – has gained such prominence in current development debates. 
The emergence of this new buzzword has to be understood within the context the 
historical evolution of aid and cooperation.4 The focus on ownership is a reaction to the 
criticism that donors received for conditionality-based lending, which became prominent 
during the structural adjustment era in the 1980s. Prior to structural adjustment approaches, 
development assistance had been overshadowed by a climate of disillusion and distrust. 
Donors were disappointed with successes made and disillusioned by often inefficient, rent-
seeking political elites in recipient countries. At first, aid became projectised to keep 
development assistance under the control of expatriate experts. But donors quickly realised 
that recipient governments needed fast-disbursing help in order to meet their financial 
obligations, while large-scale institutional reform was deemed necessary to generate the 
conditions for sustainable growth.5 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) thus started large-scale lending programmes where disbursement was tied to 
conditions on institutional reform, ‘structural adjustment’. Bilateral agencies entered into joint 
funding arrangement and offered parallel financing of policy-related programmes. However, 
while recipient governments accepted conditionality-based lending on paper, they fell behind 
with implementation in many respects. By the mid-1990s, donors and academics alike 
became increasingly convinced that conditionality – in the tough line pursued by structural 
adjustment policies – was not working.  
One major point of criticism was that external donors had not given much 
consideration to the necessary political calculations: how to win constituents’ support for 
tough decisions on public resources allocation. Particularly within developing countries, 
rejection of externally imposed structural adjustment programmes grew rapidly. As a reaction 
to these criticisms, the donors’ rationale changed. Aid conditionalities came to be viewed as 
counterproductive:  
The principles of self reliance, local ownership and participation which 
underlie the partnership approach are inconsistent with the idea of 
conditions imposed by donors to coerce poor countries to do things they 
don’t want to do in order to obtain resources they need. That view of 
                                                 
4   I will discuss this in detail in chapter three, along with the evolution of development cooperation.  
5   For a comprehensive account of this development, see Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye (1991): Aid and Power: 
The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending. I vols., London: Routledge. 
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conditionality was always of dubious value. Treating development co-
operation as a partnership makes clear that it is obsolete.6 
In that respect, the ownership debate expresses renewed trust between aid donors and 
recipient governments, since policy decisions can only be relinquished to the recipient if 
donors generally believe that a recipient is capable of defining its own development priorities 
in line with globally agreed principles of development. Nonetheless, donors are far from 
‘letting go’.7 Cooperation programmes continue to employ conditionalities that aim at 
ensuring the observation of particular principles deemed important by the donors because 
there is an intrinsic need for donor agencies to justify aid expenditure to their home 
constituencies.  
1 . 1  T h e  O w n e r s h i p  P a r a d o x  
Recent initiatives in international development cooperation like the poverty reduction 
strategies explicitly aim to foster ownership in order to justify cooperation and to make 
programmes sustainable in the long-run. In order to do so more effectively, donors have 
vowed to harmonise and align their cooperation programmes with recipients. Concerned that 
the wide variety of donor requirements was drawing down the limited capacity of recipient 
countries, donors increasingly aligned their programmes at the country level in order to 
reduce the transaction costs of the recipients. So the argument in favour of harmonisation is 
that it increases aid efficiency as well as making reforms more sustainable by fostering 
ownership.8 The poverty reduction strategy approach, which was a requirement for heavily 
indebted poor countries to receive debt relief, further institutionalised harmonisation and 
alignment at the country level.9 In terms of recipient appropriation, the poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs) require a broad-based nation-wide consensus to ensure ownership. 
At the same time, PRSPs have become the corner stone in concerted donor efforts to tackle 
global poverty reduction, in addition to providing the institutional basis for multi- and 
                                                 
6   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1995): "Development Cooperation, Efforts and Policies of 
the Members of the Development Assistance Committee", 1994 Report, Paris. A similar statement was made by the 
World Bank President in his address in 1997: “Development requires much too much sustained political will to be 
externally imposed. It cannot be donor-driven.” James Wolfensohn (1997): "The Challenge of Inclusion", Annual Meeting's 
Address by the President of the World Bank on 23 September, Hong Kong, China. 
7   Duncan Holtom (2002): "Tanzania's PRSP: 'Everyone Wants a Success Story'", Feedback Report for Interviewees, 
Research Conducted in Tanzania 2001/2002, 28 October, Swansea: Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales. 
42-50. 
8   See Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results, and Mutual Accountability, High Level 
Forum, 28 February – 3 March 2005, Paris. For an introduction to the debate, see Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2003): "Harmonising Donor Practices For Effective Aid Delivery: Good Practice 
Papers", Paris: OECD. 
9   Prior to this, the first frameworks to coordinate donor activities at the country level were the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. 
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bilateral debt relief. The PRSPs thus fulfil several purposes at once and are the centre-piece 
for political dialogue between multi- and bilateral donors and recipient governments at the 
country level.  
In a way, including ownership as a PRSP requirement serves to legitimate external 
donors’ intervention in the internal affairs of the recipient government.10 If a cooperation 
programme is owned by the recipient, aid cannot be viewed as an imposition by an outside 
actor, but rather as cooperation between equal partners to achieve a common goal. However, 
these contradictory goals – recipient ownership and donor policy-influencing on poverty 
reduction and institutional reform – present a challenge that is hard to come by: How can 
ownership be fostered if it is not present from the beginning? Answering this question 
presupposes an idea of who exactly should be ‘owning’ the programme – political leaders, 
government bureaucrats, the people?11 Often, authors distinguish between ‘government’ and 
‘national’12 ownership. Government ownership refers to the government’s commitment to a 
particular cooperation programme, while national ownership implies a broad-based 
consensus within society at large.13 Although government as well as national ownership are 
frequently mentioned in the literature, the distinction between the two concepts is usually 
either blurred or they are simply being equated. If they are mentioned together, it is usually to 
advocate a broad-based societal consensus that goes beyond government ownership.14 
However, as problematic as the notion of ownership is in and for itself, the distinction is 
necessary in order to specify who is supposed to be responsible and committed to a 
particular programme, as this has wide-reaching implications for the way in which donors 
aim to ensure ownership.  
Government ownership relates very closely to donor efforts in harmonisation and 
alignment: to the idea that multi- and bilateral aid donors aligned cooperation between 
themselves and with recipient governments in order to free scarce recipient government 
human resources from administering multiple donor programmes. It has been argued that 
                                                 
10   This argument has been made by Karen Brock, Andrea Cornwall and John Gaventa (2001): "Power, Knowledge and 
Political Spaces in the Framing of Poverty Policy", Working Paper 143, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
11   Johnson and Wasty elaborate on a distinction between top leadership, key policy-makers, and efforts towards consensus-
building among various constituencies. See John H. Johnson and Sulaiman S. Wasty (1993): "Borrower Ownership of 
Adjustment Programs and the Political Economy of Reform", World Bank Discussion Paper No. 199, Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
12   ‘National ownership’ is sometimes also referred to as ‘country ownership’. For the purpose of this research, I equate the 
two terms, since the assumption of the two terms is always that a national, country-wide consensus underpins ownership 
of a particular programme.  
13   United Nations Development Programme (2001): "Poverty Reduction Strategies: What Have We Learned?" Conference 
Report, 15-17 March in Bergen, Norway, New York: UNDP. 
14   For example, in Masud Mozammel and Sina Odugbemi (2005): "With the Support of Multitudes: Using Strategic 
Communication to Fight Poverty Through PRSPs", Information and Communication for Development, DFID, and 
Development Communication Division, External Affairs, The World Bank, London: Department for International 
Development. 
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lengthy and diverse decision-making procedures by different donors impede the 
government’s ability to commit to agreed reforms programmes and to effectively execute the 
delivery of aid.15 By harmonising aid flows and development cooperation more generally, 
donors aim to overcome these obstacles and to thus foster government ownership. 
Therefore, the most prominent means to foster government ownership are joint funding 
arrangements where the money can then allocated at the discretion of the recipient agency 
responsible. National ownership, on the other hand, relates very closely to questions of 
democratic representation, at least from the viewpoint of the donors. They make the 
argument that national ownership – a broad-based consensus on reform agendas within 
society at large – would ensure that the government’s reform plans are responding to the 
needs and demands of its citizens.16 For the donors, national ownership is a way to have their 
intervention in national policy-making be legitimated by the ‘voice of the people’. Therefore, 
the most prominent means to foster national ownership are mechanisms to ensure civil 
society participation in national policy-making.  
In other words, the means by which donors aim to ensure ownership indicate that 
the ownership debate touches on very profound aspects of domestic democratic 
accountability and representation. Yet, this relationship is often downplayed by actors in 
development cooperation, it appears as if ownership were a mere technical desirability.17 
Donors’ attempts to foster government ownership has wide-reaching consequences for the 
way in which recipient governments are accountable to their constituency. Donors attempts 
to foster national ownership has wide-reaching consequences for the way in which 
constituents are represented in the policy-making process. The aim of my research is to look 
at exactly how channels of accountability and representation in recipient countries get 
changed as a function of donor-recipient interaction.  
1 . 2  T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t  
C o o p e r a t i o n  
Investigating the mismatch between wished-for and actual reality in development 
cooperation that results from the ownership paradox requires a closer look at the power 
relations between multi- and bilateral aid agencies and domestic actors in recipient countries. 
                                                 
15   For a discussion, see Mick  Foster and Adrian Fozzard (2000): "Aid and Public Expenditure: A Guide", ODI Working 
Paper No. 141, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
16   See World Bank Group - Operations Policy and Strategy (2000): "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Internal Guidance 
Notes", January, Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 
17   A similar argument is made by David Mosse (2005): Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. 
London: Pluto Press.  
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These power relations are bound to be imbalanced, since the relationship is based on 
financial dependence – the recipient receives aid money from the donor country or 
organisation. I understand politics as the constrained use of social power, under 
circumstances where the will of any individual or group is constrained by that of others.18 
With regard to development cooperation, I take the viewpoint that donors constitute 
important socio-political actors within the recipient country context, because of the 
economic and political impact that their aid money has on national political and economic 
processes.19 From a politico-sociological perspective, donors constitute a specific group 
within a country’s state-society relations. This fact is often under-researched in academic 
studies of socio-political reform in developing countries. Too often, country politics and 
social movements are analysed without taking the donors’ role and function into account.20 I 
prefer to take a sociological approach to this analysis because political sociologists do not 
conceptualise individuals or organisations as necessarily rational and efficiency-seeking when 
formalising institutions.21 Instead, they argue that institutions should be seen as culturally-
specific practices and seek to explain why organisations adopt specific forms of institutional 
procedures and symbols.22 With this theoretical perspective, political sociologists find it 
easiest to explain the unintended outcomes of purposeful action. Since this is key to 
investigating a mismatch between wished-for and actual reality, a sociological understanding 
of donor-recipient relationships seems most appropriate for this research.23 
Much of the aid literature has focused on the fact that international development 
cooperation is necessarily hierarchical and that it reinforces systems of patronage.24 It thus 
makes sense to conceptualise donors as relevant stakeholders in political matters of the 
recipient state. Naturally, an aid-dependent recipient government will take donors’ values and 
beliefs into account as much as possible to secure its financial resources. The question then is 
                                                 
18  This definition is based on Max Weber, see Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, 
Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Compare Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996): 
"Political Science: The Discipline", in: Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political 
Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 7. 
19   On the incentive structure that donors create for domestic actors, see Peter Burnell (2004): "The Domestic Political 
Impact of Foreign Aid: Recalibrating the Research Agenda", in: European Journal of Development Research, 16 (2): 396 - 416; 
Elinor Ostrom, Clark Gibson, et al. (2001): "Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development 
Cooperation", Main Report, 'Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis', Indiana University, SIDA Studies in 
Evaluation 02/01, Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. An insightful account of the 
impact on aid on democratic processes is given by Thomas Carothers (1999): Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. 
New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
20   An exception is Peter Uvin (1998): Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford: Kumarian Press. 
21   In this, they are distinct from rational choice institutionalists, who assume that institutions evolve as the most efficient way 
of tackling a particular problem. For a discussion of the different strands of new institutionalism, see Peter A. Hall and 
Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996): "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", in: Political Studies, 44: 936-957. 
22   Pioneering work in this field was done by John W.  Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977): "Institutional Organisations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony", in: American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2): 340-363. This article was later taken up and 
incorporated into Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991): The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
23   In chapter two, I outline my theoretical approach and discuss institutional theory in more detail.  
24   For example, see Stephen Browne (1999): Beyond Aid: From Patronage to Partnership. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
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how donors, however well intentioned, can promote political development without diverting 
the recipient government’s attention away from its citizens, who have less effective means of 
sanction to hold the government accountable. “Aid can create dependency, dependency can 
invite outside involvement, and such ‘interference’ is undemocratic. [Such dependency is 
enforced by] the development of a patron-client relationship between donors and recipients, 
where the donor is expected to solve all problems.”25 An effect of such disproportionate 
resources is that recipients will downplay their prioritised problem areas in favour of donor 
priorities in order to secure funds. What effect does this kind of anticipatory behaviour have 
on donor attempts to foster ownership? With respect to budgetary accountability of joint 
funding arrangements, recipient governments would be inclined to be more accountable to 
aid donors – through bureaucratic accounting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms – than 
they are to be accountable to their own constituency, in particular to the relatively small tax 
base of their citizenry. With respect to civil society’s participation in defining national 
development priorities, recipient governments would be inclined to reflect the political 
preferences of aid donors in national policies rather than incorporating the opinions of 
consulted civil society organisations – as much as ignoring them is possible without aid 
donors realising.  
1 . 2 . 1  M o d e l  R e c i p i e n t s :  B o l i v i a  a n d  G h a n a  
I chose to investigate two different cases in order to give equal attention to both types of 
ownership promotion – one where the promotion of civil society participation in national 
policy-making is a key element of donor-recipient cooperation and one where joint funding 
mechanisms are particularly prominent. While Bolivia is a show-case example for donor 
support to civil society participation, Ghana is one of the prominent countries where donors 
experiment with multi-donor budgetary support mechanisms. Civil society participation 
mechanisms are also present in cooperation programmes with Ghana, particularly since they 
have been a condition for PRSP formulation and debt relief. Ghana is thus a useful case to 
juxtapose to the Bolivian experience. Similarly, cooperation with Bolivia has experimented 
with different forms of basket funding mechanisms, which make it an apposite case to 
juxtapose to the Ghanaian multi-donor budgetary support.  
Both Bolivia and Ghana were ‘model recipients’ during the structural adjustment era 
in the 1980s, while cooperation with both countries in the early 2000s moved more towards 
                                                 
25   Ralph M. Goldman (1988): "The Donor-Recipient Relationship in Political Aid Programs", in: Ralph M. Goldman and 
William A. Douglas (eds.), Promoting Democracy: Opportunities and Issues. New York: Praeger: 51-73: 51. 
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focusing on political reform. Before, both Bolivia and Ghana had been governed by 
authoritarian, military regimes until democratic liberalisation occurred in 1985 and 1992, 
respectively. Accordingly, both countries have experienced similar forms of development 
cooperation on governance issues for the past two decades.26 During that time, both 
countries were considered ‘model examples’ of governance reform in the 1990s. 
Consequently, donors put a high priority on further support. The levels of aid to Bolivia and 
Ghana are roughly the same, US$ 681 million to Bolivia and US$ 653 to Ghana in 2002. This 
results in roughly similar net percentages of aid per gross domestic product (GDP)27 – 
around 10 percent in both cases, which is considered the cut-off point for aid-dependent 
countries.28 Both countries were pilots for the World Bank’s early harmonisation tool, the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), and both countries were early PRSP 
countries. Both have already received debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) initiative. These similar patterns have led to comparable donor coordination efforts 
in Bolivia and Ghana that are worthwhile investigating.  
While similar types of development cooperation efforts exist in both countries, the 
political, social, economic and regional contexts are very different. Ghana’s political 
development is still marked by its colonial past during which strategic interests of some of 
today’s major donors had played a role.29 In addition, the formalised organisational structures 
of the state are still heavily influenced by their colonial precedents. In contrast, Bolivia has 
had a longer history of post-colonial independence, since decolonisation occurred much 
earlier in most of the countries. Even though Bolivia’s colonial past fundamentally altered 
and marked its political organisations, political elites had had more opportunities for 
governing a sovereign state and for designing state organisations based on underpinning 
power relations and interests of different societal fractions. Analysing whether similar donor 
approaches have different repercussions in Bolivia and Ghana gives this research some 
leverage to evaluate the impact that cooperation has had on the socio-political context. 
                                                 
26   Bolivia is considered to have been democratic since 1984, while Ghana’s democratisation started in 1989, with the first 
multiparty elections in 1992.  
27   For Bolivia, the net share of ODA as a percentage of GDP was 8.7 percent, for Ghana it was 10.6 percent in 2002. See 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004): Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid 
Recipients 1998-2002. Paris: OECD. 
28   For a discussion on aid dependence in relation with governance questions, see Deborah Bräutigam (2000): "Aid 
Dependence and Governance", EGDI Study, No. 1, Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert Group on 
Development Issues. 
29   This factor can be important, as it sometimes determines the present strategic interests of today’s donor countries. 
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1 . 2 . 2  D o n o r - R e c i p i e n t  I n t e r a c t i o n ’ s  E f f e c t  o n  
P o l i t i c a l  C h a n g e  
Focusing on donor-recipient interaction within two specific case study countries allows for 
an analysis of the socio-political context in which the interaction takes place. Until today, 
donor-recipient relationships are usually either evaluated from a relatively technical 
perspective with respect to the policies negotiated, or – when analysed from an academic 
perspective – they are often investigated at the global rather than the country level.30 Few 
exceptions have analysed donor-recipient relationships in the context of a particular socio-
political background.31 Often, country-specific policy analyses of aid programmes 
insufficiently conceptualise the socio-political context in which national policy-making takes 
place. Such studies stop short of perceiving donors’ work in the light of the role they play 
within the recipient country’s state-society relationship, in order to come to conclusions 
about the power relations that drive political change in the recipient country. I attempt to 
close this gap with my research through an analysis of the socio-political context that includes 
informal political processes that govern political interaction. 
1.2.2.1 Externally Promoted Reform  
In this thesis, I demonstrate that the donors’ interest in shaping national debates has 
repercussions on the institutional environment in which recipient state actors interact. Even 
when donor representatives attempt to foster recipient ownership, political actors in a 
developing country are likely to shape their behaviour according to donor expectations. They 
respond to these expectations in order to ensure continued support and to retain the 
legitimacy of certain state organisations vis-à-vis the donor community. Research question 
one inquires into the logic of externally promoted reform:  
Research Question 1:  In Bolivia and Ghana, do domestic political reforms reflect the 
values and beliefs of the external donor agencies involved? If so, in what ways and why do 
they do so? 
                                                 
30   See for example Collegium for Development Studies (2002): "Democracy, Power and Partnership: Implications for 
Development Cooperation", proceeding from a conference in cooperation with Sida, May 6, Uppsala; Jean-Claude 
Berthélemy (2004): "Bilateral Donors' Interest vs. Recipients' Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors 
Behave the Same?" paper presented at the HWWA conference on the 'Political Economy of Aid', 9-11 December, 
Hamburg: Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv. 
31   Exceptions include Natalie Ann Folster (2001): Systemic Constraints on Aid Policy and Aid Outcomes: The History of Canadian 
Official Development Assistance to Tanzania. PhD Thesis, Development Studies Institute, London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science; James Putzel (1992): A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines. New 
York: Monthly Review Press; Judith Tendler (1984): Captive Donors and Captivating Clients: A Nicaraguan Saga. Washington, 
DC: Inter-Amercian Foundation. 
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In practical terms, the research question asks whose values are reflected in a particular reform 
programme in a context where the recipient is dependent on external financial aid flows. 
Indeed, the emphasis of the research is on reforms reflecting the values and beliefs of the 
external donor agencies if/when these values and beliefs are not shared by the executing 
recipient state organisation. Mutually shared values and beliefs would not lead to a mismatch 
between wished-for and actual reality. Only when a programme is primarily designed to 
accommodate donors’ approaches towards an issue, perceived and actual political agendas 
diverge.  
To attempt a hypothetical answer to this question, I build on organisational theory – 
particularly Meyer and Rowan’s concept of formal structure as myths and beliefs of the 
institutional environment.32 According to this concept, certain actors and stakeholders play a 
major role in determining the formalised agenda of an organisation.33 In developing 
countries, donors have to be conceptualised as such stakeholders, because they form part of 
the environment in which a state organisation operates. By using such an approach, the 
present research moves away from the notion that formal public institutions function 
rationally and effectively. Instead, it hypothesises that state organisations have to incorporate 
the values and beliefs of donors to gain legitimacy and to ensure their survival. In the case of 
Bolivia and Ghana, the institutional environment is heavily shaped by external donors as well 
as by the values and beliefs that their policies entail. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The governments of Bolivia and Ghana incorporate values and beliefs of 
present external donor agencies into their reform programmes because they need to increase 
their own and the reform’s legitimacy and to ensure the continuity of external financial flows.  
In practical terms, this means that a mismatch between formalised agendas and informal 
political processes might occur because the recipient state organisation is dependent on 
donor support and funding. Where this dependency is substantial – because alternative 
funding might not easily be available – such a reform programme does not respond to the 
values and beliefs of the domestic environment. To give one example: a government might 
seek popular participation not – or not only – to ensure greater access to policy formulation 
by the poor, but rather to secure donor funding. The degree of such a mismatch between 
formalised and a actual political agendas is relevant because of its significance for the 
sustainability of the formalised institutions that are created by such reforms.  
                                                 
32   John W.  Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977): "Institutional Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony", in: 
American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2): 340-363. 
33   M. Kiggundu (1989): Managing Organisations in Developing Countries. West Hartford: Kumarian. 
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1.2.2.2 Formalised Agendas and Informal Political Processes  
Many authors argue that reforms are unsustainable in the long-run, if informal political 
processes are overlooked in the process of policy formulation.34 This recognition – that 
informal political processes affect the sustainability and effectiveness of formalised agendas – 
is central to evaluating whether external donors can be successful in promoting domestic 
political reforms. Research question two is formulated with the importance of informal 
political processes in mind:  
Research Question 2: In Bolivia and Ghana, in what ways is there a mismatch between the 
template for politics that arise from formalised agendas and the way that politics actually 
work?  
Daily work activities and everyday interaction depend on the informal political processes in 
which state representatives have to act. For example, where relationships between the state, 
society and the private sector take the form of patronage networks, this may be in tension 
with, say, accountability procedures that are enshrined in the formalised agenda of the 
organisation or its political leaders. If the basic moral and political principles constituting the 
informal political processes do not differ from those of the formalised institutional structure 
of an organisation, then the efficiency of the formalised institutions is unlikely to be 
compromised: my interest is therefore in diverging formalised agendas and informal political 
processes.  
To approach a hypothetical answer to this question, I build on political sociology 
approaches. In particular, I take forward the notion that all political organisations and 
institutions evolve from the social political processes in which they are embedded.35 By the 
same logic, formalised organisations respond to demands and expectations evolving from 
informal political processes. This is true even in countries like Bolivia and Ghana, where 
formalised rules and norms are not only produced as a reaction to incentives of socially 
structured interests but also as a consequence of ‘myths’ conveyed by the donor community. 
In such a case – where informal political processes do not exclusively determine the 
formalised institutional structure of an organisation – informal political processes will 
nevertheless influence the activities within it. This leads me to the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
34   For such an argument, see A. Premchand (2000): "Institutional Development and Organisational Paradoxes", in: A. 
Premchand (ed.), Control of Public Money: The  fiscal Machinery in Developing Countries. New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 
261-289. 
35   Ronald L. Jepperson (1991): "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism", in: Walter W. Powell and Paul 
DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 143-163. 
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Hypothesis 2: In Bolivia and Ghana, there is a mismatch between the template for politics 
that arise from formalised agendas and the way that politics actually work because often there 
is more pertinent pressure on government organisations to respond to informal political 
processes and real politics, while formalised agendas have to be upheld for declaratory 
purposes.  
This hypothesis implies that, in particular cases, the activities of a specific government 
organisation are not determined by specified overarching aims for which the reform was 
designed because the overarching aims conflict with social institutions. This renders the state 
organisation less effective with respect to its formalised function. However, I do not assume 
that such a situation has to be the case in all state organisations in Bolivia or Ghana. Yet, 
where a divergence between formalised agendas and informal political processes exist, 
ownership of a cooperation programme that does not address informal institutions is likely to 
be weak.  
My point here is not only to problematise the donors’ conception of ownership but 
to demonstrate what consequences the donors’ promotion of ownership can have for 
democratic accountability and participation in recipient governments. Whenever domestic 
constituents are less effective than international aid donors to have their preferences included 
in formalised reform processes, the government is more likely to be accountable to the 
donors rather than to its own constituents and policy-making is more likely to represent the 
donors’ preferences rather than that of societal groups. In other words, in such cases donor-
recipient interaction alters the channels of democratic accountability and representation in 
the recipient country.  With this research, I want to analyse exactly how such variations 
occur. 
1 . 2 . 3  S t u d y i n g  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s i s t a n c e  a n d  D o n o r s  
A problem with studying development cooperation is that many terms originate from 
practitioners, not from academics. As a result, concepts and terms are often normative and 
value-loaded, even when they appear to refer to technicalities. For example, the subject area 
of this thesis is sometimes called foreign aid, foreign assistance, development cooperation 
and sometimes even partnership. All of these terms contain a normative or purposive 
element. While the foreign aid or foreign assistance labels stress the financial aspect, 
development cooperation and partnership focus on the policy dialogue involved. All four 
terms allude to the power relationships between donors and recipients in different ways – 
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with ‘aid’ as the strongest expression of hierarchical dependency, whereas ‘partnership’ 
explicitly excludes hierarchies. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has given foreign 
assistance the label ‘official development assistance’ (ODA). The term is useful to measure 
assistance in quantifiable terms and is widely employed for international comparisons. The 
DAC defines ODA as: 
…those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided 
by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests:  
a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
the welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and  
b) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 
per cent.36 
This is a good working definition because it refers to the promotion of economic 
development and the welfare of developing countries as an objective, not an output. Also, by 
insisting on a concessional character with a grant element it excludes non-concessional loans. 
I employ ODA whenever it helps to illustrate an argument with statistical data. Furthermore, 
I use the term ‘aid’ to refer to the monetary aspects of foreign assistance, excluding technical 
cooperation. I use ‘assistance’ whenever both financial and technical assistance are 
concerned. ‘Development cooperation’ more generally addresses all forms of interaction 
between donors and recipients that aim to promote political and economic development.37 
As such, the term also includes policy dialogue, even where assistance is absent. In my view, 
‘partnership’ is too normative a concept to serve for analytical purposes. I will only employ 
the term ‘partnership’ when referring to the donors’ use of it. 
The representatives of multi- and bilateral aid agencies are often referred to as the 
‘donor community’.38 From the inside and from the outside, they are perceived as having a 
shared set of norms and practices. However, this does not imply that these norms or 
practices are static, nor are they subscribed to harmoniously or homogeneously. Like in any 
                                                 
36   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committtee (2005): Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1999-2003. Paris: OECD: 317. 
37   At present, there is a large body of literature that addresses different aspects of development cooperation. This body of 
literature is commonly called the ‘aid literature’, even where more general aspects of cooperation are concerned. For the 
sake of simplicity; I continue the use of the term aid literature, keeping in mind that it is conceptually vague.  
38   For an analytical discussion of the term, see Rosalind Eyben (2003): "Donors as Political Actors", IDS Working Paper 
183, April, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 5-8. She further distinguishes between the donor community and 
development community. The ‘donor community’ contains development professionals employed by government 
departments and multinational organisations, while the ‘development community’ further extends to members and 
associates of all development NGOs, global advocacy organisations, and academics studying development.  
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social community, norms and values are continuously contested and evolving.39 Throughout 
this thesis, I will use the term ‘donor community’ to distinguish them as a social group that 
follows different rules and incentive patterns than other in-country actors. However, donors 
have hybrid features that distinguish them from any other socio-political group: They form 
part of the socio-political context of the recipient country but they are also oriented towards 
social networks abroad. Donors belong to the international development community and to 
their civil service organisations ‘back home’. In that respect, they are integrated and 
interacting within three different contexts that determine their actions: the national context, 
the international development context and their own civil service context.40 These three 
different contexts determine the incentive structure within which donor representatives act. 
It makes them a unique social group, distinct from domestic actors because they have an ‘exit 
option’. Because of this, I use the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ to indicate that there is a 
necessarily hierarchical relationship, where the recipient receives financial assistance from the 
donors. Equating the two as ‘development partners’ blurs the this relevant difference in an 
unhelpful way when analysing power relationships between donors and recipients.41 
1 . 3  E m p i r i c a l  D a t a  C o l l e c t i o n  
For the study of donor-recipient relationships, specialised interviewing is a necessity, 
particularly in a developing country context. There are few comprehensive accounts or 
records of negotiation activity prior to the settling of agreements. Although agreements and 
memoranda of understanding might be documented, the negotiation process is a diplomatic 
matter, where the informal setting and private discussions play an important role. 
Negotiations on particular programmes and projects are based on a great variety of formal 
and informal procedures. Interviewing therefore becomes necessary to fill gaps and evaluate 
biases in the available, non-systematic information. For my specific research project, 
interviews furthermore helped to constitute the narrative of the evolution of relationships 
among individual donors as well as between the donors and the recipient governments. For 
both of these purposes, it became necessary to target a diverse field of experts: Besides donor 
representatives and government officials and consultants to both sides, interviews included 
                                                 
39   Community here can be understood in Tönnies’ terms of Gemeinschaft, although it does not have to be territorially bound. 
Ferdinand Tönnies (1887): Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie. Leipzig: Hans Buske. On the 
function of values for social action, see Talcott Parsons (1939): The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with 
Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers. 2nd edn., New York: Free Press. 
40   Rosalind Eyben (2003): "Donors as Political Actors", IDS Working Paper 183, April, Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies. 7-11. 
41  This is an academic argument. It might be necessary and appropriate for aid practitioners to refer to government 
representatives as development partners rather than recipients.   
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knowledgeable experts from the recipient countries and civil society representatives, who had 
been involved in the relationship between the donors and the government. 
Most social scientists who do empirical research interact in one way or the other with 
the objects of their research. Much literature has been written on how the perceptions of the 
research by the object studied can influence the results of the observation.42 A donor agency 
might present itself in a particular way based on its knowledge of the subject of the 
investigation. On a similar but different note, the perception of the research by the donor 
agency can influence its appreciation of resulting recommendations. Before, during and after 
the interview process, the researcher has to be conscious of the donor agency representatives’ 
perception of the research. This matters for her own scientific endeavours but also for the 
one’s of other researchers to follow. A representative who feels he has been dealt with 
aggressively or unprofessionally by a researcher is less likely to grant an interview to another 
researcher afterwards. After all, interviewees give away information and opinions voluntarily. 
If the event is being perceived as unpleasant, there is little incentive to repeat the experience. 
This is even more true in the case of elite interviews, where interviewees are likely to have a 
busy schedule and little time to spare. The following two sections will briefly outline the data 
collection process and the problems and pitfalls involved. 
1 . 3 . 1  E l i t e  I n t e r v i e w i n g  
The field work for this thesis consisted of 140 semi-structured interviews. I employed a so-
called snowball system to identify the interviewees.43 This meant that I identified a primary 
set of interviewees based on their position in a particular agency or ministry. In particular, I 
was looking for people who worked on governance issues or the poverty reduction strategy 
papers. At the end of each interview, the interviewee was asked to recommend someone else 
to talk to. The same question was then posed to all subsequent interviewees who in turn 
recommended others, thus the name snowball system. In order to employ such a system, the 
interviewees have to be generally favourable to the objectives of the research. If the 
researcher or the research were perceived as aggressive, pointless or potentially dangerous, a 
donor agency representative would not jeopardise his or her own standing within the donor 
community by giving away other people’s contact information. Already at this early stage of 
the research, the interviewer has to be sensitive to the donor agency’s perception of his or her 
research in order to expand his or her network and to advance with the analysis.  
                                                 
42   See E. J. Webb, D. T. Campbell, et al. (1981): Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
43   These methods are explained more thoroughly in Norman K Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) (1994): Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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Since the selection of interviews is based on a person’s participation in a given 
political issue, interviewees are very often ‘not interchangeable.’ The rejection of an interview 
request by a specific agency or its key representatives can have an effect on the outcome of 
the study.44 Consequently, one of the most time consuming tasks of such a research 
methodology is getting the interview.45 Not only is it necessary to follow up an initial request 
with several phone calls, the format of the interview request also plays an important role. For 
this specific project, I found that in almost all contexts, writing an e-mail worked well, simply 
because they are the easiest to respond to quickly. However, if an e-mail seems vague or is 
addressed to the wrong person, it will be left unanswered. Later on, I made sure my 
introductory e-mail made reference to very specific parts of the person’s work – or even 
better, some of their achievements – in order to underline my need to talk with her or him. 
Very often, it was more convincing to write a detailed e-mail testifying to my knowledge of 
the subject and the interest I have in this particular conversation. In fact, I have learned to 
adapt the title of my research to suit the position of the person I was interested in 
interviewing. During the early stages, when I said I was interested in governance issues but 
wanted to talk to someone responsible for the poverty reduction strategy paper, the person 
referred me to the governance advisor instead of granting me an interview. Subsequently, 
instead of arguing that poverty reduction strategy papers contain important governance 
aspects, I adapted my research title to suit the position of the interviewee. The challenge of 
getting an interview was thus to be as specific as possible about my interest in the 
interviewee’s work while remaining reasonably vague in describing the focus of my research. 
1 . 3 . 2  E t h i c a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
The general rules about courtesy apply to following up the interview. Even though this might 
be self-evident, many researchers do not deem thank you notes or similar formalities 
important. Yet, they are valuable components in fostering one’s own network and in setting 
the stage for other researchers to follow. As said, if the research is perceived as well-
organised and efficient, the interviewee is more likely to grant further interviews to other 
researchers. Furthermore, an interviewer should not underestimate how well connected 
interviewees are amongst each other. It has happened to me on two or three occasions that 
an interviewee was on the phone or in a meeting with a former interviewee when I arrived at 
                                                 
44   Samy Cohen (ed.) (1999): L'art d'interviewer les dirigeants. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France: 7. 
45   Kenneth Goldstein (2002): "Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews", in: Political Science and 
Politics, 35 (4): 669-673. 
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her or his office. A favourable or unfavourable word in such a context will define the 
ambiance for the remainder of the interview.  
A fundamental question is how information collected during interviews can be used 
to inform the researcher’s work. Opinions differ as to whether interviews should be used 
anonymously or not. The advantage of revealing the origin of a statement is that it allows an 
evaluation of specific agencies or even of particular decision-makers. However, I do not 
believe that the point of academic research is to evaluate specific people’s performance. It 
should go further than that. In some contexts, it might make sense to juxtapose opinions 
from different agencies to reveal differences between these organisations. Nevertheless in my 
own research, I have decided to keep the individual as well as the organisation anonymous. I 
will only specify whether a particular statement came from a government or a donor 
representative. This will allow me to make generalisations about the attitudes and points of 
view within a particular kind of agency without compromising my interviewees. Particularly 
with elite interviews, the interviewed community is so small that interviewees can track each 
other’s statement if too much information is given away. For example, if I quote somebody 
from the Department for International Development (DFID) criticising the World Bank 
when my interviewee list only contains three British representatives, the World Bank 
representatives are very likely to be able to work out who made the statement.  
In sum, empirical data collection through elite interviews is a time-consuming 
process. It has nonetheless proven an excellent method to obtain otherwise undisclosed 
information on political interaction between donor and recipient representatives. Based on 
these interviews, I am able to describe power relationships and negotiation processes. It has 
proven an invaluable tool to get first hand accounts from both sides. In this thesis, I use 
these interviews to present donor and recipient views on the same issues and to juxtapose 
their evaluation of specific processes.46  
1 . 4  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  A r g u m e n t   
Following the introduction in this Chapter one, the thesis is divided into three main parts 
and one concluding part. The first part develops the analytical focus – donor-recipient 
relationships – from a theoretical and empirical perspective. It does so along the lines of the 
research questions. The theoretical perspective is used to explore diverging formalised 
agendas and informal political processes, while the empirical analysis of donor-recipient 
                                                 
46   For an explanation of how the interviews were analysed, see the Methodological Notes in the Appendix.  
   29
interaction explores conceptual issues of recipient ownership. The two following parts 
explore the two tools of development cooperation that this research aims to investigate: 
multi-donor budgetary support mechanisms, and the promotion of civil society participation 
in national policy-making. In each part, one chapter is devoted to analysing diverging 
formalised agendas and informal political processes. Each following chapter builds on the 
conclusions of the previous to investigate issues of externally promoted reform with respect 
to the cooperation tool in question.  
Table 1:  Thesis Structure 
 
To be specific, part one analyses donors as political actors and outlines their 
workings and organisational structure. It is divided into two different sections: chapter two 
and chapter three. Chapter two develops the theoretical background of the research project 
and bases the analysis of donor-recipient interaction in a political sociology understanding of 
the relationship between the state and society. It elaborates how the donor community can 
be conceptualised in a developing country context, where politics are more than a mere the 
result of state-society interaction because they depend on the role that donors take within the 
political system. Chapter three analyses the international donor community against the 
Analytical Focus   
Donor-Recipient 
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background of its evolution and past lessons learned. It depicts its actors and tools on the 
country level and explains the evolution of the ownership principle in current development 
cooperation approaches. Part two and part three build on this to investigate two central 
mechanisms through which the donor community attempts to foster ownership.  
Part two analyses multi-donor budgetary support mechanisms and other joint 
funding arrangements aimed at harmonising donor efforts at the country level in order to 
discuss concepts of government ownership. Chapter four depicts the state and national 
politics in Ghana and Bolivia. It investigates formalised agendas as well as informal processes 
in order to evaluate the degree of transparency and accountability of the budget in both 
cases. By doing so, it evaluates what drives or hinders institutional reforms in both countries 
and how inefficiency problems can be explained. Chapter five investigates how the donor 
community uses direct budget support mechanisms to foster greater ownership of reform 
programmes. It analyses the multi-donor budgetary support mechanism that was launched in 
Ghana and compares it with different types of basket funding and donor harmonisation 
efforts in Bolivia in order to address in how far the formalised cooperation agenda diverges 
from ongoing political processes.    
Part three analyses donor-driven promotion of civil society participation in national 
policy-making in two separate chapters in order to discuss concepts of national ownership. 
Chapter six conceptualises the role of civil society in a democratic regime. It juxtaposes the 
donors perception of democratisation processes with the government’s and civil society’s 
understanding of state-society interaction. It further describes the channels of civil society 
participation in both countries and evaluates how far civil society participation has made 
politics more accountable and democratic. Chapter seven investigates how the donor 
community has fostered civil society participation at the country level in Bolivia and Ghana. 
It outlines civil society promotion within the PRSPs and demonstrates how this has affected 
politics in Bolivia, and compares it to the situation in Ghana. It then evaluates to what extend 
the donor community has had an impact on state-society relationships and in what ways this 
has altered the type of political regime.  
Chapter eight concludes the thesis. It summarises the argument and evaluates the 
lessons learnt. It juxtaposes budget support triggers with government priorities, civil society 
participation with democratic representation, and government with national ownership. 
Using these conclusions, it revisits the theoretical implications of the thesis with respect to 
donors and the state-society relationship in an aid-dependent country, and with respect to 
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concepts of democracy. It ends with a necessary redefinition of development cooperation 
and democratic development in light of the research findings.   
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C H A P T E R  2   –  P O W E R  A N D  P O L I T I C S  I N  
D O N O R - R E C I P I E N T  R E L A T I O N S  
This thesis is about power and politics. More specifically, it is about power and politics in 
international development cooperation. In the case of development cooperation, power 
relations are bound to be imbalanced, since the relationship is based upon a resource 
dependence – the recipient receives aid money in the form of loans or grants from the donor 
country or organisation. While this dependence is increasingly recognised by academics and 
in donor policy papers, it still does not sufficiently factor into development cooperation at 
the country level.47 With the exception of engagement in failed states where donors recognise 
the political nature of their action, in most cases they continue to ignore their own role in the 
socio-political power games that take place within national contexts.48 Based on this 
assumption, donor agencies supposedly have better solutions to the problems at hand than 
the recipient government, whose different parts are perceived to be engaged in political 
struggles and clientelistic relations that hinder them from initiating change.49 I suggest that 
such a view is flawed. Donor functionaries come with an intrinsic agenda, with values and 
principles. They play a particular role in the recipient’s state-society relations and form part of 
the country’s socio-political context in which political power brokerage takes place. By doing 
so, they shape the constraints over the use of social power within the recipient country. 
Albeit apparently obvious, this realisation has wide-reaching consequences for the study of 
political change in developing countries and for development cooperation itself.  
I argue that political activity in developing countries is no longer shaped by the mere 
relationship between society and the state of the country in question – as conventional 
                                                 
47   There is a growing awareness of donors’ political impact and the need to incorporate this into the conceptualisation of 
new initiatives. For propositions of ‘lessons’ for donors, see Mick Moore and James Putzel (1999): "Thinking Strategically 
about Politics and Poverty", IDS Working Paper 101, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Some donor agencies 
have started to come to terms with their impact on recipient’s politics, see Elinor Ostrom, Clark Gibson, et al. (2002): Aid, 
Incentives and Sustainability. An Analysis of Development Co-operation. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Co-
operation Agency; Sue Unsworth (2003): "Better Government for Poverty Reduction: More Effective Partnerships for 
Change", Consultation Document, July, London: Department for International Development; Debbie Warrener (2004): 
"The Drivers of Change Approach", Synthesis Paper 3, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
48   For a discussion of donor involvement in failed states, see Tobias Debiel, Stephan Klingebiel, et al. (2005): "Between 
Ignorance and Intervention: Strategies and Dilemmas of External Actors in Fragile States", Policy Paper No. 23, Bonn: 
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden. For donors grown recognition of their political nature, see Department for 
International Development (2005): "Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States", DFID Policy Paper, 
London: DFID; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005): "Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States", Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships, Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), Paris: OECD. 
49   Some donor agencies have considered explicit policy influencing as a means of inducing political reform. See for example 
James Blackburn and Antonio Rodríguez-Carmona (2003): "Appraisal of DFID's Influencing Activities in Bolivia", May, 
La Paz: DFID Bolivia. Yet, these policy influencing tools rarely consider the unintended consequences of their intended 
action – which are vital for comprehending socio-political interaction. 
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political sociology argues – but by a triangular relationship between society, the state and the 
country’s donor community. Today, many contemporary political sociologists have moved 
away from state-society analysis. They speak about the globalisation of politics and have 
moved beyond the boundaries of the traditional nation-state to explain national and 
international politics.50 Nonetheless, my analysis is based upon the assumption that national 
politics exist and are partly a result of the relationship between the state and its society.51 
Without conceptualising a country’s donor community as a third component in this 
relationship, politics cannot properly be explained.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section will develop a political 
sociology perspective of donor-recipient relationships that integrates external actors and 
institutions into an analysis of the social circumstances of domestic politics. In the second 
section, I conceptualise institutions and politics. I use the third and the fourth section to set 
out how I understand the state, society and national politics. In the third section, I 
conceptualise the state and national politics by introducing approaches towards collective 
memories and socio-political histories in order to analyse how donor-recipient relationships 
are situated within political legacies of national politics. In the fourth section, I juxtapose 
concepts of direct participation and representative democracy and establish categories to 
analyse civil society organisations according to the channels through which they engage with 
they engage with the state and the political system. In the concluding section, I emphasise the 
need to contextualise the socio-political setting of development cooperation programmes to 
understand how political reform results from a combination of domestic and external 
pressures and incentives.  
2 . 1  A  P o l i t i c a l  S o c i o l o g y  P e r s p e c t i v e  
Political sociology directs attention towards “the social circumstances of politics, that is, to 
how politics both is shaped by and shapes other events in societies.”52 To investigate whether 
and in what ways there is a mismatch between the template for politics that arise form 
                                                 
50   See David Held (1995): Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity 
Press; A. McGrew (1997): The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
51   I recognise that the state in many developing countries has often been described as weak, in the sense that it is not fully 
able to engage with society. Yet, even when some parts of society are disengaged, others still influence government’s 
decision-making and engage with the state unless the state has ‘failed’. For a discussion of state-society relations in 
developing countries, see Joel S. Migdal (1988): Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. For a discussion of state failure, William Zartman (1994): Collapsed 
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
52   “Instead of treating the political arena and its actors as independent from other happenings in a society, [political 
sociology] treats that arena as intimately related to all social institutions.” Anthony M. Orum (1978): Introduction to Political 
Sociology: The Social Anatomy of the Body Politic. Prentice-Hall: 1. 
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formalised agendas and the way that politics actually work, it is necessary to analyse the social 
and political circumstances in which the donor-recipient relationships take place. This needs 
to be done in a historical perspective, where social and political institutions can be 
understood as a consequence of historical events.53 At the macro-political level, conventional 
political sociology has been almost exclusively concerned with state-society relationships. 
This is problematic since, in the contemporary world, politics and the state cannot be 
conceptualised as only the result of societal relationships and instructions – especially not in a 
developing country context where donors play a decisive role. There is a failure in the current 
literature to conceptualise foreign donors in a developing country context as relevant actors 
within the traditional state-society dynamic. Attempts have been made to approach the 
internationalisation of politics but they fall short of explaining political dynamics as a 
consequence of both social institutions and international stakeholders.54 Yet, the current 
literature on political sociology has much to offer to fill this gap.  
Several aspects make a political sociology approach apposite to investigate problems 
of external promotion of political reform. One is its focus on the study of social institutions 
and the comparative analysis of institutional change.55 “Institution represents a social order or 
pattern that has attained a certain state or property.”56 Social institutions have consequences 
for social and political action. Essentially, “whichever story political scientists want to tell, it 
will be a story about institutions.”57 Building on Parsons, political sociologists perceive choice 
as bounded by institutional constraints, although there is some disagreement about the 
degree of constraint and how the nature of society determines social institutions. Rational 
action, in “conformity with these norms, does not follow automatically from the mere 
acceptance of the ends as desirable.”58 This is of particular interest for my research, because 
institutional design approaches often argue that actors conform to norms and institutions 
that they consider to be desirable. In contrast, political sociologists view social institutions as 
giving rise to socially structured interests, and hence to an organised system of incentives. 
                                                 
53  Albeit a bit awkward, the term ‘historical sociology of politics’ more accurately reflects the historical evolution of social 
norms that shape political institutions. Yves Déloye (2003): Sociologie historique du politique. Paris: La Découverte. For the 
purpose of this research, I employ a political sociology perspective that takes historical antecedents into account. 
54   Work on the impact of donors on the political sphere of developing countries exist but they do not reconcile traditional 
state-society approaches and lack a thorough understanding of the social genesis of politics. See for example J. Grugel 
(ed.) (1999): Democracy Without Borders: Transnationalisation and Conditionality in New Democracies. London: Routledge; Peter 
Burnell (1997): Foreign Aid in a Changing World. Issues in Third World Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
55   This has been its primary purpose since its founding, see Emile Durkheim (1895): Les règles de la méthode sociologique. Paris: 
Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière. He defines sociology as the “science of institutions, of their genesis and of their 
functioning.” 
56   Ronald L. Jepperson (1991): "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism", in: Walter W. Powell and Paul 
DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 143-163: 145. 
emphasis in the original. “Order or pattern” denote standardised interaction sequences. 
57   Bo Rothstein (1996): "Political Institutions: An Overview", in: Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A 
New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 134. 
58   Talcott Parsons (1990 (1934)): "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions", in: American Sociological Review (55): 318-
333: 325. 
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Yet, there is still widespread disagreement on the nature of mechanisms through which 
norms and rules are produced and maintained. Several scholars are currently trying to come 
to terms with the problem of explaining the relationship between informal and formal 
institutions as well as the feedback process between social and political norms.59 In the case 
of governance reform in a developing country context, I argue that formalised rules and 
procedures are not only produced as a reaction to incentives of socially structured interests 
but also as a consequence of ‘myths’ conveyed by the donor community. Yet, socially 
structured interests will largely determine the way that politics actually work.60 
2 . 1 . 1  T h e  P o s t m o d e r n  T u r n  
Historically, the state and the world state system were essential means of securing power and 
domination, and political sociologists have done well in identifying this function of state 
formation.61 The most distinctive feature of the state as a political organisation has been the 
differentiation of the subjects of rule into “territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive 
spaces of legitimate domination.”62 However, as a consequence of globalisation and 
internationalisation, states today have become “simply one class of powers and political 
agencies in a complex system from world to local levels.”63 Yet, in the global political 
organisation, states remain as a key source of legitimacy and accountability in relation to 
powers below and above the national level. Even though it is not self-evident that in the 
circumstances of late modernity collective power has to take the form of a state, it can 
reasonably be assumed that states will continue to be major sites of social reproduction, 
struggle and collective agency well into the twenty-first century.64 “Borders still matter” – and 
thus the state matters – because most global or international actors have so far “felt the need 
for some kind of stabilising framework of rules and public support structures beyond the 
                                                 
59   James S. Coleman (1990): "Commentary: Social Institutions and Social Theory", in: American Sociological Review, 55: 333-
339; Douglass North (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. The Political Economy of Institutions 
and Decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
60   This is in line with the argument that multiple institutions shape the political landscape in a globalised world, see Ian Clark 
(1999): Globalization and International Relations Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press; James N. Rosenau (1990): Turbulence 
in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Others like Srivastava argue that 
the effective translation into reality of perfectly designed macro rules may be hindered by diverging micro layer rules. See 
Manoj Srivastava (2004): "Moving Beyond 'Institutions Matter': Some Reflections on How the 'Rules of the Game' 
Evolve and Change", Crisis States Programme Discussion Paper No. 4, London: Development Studies Institute. Using 
his terminology, I argue that macro rules are influenced by external donors while micro layer rules continue to be largely 
determined by socially structured interests.  
61   Anthony Giddens (1985): The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press; Michael Mann (1986): The Sources of Social Power: 
The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914. 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gianfranco Poggi (1978): The 
Development of the Modern State. London: Hutchinson. 
62  J. Ruggie (1993): "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations", in: International 
Organization, 47: 139-147. 
63   P. Hirst and G. Thompson (1996): Globalization in Question. Cambridge: Polity Press: 190-206. 
64   Angus Stewart (2001): Theories of Power and Domination: The Politics of Power in Late Modernity. London: Sage: 123-129. 
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networks generated through market transactions.”65 Yet, what then determines politics on the 
– still existing – state level in an increasingly globalised world? 
Recently, emerging literature on globalisation has begun to challenge the traditional 
state-society focus in political sociology.66 This shift has produced the ‘postmodern turn’.67 
Such theories have focused on the ‘society’ side of the old, inflexible state-society concept 
and argued that postmodern societies have to be analysed in ‘cultural’ rather than in ‘state’ 
terms.68 Societies are now not only to be conceptualised as defined by the state in which they 
are located, but rather according to common cultural denominators which transcend national 
borders, like certain levels of education or specific preferences for music or shared world 
views. However, much remains to be explained about how the ‘state’ side of the old concept 
is affected by the ‘dissolving’ of traditional borders. To approach this problematic, Nash 
conceptualises the ‘internationalised state’ – the form of state she sees currently developing as 
an aspect of global governance. Such a state shares sovereignty as a result of its participation 
in international agreements.69 As political arenas today are constituted by complex regional, 
national, international and transnational networks, the political structuring of the world in 
terms of the territorial differentiation seems increasingly problematic.70 In such 
circumstances, there is a “growing asymmetry between the global and the transnational scale 
of contemporary social life and the territorial organisation [in other words, the state-isation] 
of liberal democratic governance.”71 These findings begin to get at the discrepancy between 
the template for politics and the way that politics actually work in developing countries’ state 
organisations that I problematise with this thesis.  
2 . 1 . 2  T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e d  D e v e l o p i n g  S t a t e   
Kate Nash’s idea of the internationalised state presents an important first step towards 
conceptualising politics as incentives at the state level. Yet, it still does not adequately address 
the social circumstances of politics in a developing country context, where sovereignty is 
                                                 
65   R.J. Holton (1998): Globalization and the Nation-State. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 108. 
66  Works on globalisation are too numerous to be listed here. Some of the authors that have rethought the changed 
relationship between societies and politics are A. McGrew (1997): The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and 
Territorial Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press; David Held (1995): Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press; James N. Rosenau (1990): Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change 
and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Anthony Giddens (1990): The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
67   Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1997): The Postmodern Turn. New York: Guilford Press; Steven Seidman (1994): The 
Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
68   See for example, K. Kumar (1995): From Post-Industrial to Postmodern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
69   Kate Nash (2000): Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics, and Power. Oxford: Blackwell: 260-264. 
70  W.E. Connolly (1991): Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. London: Cornell University Press. 
71   A. McGrew (1997): The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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shared not only because of the government’s participation in international agreements, but 
also because of international pressures of a more unequal nature. A developed country has 
better means to object to international agreements which limit its sovereignty or at least to 
shape the international agreement according to its own preferences.72 A developing country 
has much fewer means to shape the outcome of international, bilateral or multilateral 
agreements in accordance with internal pressures, as it is more dependent on international 
support – financially but also in terms of strategic alliances. Political sociology is also right in 
stressing that the state, or at least the state level of politics, still matters. In an internationalised 
context, where all international relations are based on the existence of a state, the state-
society relationship cannot be regarded as obsolete. Nevertheless, social and political theory 
has yet to produce an approach, where the social circumstances of politics are conceptualised 
around the state, but not exclusively based on the society that the state governs. Particularly in a 
developing country, politics are also shaped by external actors and external social institutions, 
while the social circumstances in the country itself remain equally important. I hope to bridge 
that gap in the current literature by integrating external actors and institutions into an analysis 
of the social circumstances of politics. 
2 . 2  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  P o l i t i c s  a n d  I n s t i t u t i o n s  
Politics can be conceptualised as the “constrained use of social power”.73 The concept of 
politics refers to collective decision-making under circumstances where the will of any 
individual or group of individuals is constrained by that of others. Numerous scholars have 
defined politics in terms of power in similar ways.74 Max Weber describes power as “the 
chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even 
against the resistance of others participating in action.”75 Politics then are the power plays 
through which different social groups try to realise their own will. Thus, political actors 
usually have to operate under constraints imposed by others. Over time, these constraints 
develop into institutions. So, essentially, while this thesis is concerned with power and 
politics, it is also concerned with the institutions that shape political interaction.  
                                                 
72   Good examples are the European Union’s agricultural policy approaches towards WTO negotiations or the United States’ 
refusal to accept the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto agreement.  
73   Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996): "Political Science: The Discipline", in: Robert Goodin and Hans-
Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 7. 
74   The most notable classics are Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, 
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); Harold Dwight Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950): Power and Society: A 
Framework for Political Inquiry. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Robert A. Dahl (1963): Modern Political Analysis. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
75   Max Weber (1948): "Class, Status and Party", in: H. H.  Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology. London: Routledge: 180.  
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2 . 2 . 1  C o n c e p t u a l i s i n g  I n s t i t u t i o n s   
In line with a political sociology perspective of state-society relations, I take a sociological 
approach towards the concept of institutions. ‘New institutionalism’ is a popular trend in 
current political science literature, despite the considerable confusion about what it actually 
is.76 My main reason for employing the sociological strand of new institutionalism is that – 
unlike rational choice institutionalists – sociological institutionalists do not conceptualise 
individuals or organisations as necessarily rational and efficiency-seeking when adopting 
institutions. Sociological institutionalists argue that institutions should be seen as culturally-
specific practices. They seek to explain why organisations take on specific forms of 
institutional procedures and symbols,77 building on sociological concepts of individuals and 
organisations as seeking to define and express their identity in socially appropriate ways.78 
Rational choice theorists on the other had perceive individuals and organisations as seeking 
to maximise their well-being. The question is not which perception is true and which one is 
false. Both describe a particular aspect of what shapes human preferences and behaviour. 
Sociological institutionalists argue that individuals and organisations often adopt new 
institutional practices because they enhance the social legitimacy of the organisation or its 
participants, not because they advance their efficiency. In some cases, such practices may 
actually be dysfunctional with regard to achieving the organisations’ formal goals – explicit in 
the formal institutions that constrain the organisations’ actions. This can be described as 
‘logic of social appropriateness’ in contrast to ‘logic of instrumentality’.79 Rational choice 
institutionalists, who assume that institutions evolve as the most efficient way of tackling a 
particular problem, have difficulties in explaining the unintended outcomes of purposeful 
action. In my case, these unintended outcomes are the main research focus. For that reason, 
a sociological understanding of institutions is most appropriate, especially since the influence 
of poststructuralist and postmodern theories has broadened the concept of power from 
formalised political institutions to informal political processes.80 
                                                 
76   Hall and Taylor have usefully distinguished between historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism to point 
out some of the most relevant differences between these strands. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996): 
"Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", in: Political Studies, 44: 936-957.  
77   Pioneering work in this field was done by John W.  Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977): "Institutional Organisations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony", in: American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2): 340-363. This article was later taken up and 
incorporated into Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991): The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
78   Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996): "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", in: Political 
Studies, 44: 936-957: 949. 
79   John Campbell (1989): "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy", in: James G. Olsen March and 
Johan P. (eds.), Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. London: Free Press: 377-409. 
80   Torben Bech Dyrberg (1997): The Circular Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community. London: Verso; Michel Foucault 
(1980): "Truth and Power", in: Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge. New York: Pantheon: 107-133; Michel Foucault 
(1991): "Governmentality", in: G. Burchell, et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. London: Harvester 
Weatsheaf: 87-104; Jacob Torfing (1999): New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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Two issues are fundamental in institutional analysis: how to construe the relationship 
between institutions and actors’ behaviour, and how to explain the process through which 
institutions originate or change. In fact, the juxtaposition of institutions and action is one of 
the most fundamental dilemmas in social science.81 Traditionally, political science has been 
preoccupied with questions related to the desirability of specific political institutions – and 
how they could be ‘designed’ to achieve a particular outcome.82 In reaction to this more 
normative approach, political scientists after the second world war diverted attention towards 
variables such as the function that particular organisations fulfil for the system, systemic 
constraints, or the differences in distribution of power between social groups or classes.83 
These scholars argued that concentrating on either formal, legal aspects of institutions or on 
their ‘internal logic’ seemed to block the development of any ‘explanatory’ theory. It was only 
during the 1980s, that institutions – and institutional design – regained importance in political 
theory. Increasingly, theorists criticised the functionalist tradition of explaining institutional 
variation only with general social needs, thus neglecting that “in any given situation adequate 
institutional arrangements may fail to crystallize.”84 They suggested that functionalist 
explanations could not explain how individual actions of decision-makers can have a decisive 
impact on the evolution of particular institutions. Their argument was that institutions had to 
be examined very carefully to explain where they came from, independently from the ‘needs’ 
of the system.85 As a consequence, the state and its institutions were brought back into the 
analysis,86 international theory highlighted the relevance of ‘regimes’,87 and democratisation 
                                                 
81   Do actors create the conditions in which they interact, or are actions shaped by the constraints of their social 
environment? Structuralism, functionalism, system theories and group theories have always emphasised the relevance of 
institutions for shaping individual action. Proponents of symbolic interactionism, behaviouralists, actor-centred 
approaches such as rational choice theorists, and even most institutional approaches stress the way in which actors shape 
the playing field in which they interact. It is unlikely that this controversy will ever be fully resolved. For a discussion, see 
Quentin Skinner (1986): The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
82   Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes and other classical political theorists had a great impact on this 
kind of political science in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For an overview of the evolution, see Gabriel A. Almond 
(1996): "Political Science: The History of the Discipline", in: Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New 
Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 50-96. 
83   See for example H. Wheeler (1975): "Constitutionalism", in: Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of 
Political Science. Vol. v. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley: 1-92; A. King (1975): "Executives", in: Fred I. Greenstein and 
Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science. Vol. v. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley: 173-256. Some argue that the 
reason for this paradigm shift was that in the historical events of the early twentieth century, formal political institutions 
seemed to have played almost no role. Bo Rothstein (1996): "Political Institutions: An Overview", in: Robert Goodin and 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 139-144. 
84   Smuel N. Eisenstadt (1968): "Social Institutions", in: David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences. Vol. xiv. New York: Free Press and Macmillan: 409-429: 414. 
85   In this context, ‘critical junctures’ are considered as decisive for the development of new institutions. See Ruth B. Collier 
and David Collier (1991): Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
86   This statement pays tribute to an influential book that highlighted the relevance of the state in political processes, Peter B. 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (1985): Bringing The State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. The authors argue that, although the state is influenced by society that surrounds it, it also shapes political and 
social processes as an autonomous actor.  
87   Stephen D. Krasner (1983): International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. He conceptualises international 
regimes as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
issue-area.” (p. 1) 
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theory focused on the consolidation of the ‘rules of the game’.88 These new approaches were 
much better able to explain the impact of human action and of critical junctures on the 
evolution of particular institutions. However, I am concerned that a too narrow 
conceptualisation of institutions neglects the socio-political power relations that underpin and 
explain persisting institutions.  
2 . 2 . 2  M u l t i p l e  I n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  O r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
C h a n g e   
If the political arena is intimately related to all social institutions, as political sociology 
argues,89 heterogeneous societies would be expected to shape and be shaped by multiple 
social and political institutions. Many developing countries have a history in which different 
societal groups constructed their identity around (semi)autonomous political entities, defined 
by independent political institutions. Such ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ institutions often 
continue to co-exist with the formalised political institutions of the modern state. Moreover, 
whenever a state’s history displays political ruptures like colonisation, revolution, secession or  
decolonisation, the subsequent political arena might be defined by partially conflicting 
institutions from different political periods. In other words, the political arenas in countries 
like Bolivia and Ghana are likely to be shaped by multiple, sometimes conflicting institutions 
that co-exist and impact political action even when they are contradictory.90 
In a context where multiple institutions coexist, it is vital to understand how 
processes of institutional transformation occur. How do informal political processes become 
formally recognised and how do formalised institutions alter social norms and moral 
templates? Institutions are not static but inherently evolving. They form the framework in 
which all aspects of social interaction takes place, from political decision-making to personal 
relationships. Because institutions have been configured by past processes and circumstances, 
they are never in full accord with the requirements of the present.91 It follows that a central 
                                                 
88   In relation to democratic consolidation, the term was first used by Adam Przeworski (1991): Democracy and the Market: 
Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Studies in Rationality and Social Change, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. He takes it from the economically oriented analyses of Douglass North (1990): Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance. The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Margaret Levi (1988): Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
89   Anthony M. Orum (1978): Introduction to Political Sociology: The Social Anatomy of the Body Politic. Prentice-Hall: 1. 
90   For a discussion on institutional multiplicity, see Jo Beall, Sibongiseni Mkhize and Shahid Vawda (2004): "Traditional 
Authority, Institutional Multiplicity and Political Transition in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa", Crisis States Programme 
Working Paper No. 48, London: Development Studies Institute; Manorama Sharma (2004): "Critically Assessing 
Traditions: The Case of Meghalaya", Crisis States Programme Working Paper No. 52, London: Development Studies 
Institute. 
91   This is the basic argument of historical institutionalism. In contrast to rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism argues that – even though human behaviour is rational and purposive – institutions are path dependent 
and create unintended consequences. For this argument, see Thorstein Veblen (1899): The Theory of the Leisure Class: An 
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question is what confers social appropriateness on formalised institutional arrangements. 
Ultimately, this is an issue about the sources of institutional authority. Interpretations of how 
institutional authority is established varies. Such authority, just like institutions, is not stable 
over time. Nevertheless, it exists, established through the regulatory scope of the modern 
state or practices of certain professional communities,92 through interactive processes of 
discussion within a given network,93 or even transnationally under the aegis of international 
regimes.94 The authority over a particular institution varies depending on who is involved and 
affected. Some authors argue that explaining institutional performance requires an analysis of 
the inherited balance of power or ‘political settlement’. Khan claims that the institutional 
structure of a particular society depends on its political settlement.95 From a postmodernist 
perspective, this settlement does not necessarily have to take place at the level of state-society 
interaction. Parts of it could well be a settlement between national actors and external 
donors.  
By means of this thesis, I investigate whether and how political reforms reflect the 
values and beliefs of external donor agencies involved. To conceptualise this problem, it is 
useful to turn towards the literature on organisational change. This body of literature 
provides extensive explanations for how and why organisations change, and what determines 
their formal organisational structure. Even though it often implicitly addresses private sector 
organisations rather than public sector organisations and also tends to analyse organisations 
in developed countries rather than in developing countries, it nevertheless provides some 
useful insights into the nature of any organisational change.96 An organisation can be defined 
as having a boundary, as well as having an institutional environment with which it interacts. 
Essentially, it is an “abstraction”, although organisations do also have physical aspects.97 
Every organisation has raison d’être, its existence is linked to a particular goal or mission. Yet, 
especially in developing country contexts, organisational boundaries are difficult to pinpoint 
                                                                                                                                               
Economic Study of Institutions. reprint of 1st edn., London: Allen and Unwin. Most recently, the argument has been 
developed further in Ruth B. Collier and David Collier (1991): Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
92   Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991): "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality", The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 
63-82. 
93   John L. Campbell (1994): "Recent Trends in Institutional Analysis: Bringing Culture Back In", Working Paper, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Department of Sociology. 
94   John W.  Meyer, John Boli and George M. Thomas (1994): "Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural 
Account", in: W. Richard Scott, et al. (eds.), Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. 
London: Sage: 12-37. 
95   Mushtaq Khan (1995): "State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist Explanations", in: John Harriss, et 
al. (eds.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. London: Routledge: 71-86. 
96   Beetham suggests that organisational theory explores “the most general features common to all organisations in modern 
society, and by theorizing about the conditions for organisational efficiency, regardless of whether the organisation 
concerned is public or private, sacred or secular, devoted to profits or preaching, to saving life or ending it.” D. Beetham 
(1991): "Models of Bureaucracy", in: G. Thompson, et al. (eds.), Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. London: Sage: 129. 
97   Barbara Senior (1997): Organisational Change. London: Pitman: 4. 
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because they are “superseded by individual, family, village, tribal or community 
considerations.”98 Every organisation is linked to actors and stakeholders who play a major 
role in determining the organisation’s welfare and destiny. In an aid-dependent country, these 
stakeholders do not exclusively come from the immediate social environment of that 
organisation. They are more likely to be part of the donor community with which the 
organisation interacts. The international environment of organisations in Bolivia and Ghana 
includes stakeholders such as the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), bilateral aid donors, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation and other actors such 
as international corporations and banks. I argue that these stakeholders heavily influence the 
political, economic, technological environment of state organisations in both countries.99 
Instead of conceptualising these actors simply as passive elements within the organisational 
environment, I focus on ways in which these actors, as part of the organisational 
environment of state organisations, shape organisational change.  
A common view in the literature on organisational theory and in the newer 
approaches to institutional ‘modelling’ or ‘design’, is that formal public organisations are 
rationalised.100 Implicitly, such organizations are often assumed to be the most effective way 
to coordinate and control complex relational networks. I move away from this notion in this 
thesis, building on the work of Meyer and Rowan on institutionalised organisations: 
Organisational structures are created and made more elaborate with the rise 
of institutionalised myths, and, in highly institutionalised contexts, 
organisational action must support this myth. But an organisation must also 
attend to its practical activity. The two requirements are at odds.101 
Political reform in a developing country context represents a form of organisational change 
where state organisations have to incorporate beliefs and myths of their resource 
environment into their formalised agenda in order to gain and maintain legitimacy and ensure 
survival.  This is in stark contrast with rational choice applications of new institutional theory 
to questions of development, be it political or economic. I question whether a rational choice 
approach is very helpful in answering questions of political change in a developing country 
context where a multitude of institutions continue to co-exist. 
                                                 
98   M. Kiggundu (1989): Managing Organisations in Developing Countries. West Hartford: Kumarian: 16. 
99   The external stakeholders’ influence on the socio-cultural environment can be debated and will not be the focus of this 
research.  
100  For a review of organisational theory, see W. Richard Scott (1975): "Organizational Structure", in: Annual Review of Sociology 
(1): 1-25. For institutional design approaches see for example Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson (2002): Partners for 
Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
101  John W.  Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977): "Institutional Organisations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony", in: 
American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2): 340-363: 361. emphasis added. 
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2 . 2 . 3  F o r m a l i s e d  I n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  I n f o r m a l  P o l i t i c a l  
P r o c e s s e s   
As outlined in the introduction, I am attempting to explain in what ways a mismatch exists 
between the template for politics that arises from formalised agendas and the way that 
politics actually work. Formalised institutions and informal political processes are key 
concepts here. To start, I define formalised institutions as “formal arrangements for aggregating 
individuals and regulating their behaviour through the use of explicit rules and decision 
processes enforced by an actor or set of actors formally recognized as possessing such 
power.”102 I understand formalised institutions as explicitly laid out to be binding by decision-
making powers. I employ informal political processes as all remaining rules and procedures that 
are not made explicit but are known and recognised by the individual actors. They include 
procedures and social norms, symbol systems and moral templates that provide the ‘frames 
of meaning’ that guide human action.103 
Often, political scientists distinguish between formal and informal institutions 
instead.104 Yet, despite employing these terms, scholars disagree as to whether ‘routines’, 
‘customs’, ‘social norms’ or ‘culture’ should be conceptualised as ‘informal’ institutions.105 
What is more, the juxtaposition of ‘formal’ versus ‘informal’ suggests permanency of either 
type and blurs the fluidity and interconnectedness between the two. I prefer to speak of 
‘formalised’ instead of ‘formal’ institutions to emphasise the process nature of 
institutionalisation and to highlight the fact that a particular institution has been made 
explicit. Similarly, I prefer to speak of ‘informal political processes’ instead of informal 
institutions. When speaking of informal institutions, a scholar is bound to define the scope of 
the institution and prove a certain degree of persistence over time. This might be useful when 
analysing a particular informal institution. However, in a context of considerable institutional 
multiplicity it is difficult to identify particular informal institutions as decisive in shaping 
individual action.  
                                                 
102  Margaret Levi (1990): "A Logic of Institutional Change", in: Karen S.  Cook and Margaret Levi (eds.), The Limits of 
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Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bo Rothstein (1996): "Political Institutions: 
An Overview", in: Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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Several scholars have attempted to identify such rules actually agreed upon and 
followed by the agents involved.106 Such a distinction is helpful in a micro, actor-oriented 
analysis, for example when analysing the functioning of bureaucracy, but less effective in 
explaining how a government reacts to demands from societal groups, especially in non-
standard and unforeseen situations. Since the thrust of my argument is not to prove the 
existence of a particular informal institution but to show how various informal institutions, 
norms and processes affect the formalisation of political agendas, I avoid the term ‘informal 
institution’ for the sake of analytical flexibility. In a context of institutional multiplicity where 
formalised and informal institutions and processes are intertwined and interwoven, a 
juxtaposition between formal and informal presents to a rigid corset to analyse real politics 
and the formalisation of political agendas. 
In addition, I am trying to avoid a distinction between ‘institutions’ and ‘culture’. 
Some institutionalists make this distinction to emphasise a qualitative difference between the 
two: institutions provide strategic solutions to actors’ behaviour in order to make it more 
efficient, while culture is considered purely customary and not rationally calculated. I argue 
that the distinction between rational and irrational qualities is not useful for categorising 
formal and informal institutions. The relationship between actors and institutions is 
essentially the same, no matter whether they are formal or informal. The only distinction 
between the two is that one set of institutions is explicit, while the other one is tacit. Some 
authors refer to institutions as ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘socially embedded’, instead of formalised 
and informal.107 This has the advantage that either bureaucratic or socially embedded 
institutions can be described as more or less formal. On the other hand, such terms suggest 
that bureaucratic institutions are not socially embedded. That again is a value judgement on 
the quality of institutions that I want to avoid.  
Unintended consequences are ever-present in the social world,108 particularly in a 
developing country context, where external and internal actors’ interests potentially compete. 
For that reason it is problematic to assume that institutions are intended to maximise 
efficiency, like rational choice institutionalism argues. Institutions impact on individuals’ 
behaviour in a ‘cognitive dimension’. This is to say that institutions influence behaviour by 
                                                 
106 These rules have been labelled “standard operating procedures”, “work rules”, or “rules-in-use” as opposed to “rules-in-
form”, Peter A. Hall (1986): Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford: Oxford 
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107  See Frances Cleaver (2000): "Moral Ecological Rationality, Institutions, and the Management of Common Property 
Resources", in: Development and Change, 31 (2): 361-383. 
108  Robert Merton (1936): "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action", in: American Sociological Review, 1 
(6): 894-904. 
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providing cognitive categories and models to interpret the world. Such interpretations shape 
actions of individuals, which would not be able to act without a cognitive understanding of 
the context in which they are set. In other words – no matter whether they maximise actors’ 
material rent-seeking or not – institutions provide the very terms through which meaning is 
assigned in social life. This is a social constructivist approach towards institutions, which 
stresses that institutions do not only affect the strategic calculations of individuals but also 
their most basic preferences and very identity. 109 I am employing such an approach because 
donor-recipient relationships inevitably take place in a pluricultural playing field where 
different meanings and identities coexist. By looking at the relationship between formalised 
institutions and informal political processes, I am hoping to get at how these diverging 
meanings coexist and how actors try to reconcile them.  
2 . 3  T h e  S t a t e  a n d  N a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s  
Before investigating how external actors impact domestic political reforms in a recipient 
country, a conceptualisation of the state and national politics more generally is necessary. 
Donors’ relationships with a recipient government need to be seen within their national 
context in order to fathom the multitude of institutions impacting on the relationship. To do 
so, I investigate collective memories of the socio-political history of a country in order to 
analyse how donor-recipient relationships are situated within political legacies of national 
politics. In developed as well as developing countries, states and societies are in a recursive 
relationship of mutual engagement, constitution and transformation.110 The state exists in a 
conflictual context within which a mix of social organisations struggle for survival and access 
to power. Theorists have argued that the state is imbricated in this struggle and competes to 
maintain social control and create the conditions for domination.111 This struggle is more 
apparent in those developing countries where the state is relatively weak.112 In weak states, 
state domination continues to be challenged by social groups and governments need to 
secure the legitimacy of their rule through alliances with strong societal movements. Such 
alliances define the political realities of the public realm and explain particular forms of 
political clientelism that exist in developing states. They have an impact on the prospects of 
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institutional reform, whenever institutional reform is not underpinned by strong societal 
coalitions that can make changes sustainable. In other words, externally promoted reform 
initiatives are unlikely to be successful whenever donors pressure the recipient government 
for institutional reforms that lack strong societal support.  
2 . 3 . 1  T h e  P u b l i c  R e a l m  
Politics take place in the public realm. Political theorists have long distinguished between the 
public and the private realm to delimit the scope of politics. “One of the essential qualities of 
what is political, and one that has powerfully shaped the view of political theorists about their 
subject-matter, is its relationship to what is ‘public’.”113 Although neither the public nor the 
private realm are fixed in time or space, understanding what constitutes the public realm in a 
particular context helps to understand what constitutes politics. Yet, conventional political 
theory has usually focused on the public sphere as arising from bourgeois society originating 
in the European Middle Ages.114 Theorists have conceptualised the public realm as the sphere 
of discourse in which citizens shape and voice public opinion, directed at the state and its 
institutions. In this line of thought, the public realm is where participatory politics 
originate.115 However, little attention has been directed towards decolonisation as having a 
decisive effect on the state, society and the public realm in post-colonial states. This Peter 
Ekeh’s point. He argues that enduring legacies of colonialism have resulted in prevailing 
distortions of many African states.  
In most African countries, colonialism marked a “re-invention of social formations” 
that have endured until this day.116 Despite the resilience of certain pre-colonial social 
formations and traditions, which continue to influence political relations, the character of 
contemporary African politics has been shaped by colonialism and socio-political reactions to 
it.117 In these terms, colonialism was an arena for hegemonic contestations in which the 
colonising elite and the colonized elite traded ideologies or justificatory theories of 
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legitimisation in their struggle for supremacy. In their struggle for independence, African 
political elites sought to challenge the colonisers’ legitimation ideologies in two ways. For 
one, they needed to justify the replacement of foreign personnel during the liberation period. 
Second, they had to legitimate the hold of the emerging ruling classes on state power in the 
post-colonial period. In addition, discrediting and sabotaging the colonial regime by strikes, 
tax evasion and insubordination to colonial authority became strategies in the fight for 
independence. They were perceived as acts of heroic and worthy emulation. The immediate 
effect was to make the citizen believe that rights were far more important than duties.  
What is more, hegemonic contestations resulted in the creation of two public 
spheres: a ‘primordial public’ and a ‘civic public’.118 On the one hand is the primordial public, 
which is “closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments and activities which 
nevertheless impinge on public interest” to the extent that these groupings influence 
individuals’ public behaviour. The major constituents of this public are ethnic, communal 
and hometown development associations who owed their origins to the alienating nature of 
the colonial state and its failure to provide basic welfare and developmental needs. The 
primordial public functioned as an “exit site” for those who felt alienated from the state as 
well as a parallel or “shadow state” that provided public goods and services through self-help 
efforts and resources corruptly and criminally expropriated from the state.119 In contrast, the 
civic public, “historically associated with the colonial administration”,120 has become 
identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. The two publics are characterised by 
very different relationships with moral principles. In the primordial public, the moral 
principles of the private realm continue to act as imperatives in the public sphere. “The civil 
public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private 
realm and in the primordial public.”121 This is to say that there is a discontinuity of moral 
principles between the social order and the state in African states. 
Liberation legitimation strategies also included discrediting tradition as a basis of 
legitimacy in order to disperse rival claims of traditional authorities, whenever they could not 
be co-opted into the new system. In addition, post-colonial elites drew on elements of ethnic 
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domain-partition ideology to exploit these as a basis for claiming power. It has been pointed 
out that this was not only a top-down approach but also a bottom-up reaction.122 These 
activities of ‘voluntary ethnic association’ have been termed ‘tribalism’.123 In other words, as a 
result of decolonisation, the state in post-colonial countries is situated in a context of 
institutional multiplicity, where traditional, post-colonial and ‘tribal’ institutions shape 
national politics in various and sometimes conflictual ways. 
2 . 3 . 2  C l i e n t e l i s m  a n d  P a t r o n a g e  P o l i t i c s  
While Ekeh’s concept of the two publics in post-colonial states has gone largely unnoticed, 
the post-colonial state in Africa more generally has been the subject of many studies and has 
been described in many different ways.124 In particular, scholars have focused on the hybrid 
political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with and 
suffuse, rational-legal institutions.125 The modern state has thus been described as ‘neo-
patrimonial’ to draw attention to how the resources of the modern state are captured by 
personal or private networks in the hands of dominant patrons.126 The prefix ‘neo’ indicates 
that there is a hybrid character of the patrimonial states in Africa today: the most important 
parts of the patronage system are illegal and clash with the formal structure of the state. The 
mechanisms of patrimonialism are in conflict with, and frequently challenged by, formal 
commitments to ‘legal-rational’ or bureaucratic state operation. 
The term patrimonial derives from Max Weber’s concept of patrimonial authority. In 
a patrimonial state, all resources are at the discretion of the ruler. Although he is bound by 
custom, the ruler can show a high degree of arbitrariness in his use of resources, decision-
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making and dealings with his subjects.127 Weber distinguished patrimonial authority from 
rational-legal authority, in which the public realm is carefully distinguished from the private 
realm. Clientelistic relationships diffuse the idealised juxtaposition between what is public and 
what is private. Whenever the state is weak and governments dependent on coalitions with 
different fractions of society to uphold their rule, patterns of clientelistic politics persist, in 
which alliances and support are traded for resources.128 These resources include the power to 
allocate rents, provide services, determine policies and their beneficiaries, and to allocate 
bureaucratic positions.129 Because of this, the flow of information is not determined by 
efficiency concerns, it is rather used as an instrument of control and influence.  
Allocations of particularistic advantages have long been the subject of academic 
investigations, across different disciplines. Economists have focused on rent-seeking and 
related it to the scope and range of government activity in the market economy.130 Political 
scientists have debated different aspects of corruption, defined as a “behaviour which 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains”.131 Political sociologists have engaged with 
the analysis of clientelism which is a study of relationships of power between patrons and 
clients.132 Patron-client relationships may not be corrupt, unless a patron occupies a public 
position or extracts favours from those in public positions to service the personal ties of 
reciprocity with his clients.133 In Latin America, clientelistic relationships are often referred to 
as prebendalismo. The term prebendalismo comes from the Latin word præbenda, which originally 
denoted an endowment given to a member of the clergy. Max Weber speaks of prebendal 
more generally to denote the endowment of non-heredity sinecures to uphold personal 
relations.134 Prebendalismo denotes politics where an office in the bureaucracy of the state is 
granted in return for favours or political loyalty. 
                                                 
127  Weber’s classic studies on the subject compare pre-industrial states in Europe and Asia, not in Africa. However, the 
notion of a patrimonial state as a concept is not restricted to any particular region. Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).   
128  For an overview of the different discussions, see Paul Hutchcroft (1997): "The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact 
of Rents, Corruption, and Clientelism on Third World Development", in: Political Studies, XLV: 639-658. 
129  Roger Tangri (1999): The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals, Privatization, and Private Enterprise. Oxford: James Currey.   
130  James Buchanan (1980): "Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking", in: James Buchanan, et al. (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-
Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A & M Press; Anne Krueger (1974): "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society", in: The American Economic Review, 64 (2): 291-303. 
131  Joseph Nye (1989): "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis", in: Arnold J. Heidenheimer, et al. 
(eds.), Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books: 966. See also the discussions in James C. 
Scott (1972): Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; Robin Theobald (1990): Corruption, 
Development and Underdevelopment. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
132  James C. Scott (1977): "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South-East Asia", in: Steffen W. Schmidt (ed.), 
Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
133  John Waterbury (1973): "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," in: World Politics, 25 (4): 533-555. 
134  Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck): 727. The concept of ‚prebends’ was popularized in 1987 by Richard Joseph. “A prebend is an office of state 
which an individual procures either through examinations or as a reward for loyal service to a lord or ruler.” Richard A. 
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However, recognising that particularistic favours play an important role in neo-
patrimonial states, I argue against a cultural explanation of clientelism and patronage 
politics.135 Much rather, clientelism and patronage politics are part of the tool-kit of strategies 
that individual actors have learned to employ in order to pursue their goals and to ensure 
their political survival. Socio-political histories and collective memories help to explain 
current political networks. They can be used as an indicator to where informal political 
processes might be in conflict with or challenged by formalised institutions of the state.   
2 . 3 . 3  S t a t e  D o m i n a t i o n  
The state has been the subject of continuous academic interest. Among the first social 
scientists to take up the subject of the state were the early political economists: Marx and his 
disciples.136 Marxian writing has stressed the importance of class structures within a society 
and focused on the economic interests that structure societal tensions and conflict. Marxian 
structuralism has established the notion of social groups, classes, which largely shape 
individuals’ political and economic calculations. Backed by these assumptions, structuralists 
view the state as an object manipulated by competing classes and class fractions.137 In these 
analyses, the state is generally treated as dependent on, or as a product of, the interests of the 
dominant class or on power struggles between classes.  
Another branch of historical and comparative social science is based on the writings 
of early German sociologists.138 Historical sociologists describe the state as a set of 
organisations which possess the legal and administrative authority to make binding decisions 
over its subjects and over all action taking place in the territorially defined area of 
                                                                                                                                               
Joseph (1987): Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 55.56.  
135 Some authors have argued that cultures in transitional societies often do not incorporate the skills required for the 
operation of complicated state bureaucracies, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1965): "Social Structure and Organizations", in: 
James G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally: 142-193; Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1974): Creating 
Efficient Industrial Administrations. New York: Academic Press. 
136  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848): Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei. London: Burghard; Karl Marx (1872): Das 
Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Hamburg: O. Meissner. 
137  Using such an approach, they have accounted for the historical transformation from feudalism to capitalism, discussed 
possible sources of variation in government among and within modes of production, and clarified the relationship 
between the policies of modern democratic governments and capitalist interests. Immanuel M. Wallerstein (1974): The 
Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press; Barrington Moore (1966): Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord 
and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press; Perry Anderson (1974): Lineages of the Absolutist State. 
London: NLB; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1992): Capitalist Development and 
Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
138  Most dominantly Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. 
C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); Otto Hintze (1909): Historische und politische Aufsätze. Berlin: Verlag Dt. Bücherei; Georg Simmel 
(1892): Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie. Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt. Today, most 
modern scholars who offer academic definitions of the state draw heavily on the notions of Max Weber. 
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jurisdiction.139 The emphasis here is on the recourse to coercion which Weber termed the 
‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ of the state. Historical sociology has 
proved useful in tracing the development of the ‘modern’ state,140 or of focusing on the 
degree of ‘stateness’ – how strong or weak the state is with respect to its infrastructural 
power.141  
The state’s ability to define and uphold the ‘rules of the game’ of the political arena is 
key to understanding national politics. As much as different fractions of society challenge and 
oppose each other in their quest power and resources, they might challenge the state’s 
primacy to define the very delimitations of the arena. Some scholars have conceptualised the 
degree of ‘strength’ of a state according to the state’s capabilities to regulate social 
relationships, penetrate society, extract and use resources.142 For the purpose of this research, 
I understand state power in its minimalist definition as the capacity of a state to legitimate its 
domination of society.143 My aim is merely to investigate whether the state’s domination of 
Ghanaian and Bolivian society is strong enough to ensure political stability, at least in the 
short run.  
2 . 4  S t a t e - S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  
Research on state rule and domination inevitably requires a look at the perpetual struggles 
between rulers and the ruled, at the never-ending cycles of concentration and fragmentation, 
usurpation and legitimation.144 The state and national politics are closely linked to the way in 
which the state is embedded in society and to how society interacts with the state at the 
national level. How does political participation take place? The discussion of political 
participation is closely tied to the concept of civil society – both from an academic and from 
                                                 
139  This is Weber’s definition of the state, see Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, 
Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
140  Charles Tilly (1975): The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Reinhard 
Bendix (1978): Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press; Michael Mann (1986): 
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141  J. P. Nettl (1968): "The State as a Conceptual Variable", in: World Politics, 20 (4): 559-592; Bertrand Badie and Pierre 
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142  Joel S. Migdal (1988): Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
143  See Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (1994): "State Power and Social Forces: On Political Contention and Accommodation 
in the Third World", in: Joel S. Migdal, et al. (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third 
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 293-326. 
144 Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck); Reinhard Bendix (1960): Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press: 285-468. 
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a practitioner’s point of view. The question is who participates in national policy-making, and 
the answer has implications for democratic politics as well as for development cooperation 
more broadly. The link between notions of civil society and democratic theory is problematic 
because it results in a normative definition of civil society. Very often, civil society is 
conceptualised as contributing towards democratisation and democratic consolidation.145 In 
many ways, such a definition does not help to understand societal dynamics and the 
interaction between the state and society. Nonetheless, civil society has become a key term in 
the political discourse and interaction between aid donors and recipient governments, 
affecting the very way in which state-society relationships are constructed. In many 
developing countries, the number of non-governmental organisations has grown 
exponentially because external funding opportunities increased.146 Even transnationally, 
developed and developing countries’ organisations are increasingly cooperating. Yet, the 
definition of what constitutes civil society remains ambiguous and understandings of who 
forms part of one country’s civil society abound.147  
It can be argued that the concept of civil society dates back to classical political 
thinkers like Adam Smith, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Alexis de Tocqueville. They 
developed the notion that civil society is an intermediate sphere between the private and the 
political realm. It consists of voluntary associations that are sustained by an informal culture 
of self-organization and cooperation.148 Nonetheless, the concept of civil society has only 
recently sprung to the forefront of political dialogue and academic writing – notably since the 
early 1980s when civil society organisations came to be recognised as the drivers of 
democratic transitions, particularly in Eastern Europe.149 Today, ‘civil society’ occupies an 
important territory in democratic theory.150 What is more, donors in development 
cooperation tend to perceive societal engagement with the state in these terms: civil society 
participates in national policy-making and consolidates democracy in the process. While such 
a simplistic understanding does not help to understand the multifaceted nature of state-
                                                 
145 Robert D. Putnam (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1992): Capitalist Development and Democracy. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. The argument is further developed in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Björn 
Wittrock (eds.) (1998): Participation and Democracy, East and West: Comparisons and Interpretations, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
146 United Nations Development Programme (1993): Human Development Report 1993: People's Participation. New York: UNDP. 
147 It is not my aim here to elaborate on the academic debate but rather to look at perceptions among practitioners. For the 
academic debate, see Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, et al. (eds.) (2005): The Handbook of Political Sociology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Ronald N. Jacobs (2003): "Toward a Political Sociology of Civil Society", in: Betty Dobratz, 
et al. (eds.), Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 12: Political Sociology of the 21st Century. Oxford: Elsevier Science: 19-47; 
Laurence Whitehead (2002): Democratization: Theory and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 65-89. 
148  Compare John Ehrenberg (1998): "Beyond Civil Society", in: New Politics, 6 (4): 1-5. 
149  Wolfgang Merkel and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (1999): Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie. Transformationen, Erfolgsbedingungen, 
Entwicklungspfade. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
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society relationships in developing countries, it can have far-reaching implications for the way 
in which state and society engage in an aid-dependent context. Recipient governments are 
unlikely to take externally enforced civil society participation serious if societal movements 
do not succeed in pressuring the government into following up on their promises of 
inclusion.   
2 . 4 . 1  D i r e c t  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  v e r s u s  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
D e m o c r a c y  
The idea of political participation as a motor for democratic consolidation is underpinned by 
the realisation that representative institutions alone are insufficient to guarantee the exercise 
of the will of the people. The term ‘representative democracy’ merely denotes the logistical 
aspect of it, namely that representatives instead of the populace actively participate in the 
deliberation process. Representative democracy is often equated with liberal democracy, 
although they are not necessarily the same. The term ‘liberal democracy’ stresses the fact that 
the state adopts a laissez-faire doctrine on most aspects of civil life.151 Another term is 
‘deliberative democracy’ which stresses that deliberation not only takes place in parliament, 
but also through various other channels. Empirically, all existing democracies combine 
aspects of several theoretical approaches. Besides a few exceptions like Switzerland, where 
issue-based referendums are common, few democracies make heavy use of plebiscites in the 
regular decision-making process. Generally, the elected government, in particular the 
executive, decides on every-day politics on behalf of the electorate.  
Marxist theorists have attacked the idea of representative democracy as wrongly 
representing societal truths. A democratic government might claim to be acting on behalf of 
the citizens. In reality, however, it is dominated by the ruling elite, who holds particular class-
based or otherwise originating interests that do not represent the majority of the 
population.152 From the late nineteenth century onwards, many European theorists expressed 
increasing concern with the feasibility of democratic politics in existing societies. While 
marxists worried about class domination of politics, others – like Max Weber – became 
increasingly concerned with the domination of politics by large-scale bureaucracies.153 Thus, 
                                                 
151  The only justification to intervene is to prevent ‘harm’ to any citizen, according to Mill. The underlying conviction of this 
approach is that no one can know what is good for someone else. Any intervention of the state to do something ‘good’ is 
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153  Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
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the vision of democracy became much more restricted to choosing representative decision-
makers and controlling their excesses as much as possible.  
There is an inevitable tension between democracy and bureaucracy – where elected 
officials and appointed civil servants take decisions en lieu of a popular plebiscite for the sake 
of efficiency. This tension has been of concern in political thought for a long time. Already in 
1864, the French theorist Alexis de Tocqueville warned that, on behalf of the demos, the 
public administrator would come to dominate the public sphere and threaten individual 
freedom.154 This happens because the Greek idea of polis cannot be sustained in modern 
society, where small city republics have been replaced by states with a large number of 
citizens. John Stuart Mill noted that, in these big numbers, people cannot participate “in any 
but some very minor portions of the public business.”155 The question is: How can the 
requirements of participation in public life, which create the basis for democratic control of 
the governors, be reconciled with the requirements of skilled administration in a complex 
mass society?  
Proponents of direct democracy argue that a resignation to the limitations posed by 
societal differences is not necessary. Alongside with representative democratic institutions, 
mechanisms of direct participation at the national level can ensure that the elected 
government is aware of the will of the people. Even when the ruling elite’s interests conflict 
with the will of the majority of the population, participatory processes would make it easier 
for the citizens to be heard and harder for the government to ignore them. In other words, 
one of the main arguments in favour of participatory mechanisms is that they consolidate 
democratic institutions by better representing societal interests.156 Such an argument requires 
a closer look at the institutions of a representative democracy and at existing channels of 
participation. Even in representative democracies, various channels exist through which 
citizens can influence the government and turn the decision-making process to their favour, 
formally and informally. 
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2 . 4 . 2  C h a n n e l s  o f  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
D e m o c r a c y  
In a representative democracy, parliament is the main forum to act as the centre of debate, 
with elected representatives as participants. At the same time, electoral competition is 
thought of as a means to harness leadership qualities with intellect for the benefit of the 
electorate. The original idea was that representative democracy can combine accountability to 
the people with professionalism and expertise in order to make governing more efficient.157 
Any citizen can either vote for particular candidates or decide to run for a political position, 
as a party member or as a stand-alone candidate. As long as competition between candidates 
exists, a citizen’s choice for the platform of one or the other candidate is considered an 
expression of his or her political will. Candidates thus aggregate the will of a group of voters 
and represent their interests in the political process, as expressed in the candidate’s or party’s 
campaigning platform. Political scientists usually distinguish between the active right to elect 
a representative and the passive right to be elected.  
Yet, even though elections are the most common way of participating in democratic 
politics, representative democracies allow for several other channels of political participation. 
Indeed, key aspects of political participation take place informally.158 They can take the form 
of collective action through interest groups and non-governmental actors’ lobbying. Political 
participation also materialises through individuals’ engagement in community affairs and 
through contacts with traditional leaders, religious figures, business leaders or other 
influential figures, even where these do not hold official positions in the formal hierarchy of 
the state. Lastly, participation also takes place when citizens express disapproval of their 
government’s politics outside of, and in opposition to, established institutional structures. 
Social protest, even outbursts of street protests, are an important means the populace has to 
engage with government’s political decision-making.159  
Even though the expression of the general will in a representative democracy will can 
only happen at the moment of an election, many decisions need to be made throughout a 
governments’ term that are much more concrete and technical than party platforms. From 
very early on, stakeholders have therefore formed issue-specific groups that try to enter into 
contact with politicians and public officials in order to affect the outcomes of these 
                                                 
157  John Stuart Mill (1951): "Considerations on Representative Government", in: H. Acton (ed.), Utilitarianism, Liberty and 
Representative Government. London: J.M. Dent & Sons: 239-240. 
158  Stephen Bennett and Linda Bennett (1986): "Political Participation", in: Samuel Long (ed.), Annual Review of Political Science 
No. I. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
159  For a discussion of different forms of participation, see Joan M. Nelson (1987): "Political Participation", in: Myron Weiner 
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decisions.160 An interest group is a formally organized group of voluntary members who 
share a common political goal, which they try to communicate to decision-makers through a 
variety of means.161 The most common types of interest groups are economic associations, 
but any non-governmental organisation (NGO) can be referred to as an interest group as 
well, since actors have founded the NGO to further a particular common interest. Interest 
groups pool financial and political resources of its individual members and coordinate joint 
actions that seek to influence policy-makers. Indeed, this reference to policy-making is what 
distinguishes this type of insider lobbying from other channels of participation. Instead of 
ignoring or aiming at abolishing the existing political system, interest groups lobby decision-
makers for particular policies within the existing political framework.    
Aside from interest groups that use insider channels to influence policy-making, 
several primordial social networks exist in Bolivia. Unlike non-governmental organisations, 
these networks have not been created in response to a governmental demand or an inviting 
opportunity to wield political influence. Rather, these traditional forms of social institutions 
have survived the changes of political organisation and continue to play an important role in 
the social organisation of collective action in today’s political system. Because of this, 
governments have tried to accommodate them by creating institutions within the democratic 
state that acknowledge the importance of primordial institutions and networks. At the same 
time, these institutions assure the primordial forms of collective action a voice within the 
democratic system. In the discussion around civil society associations, social scientists often 
exclude social groups based on affective ties of blood, marriage, residence, clan and ethnicity 
from the definition of civil society, arguing they constitute part of the primordial rather than 
the civic public realm. However, in terms of informal channels of policy influencing, the basis 
on which these social networks are formed is not relevant. I argue that it is their reference to 
the state and to the political system that matters. The public realm becomes civic as soon as 
such networks address the workings of the existing political system.  
Probably the most visible form of collective action to influence politics are protest 
movements. Unlike the previous types, movements do not enter into direct contact with 
governmental decision-makers and rely on outside lobbying techniques. Through public 
campaigns, other forms of communication and street protest, they try to convey their 
demands to elected officials. Moreover, this signal gains in importance if social movements 
                                                 
160  For an early discussion, see Alexis de Tocqueville (1966): Democracy in America. 1st perennial classics, New York: Harper & 
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can appeal to public opinion and sway citizens outside of the movement to adopt the 
position of the protestors.162 Social movements are qualitatively different from the other 
groups mentioned. First, social movements are seen as based on networks of informal 
interaction between organisations, groups and individuals. A single organisation is not a 
social movement, nor is a single protest event. Secondly, the construction of collective 
identity is an important aspect of social movement activity. Thirdly, social movements engage 
in collective action in social conflicts with other actors, including institutions and counter-
movements.163 Some authors distinguish between progressive and non-progressive social 
movements. In such an understanding, progressive movements aim to include a particular 
section of society in the political sphere while non-progressive movements aim to exclude.164 
For the purpose of this research, such a distinction is not very helpful. Identity formation 
treads a thin line between inclusion and exclusion and both actions are not mutually 
exclusive.  
It is through these formal and informal channels of democratic participation that the 
state and society interacts. I argue that channels of participation are the most useful 
categories to analyse civil society organisations and their impact on democratic politics. 
Theorists of civil society often distinguish different societal groups according to the thematic 
origin of collective action.165 Yet, in terms of informal channels of policy influencing, the 
basis on which these societal organisations are formed is key to their impact on democratic 
politics. What matters is the way in which they engage with the state and the political system.  
2 . 5  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  T w o  
There has been a tendency to view institutions as ‘perpetual motion machine’ – once in place, 
they create cultural politics so that actors adhere to them. Such assumptions are particularly 
present in theories of democratisation: what institutions need to be established, or to be in 
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place, to establish or consolidate democracy?166 I am concerned that such approaches have 
blurred analysts’ understanding of informal processes and real politics – as interesting as 
institutional design questions might be for political theory. Instead, I argue that social 
constraints do matter. I do not conceptualise institutions as deterministic for individual and 
organisational action. Rather, they shape the playing field in which interaction takes place. At 
the same time, human interaction within this playing field reaffirms or challenges existing 
institutions. Furthermore, particular forms, procedures or symbols fulfil ‘functions’ for the 
system.167 That does not explain how they came about, but it explains their success and 
relative persistence.  
In order to investigate in what ways donors’ attempt to foster ownership affects 
political change in recipient countries, it is necessary to analyse the social and political 
circumstances in which donor-recipient relationships take place. I argue that the fit between 
formalised institutions and informal political processes in developing countries is sometimes 
quite loose, building on Ekeh’s argument of the ‘two publics’. I want to show with my 
research that this loose fit is partly a result of donors’ influence on policy formulation and 
that the channels of accountability and representation get changed as a function of the 
politics of development cooperation with recipient governments. Because of their relative 
influence at the macro-political level, donors can be important stakeholders in the 
determination of formal arrangements of the state, the formalised institutions. Yet, they are 
not part of the wider social environment within the recipient country, and thus do not 
determine tacit social norms and moral templates, the informal political processes. As a 
result, formalised institutions and informal political processes often diverge. In an aid-
dependent country, politics are profoundly affected by external actors and external social 
institutions, while the social circumstances in the country itself remain equally important. My 
aim is to show that donor influence systematically produces such divergences, whenever 
informal political processes are ignored by external policy-makers. In particular, I  investigate 
in part two how clientelism, bureaucratic functioning and hegemonic structures within the 
state affect donor efforts to reform the public administration of a recipient. Understanding 
country specific state-society relationships, in turn, are crucial for the success of donors’ 
efforts to encourage civil society participation in national policy-making, as will be 
demonstrated in part three. 
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C H A P T E R  3   –  D E V E L O P M E N T  
C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  P E R S P E C T I V E   
 Chapter three is devoted to explaining the modalities of donor-recipient cooperation at the 
country level, while paying particular attention to donors’ harmonisation efforts by means of 
the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) and the donor-recipient negotiations involved. 
To understand how in-country cooperation works, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
evolution of international development cooperation more generally. Cooperation 
programmes and the prominence of poverty reduction strategies can only be understood in 
the context of global debates and past developments. It is key that shortcomings of the 
structural adjustment era prompted the World Bank to reorient its development discourse 
and to reformulate its policy goals. Besides ‘sustainable growth’ and ‘development’, ‘pro-poor 
policies’ and ‘enabling institutions’ now feature prominently in the Bank’s and in other 
donors’ discourse. On an operational level, the World Bank and other bilateral donors have 
come to argue that reform progress can only be sustainable if it is backed by recipient 
governments once international donors phase out their funding. This has been termed 
‘ownership’. Donors want the recipient government, and ideally society, to feel in charge of 
supported reforms and recognise them as in their own interest. This debate around 
ownership is key to my research question. More than most other debates it serves to illustrate 
the mismatch between the donors’ perception of existing political systems and the political 
reality on the ground. Despite the evident paradox that surrounds the ownership debate, it 
has triggered donor efforts to harmonise their efforts in order to increase recipient 
ownership. The poverty reduction strategy papers are a central element of these donor 
harmonisation efforts.  
The first attempts to harmonise donor interaction with recipient governments were 
the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) of the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework. They set the stage for harmonised efforts 
regarding the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief initiative proposed by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under the initiative, bilateral 
donors committed themselves to waiving bilateral debts in addition to multilateral debt relief 
if and where recipient countries complete the requirements of the HIPC initiative. Within the 
framework of the second round of HIPC, recipient governments had to formulate a PRSP to 
outline their pro-poor, long-term development strategy. The PRSP became an important 
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anchor point for donor harmonisation. In an unprecedented way, multi- and bilateral donors 
coordinated among themselves within the framework of the poverty reduction strategy paper 
(PRSP) formulation at the country level. Even though the IMF proposed the PRSP, all multi- 
and bilateral donors collectively recognised it as the basis for further interaction with 
recipient governments. In that respect, the PRSP initiative can be compared to structural 
adjustment in that it provides a framework of cooperation upon which many bilateral donors 
model their cooperation programmes. This is even more evident in terms of debt relief; once 
a highly indebted poor country has reached the completion point of the IMF initiative, 
substantial amounts of bilateral debt are usually also waived.168 These are the most prominent 
examples of donor harmonisation globally, and harmonisation continues in several sectors at 
the country level with so-called sector-wide approaches (SWAPs). However, the question is: 
what exactly is being harmonised and do recipient governments actually benefit from such 
harmonisation? In this chapter, I trace donor harmonisation efforts at the country level in 
order to show how they affect donor-recipient relationships as well as the perception of 
existing political systems versus the political reality on the ground. 
As I explained in chapter one, I have picked two case study countries – Bolivia and 
Ghana – that are relatively similar in terms of recipient criteria, albeit very different as 
countries. I do this to analyse in how far donors adapt their principles and guidelines to very 
different country contexts. In terms of recipient criteria: the levels of aid to Bolivia and 
Ghana are more or less the same,169 with roughly similar net percentages of aid as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP).170 Both Ghana and Bolivia had become 
structural adjustment role models in the 1980s, based on their economic recovery 
programmes. By 2005, both countries continued to be ‘donor darlings’. They were likely pilot 
countries for new international initiatives, such as the World Bank’s CDF. Both countries 
were early HIPC countries and both countries’ governments developed a PRSP to be eligible 
for debt relief. Both Ghana and Bolivia were on the edge of being classified as aid dependent 
countries, with aid as a percentage of the GDP oscillating around 10 percent throughout the 
past decade.171 In the following section, I trace Bolivia and Ghana’s history as aid recipients 
and explain the aid strategies of both countries’ multi- and bilateral donors. 
                                                 
168  In fact, the Paris Club – which is an informal organisation that represents all major creditor states – have subscribed to the 
‘Cologne terms’ in which they agree to cancel up to 90 percent of a highly indebted poor country’s bilateral debt, once it 
has reached HIPC completion point.  
169  In 2002, Bolivia received US$ 681 million in ODA while Ghana received US$ 653 million.  
170  For Bolivia, the net share of ODA as a percentage of GDP was 8.7 percent, for Ghana it was 10.6 percent in 2002. See 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004): Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid 
Recipients 1998-2002. Paris: OECD. 
171  World Bank (2004): World Development Indicators. CD-Rom, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
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This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I briefly explain the 
history of development cooperation to put structural adjustment, poverty reduction strategy 
papers and debt relief into perspective. In the second and the third section, I trace the history 
of development cooperation with first Bolivia and then Ghana. In both cases, I look at 
official development assistance to both countries and explain how development cooperation 
with Bolivia and Ghana has evolved over time. Building on this, I introduce both countries’ 
PRSP processes as one of the most prominent tools for donor harmonisation. To conclude, I 
open up the analysis for a closer look at harmonisation and ownership questions in relation 
to two particular tools of cooperation that I address in parts two and three of the thesis: 
multi-donor budgetary support and support to civil society participation. 
3 . 1  E v o l u t i o n  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n   
The history of development cooperation since the Second World War serves as a good 
starting point to explain how subsequent approaches to development have evolved.172 Often, 
the features of particular programmes or trends are a result of criticisms levelled at past 
approaches. The table below illustrates the evolving trends of development cooperation 
throughout the past decades:  
Table 2:  Changing Prominent Approaches in Development Cooperation 
Decade Focus 
1950s  decolonisation, financial aid support transitions  
1960s aid to fill the resource gaps in recipient countries’ macro-economy 
1970s aid becomes ‘projectised‘ because donors are disillusioned with the 
capacity of recipient governments, increase in technical assistance 
1980s structural adjustment agenda, the recipient governments agree to 
particular reform agendas as a condition for loans 
1990s support of democratisation (bilateral donors), civil society and political 
institutions (multilateral donors) 
2000s focus on pro-poor policies, harmonised cooperation and government 
ownership (debt relief) 
The above table is a broad simplification but it helps to put different approaches to 
cooperation into perspective and relate them to each other. In reality, these practices overlap 
and have never been limited to one decade only.173 In fact, some previously prominent 
                                                 
172  For a discussion of the different stages of development cooperation over time, see Rehman Sobhan (2002): "Aid as a 
Catalyst: Comments and Debate (II): Aid Effectiveness and Policy Ownership", in: Development and Change, 33 (3): 539-548: 540. 
173  See also David E. Satterthwaite (1999): The Constraints on Aid and Development Assistance Agencies Giving a High Priority to Basic 
Needs. PhD Thesis, Development Studies Institute, London: London School of Economics. 
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methods continue to be employed until today – albeit with a certain disillusionment in terms 
of lack of overall success – such as technical assistance, for example. The timeframe in terms 
of decades is a rough estimate to denote the heyday of a particular approach. Generally, every 
method or practice was developed because practitioners were disappointed with the previous 
form of cooperation and were aiming at rectifying its deficiencies. The following sections 
discuss each one in greater detail.  
3 . 1 . 1  F r o m  G a p - F i l l i n g  t o  T e c h n i c a l  A s s i s t a n c e  
During the early days of development cooperation, aid was a foreign policy tool more than 
anything else and explicitly used for foreign policy purposes. It was not considered to be a 
social intervention but rather a technical instrument to achieve economic development and 
security goals. Political links played a major role in establishing development cooperation 
links.174 Development aid was tightly linked to the policies of the bi-polar world. Aid was also 
rooted in the economic and political legacies of colonial history. This was reflected in the 
geographic orientation of aid flows and in the sometimes peculiar groupings of aid recipient 
countries.175 Originally, the World Bank was intended to serve mainly as a financing 
organisation for the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War.176 However, it 
was soon crowded out by the Marshall Plan, which was approved by the US congress in 
1948. Between 1948 and 1953, the US government spent two to three percent of its GDP 
under this initiative, almost entirely on a grant basis.177 This represents three to four times the 
target of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) agreed on in the ‘Monterrey 
Consensus’, and more then ten times the present level of ODA as a percentage of GDP 
given by the US in 2003.178  
                                                 
174  Even though this might still be true today, it is not as explicit as it was during the first two decades after the Second World 
War. Today, development cooperation is usually justified content-specifically: to alleviate poverty, to support 
democratisation, and so on. Some authors argue that today’s security concerns are a major factor in determining 
development policies. Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow and James Putzel (2006): "Policy Arena - Introductory Article: On 
the Discourse of Terrorism, Security and Development", in: Journal of International Development (18): 51-67. 
175  Such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific group linked to the European Union. This group contains all former colonies 
of EU member countries that receive aid by means of EU policy. Sven Grimm and Bettina Woll (2004): "Political 
Partnership with the South", ODI Briefing Paper on 'European Development Cooperation to 2010', May, London: 
Overseas Development Institute.  
176  Kunibert Raffer and H. W. Singer (1996): The Foreign Aid Business: Economic Assistance and Development Co-operation. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 58-70. 
177  This figure excludes military aid. The total magnitude of aid through the Economic Recovery Programme – through 
which the Marshall Plan was implemented – amounted to US $ 13.2 million, US $ 21 million including military aid. David 
A. Baldwin (1985): Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 321. 
178  The Monterrey Consensus was established at the International Conference on Financing for Development that took place 
in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2003. At the conference, developed countries reaffirmed the objective to make 0.7 percent of 
their GDP available as official development assistance to developing countries. United Nations (2002): "Report of the 
International Conference on Financing for Development", A/CONF.198/11, 18-22 March, Monterrey. During the past 
few years, total ODA net from the US was around 0.2 to 0.5 percent.  
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The Marshall plan had strong effects on North-South relations because its success 
made people perceive it as a promising model for cooperation on a global scale. Keynes’ 
proposition that the availability of capital determined growth, which in turn was needed to 
improve poverty and inequality indicators, was generally accepted.179 Aid during the 1950s 
and 1960s was largely intended to fill the resource gap in the recipient country’s macro-
economy.180 During the early stages, such gap-filling aid often took the form of construction 
projects like roads, railways and power stations, which required large sums of money. Over 
time, international donors ceased to regard capital scarcity as a sufficient reason for providing 
financial assistance. More advanced developing countries were able to attract private finance 
and official non-concessionary loans. By the end of the 1960s, it was apparent that political 
obstacles, social customs and adverse traditions could all limit the absorptive capacity for 
capital and constrain economic prospects.181 One inference was that the Third World needed 
a particular form of aid, technical assistance, so as to create the conditions in which capital 
transfers could be utilised effectively.  
3 . 1 . 2  F r o m  T e c h n i c a l  A s s i s t a n c e  t o  A d j u s t m e n t  
L e n d i n g   
Despite all efforts, world poverty and global inequalities continued to increase. Development 
assistance at the time was judged as a failure, especially against the high hopes that it had 
come with. Part of the blame was thrown at recipient government elites for being inefficient 
and for seeking rents instead of fostering development. In 1969, the Commission on 
International Development noted that the “climate surrounding foreign aid programmes is 
heavy with disillusion and distrust.”182 Technical cooperation and technical assistance grew in 
real terms from one eighth of DAC net bilateral ODA in the early 1960s to one third by the 
mid-1980s.183 Factually, this meant that external experts and donor representatives were sent 
to work in a recipient government ministry or implementing agency to assist them with 
‘knowledge transfer’. Aid became ‘projectised’. In the early stages, technical experts advised 
                                                 
179  The economist John Maynard Keynes was very influential at the time. In 1942, he and his colleagues prepared a 
memoranda on an international clearing union, on commodity buffer stocks and plans for relief and reconstruction, which 
influenced the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – albeit along different lines than 
they had planned. Kunibert Raffer and H. W. Singer (1996): The Foreign Aid Business: Economic Assistance and Development Co-
operation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 58-62. 
180  The case was elaborated in the so-called two gap theory: which stresses the savings-investment and foreign exchange gaps 
in developing countries’ economies as the reason for underdevelopment. For the original elaboration, see Hollis Chenery 
and Alan Strout (1966): "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development", in: American Economic Review, 56 (4): 679-733. 
181  Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and Hans W. Singer (1970): Perspectives of Economic Development. Boston: Houghton Mifflin: 34. 
182  Commission on International Development (Pearson Commission) (1969): Partners in Development: Report. New York: 
Praeger Publisher: 4. 
183  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005): Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid 
Recipients: 1960-2003. International Development Statistics CD-ROM, Paris: OECD. 
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governments to plan the development of their economies. This even included the 
preparation of detailed national development plans by expatriates.184 The focus on 
technology transfer for capital projects was underpinned by an emphasis on providing policy 
analysis and management skills.185 Nonetheless, by the end of the 1970s, there was more 
poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy and poor health than ever.186 Unsurprisingly, the quality 
and cost-effectiveness of technical cooperation began to be questioned. Moreover, expatriate 
experts caused local resentment since their fees and expenses were considerably higher than 
the local equivalent and represented a large chunk of an aid project’s budget.  
In the 1980s, the World Bank came to the fore as a centre of intellectual influence in 
development thinking, with many bilateral donors modelling their approaches in accordance 
to the Bank’s. Bilateral aid agencies entered joint funding arrangements with the Bank and 
offered parallel financing of its policy-related programmes. The Bank first signalled the need 
for a reorientation towards policy-oriented economic reform in 1981.187 Increasing debts of 
developing countries also became an issue, including failure in meeting obligations to the 
Bank itself. The initial idea was that struggling countries needed fast-disbursing help with 
meeting their financial obligations to accelerate development. This was linked to policy 
guidance embracing measures to liberalise the supply side of the economy.188 The World 
Bank and the IMF started large-scale programmes of lending where disbursement was tied to 
conditions of institutional reform. Yet it is interesting to note that conditionality did not 
depend primarily on the state of affairs of the recipient country. Rather, studies have shown 
that there was an inverse relationship between the use of conditionality and recipient 
governments’ access to alternative sources of finance. There was an upsurge in conditionality 
in Latin America in the 1980s, after the debt crisis had effectively cut the region off from 
alternative sources of finance. This also explains why there was such a high concentration of 
conditionality in sub-Saharan Africa, where financial difficulties and little access to private 
capital markets prevail. On the other hand, South-East Asia, a region with relatively large 
                                                 
184  Indeed, technical assistance is re-emerging in post-conflict settings like Afghanistan and Iraq, where the external donors 
are heavily involved in the re-establishment of political institutions. For a discussion of donor involvement in state 
reconstruction, see Adele Harmer and Joanna Mcrae (eds.) (2004): "Beyond the Continuum. The Changing Role of Aid 
Policy in Protracted Crises", Humanitarian Policy Group Report No. 18, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
185  Peter Burnell (1997): Foreign Aid in a Changing World. Issues in Third World Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press: 
88. 
186  World Bank (2001): World Development Report 2000/2001 - Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
187  By means of the following publication: World Bank (1981): Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for 
Action. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
188  Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye (1991): Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending. I vols., London: 
Routledge: 32-38. 
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access to alternative financial resources, was targeted with conditionalities to a much lesser 
extent during the 1980s.189  
Over time, criticism arose as to the social costs of structural adjustment. Initially, the 
international finance institutions failed to realise that structural adjustment involves difficult 
choices over the allocation of public expenditure, and that the poorest are usually the least 
able to voice their demands. In that respect, capital inflows “play a crucial political role as 
well as a purely economic one.”190 However, in the early days of structural adjustment lending 
donors did not give much consideration to the necessary political calculations: how to 
console the losers and how to mobilise prospective winners to politically support economic 
reform measures. The lesson learnt from the structural adjustment experience was thus 
threefold for the donors. For one, it created a strong emphasis on pro-poor policies with the 
objective that the poor must not be marginalized and that their voices be heard.191 Also, it 
shifted the emphasis from structurally adjusting the economy to reforming political 
institutions so as to enable economic development. At the same time, the critique provoked 
by conditionality-based lending resulted in a new emphasis on questions of ownership. The 
argument brought forward was that country-owned reform would be sustainable in the long 
run, while conditionality-induced reforms were likely to cease once donors withdraw from 
the scene. These lessons learned led the donor community to emphasise programmes that 
focused more on poverty reduction and political reform, with an emphasis on ownership.  
3 . 1 . 3  F r o m  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  t o  P r o - P o o r  
G o v e r n m e n t  O w n e r s h i p  
In September 1999, the World Bank and the IMF endorsed a new framework to achieve 
what had by then become their core task – sustainable poverty reduction. The new approach 
was reflected both in the World Bank’s Annual Report 2000, and in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2000/2001.192 The Millennium Development conference – which resulted 
in the Millennium Development Goals – and the Monterrey agreements in 2002 further 
institutionalised this approach. By then, poverty reduction had become the primary objective 
of the international development community for financial support to poor countries. Backed 
                                                 
189  The Philippines are one of the few countries that received highly conditional loans, while the conditionality of policy-
based lending in other countries – such as South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand – was low. Ramani Gunatilaka 
and Ana Marr (1998): "Conditionality and Adjustment in South-East Asia and Latin America", in: Tony Killick (ed.), Aid 
and the Political Economy of Policy Change. London: Routledge: 53-84.  
190  World Bank (1990): World Bank Development Report 1990: Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press: 115. 
191  The path breaking document to stress this point was Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers, et al. (eds.) (2000): Voices of the 
Poor. Vol. 3, New York: Oxford University Press. 
192  World Bank (2000): Annual Report 2000. Washington, DC: World Bank. and World Bank (2001): World Development Report 
2000/2001 - Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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by donor countries, the World Bank and the IMF announced a new framework for 
international cooperation, expressed through the CDFs and the PRSPs. According to these 
new concepts, debt relief and concessional loans were to be based on explicit poverty 
reduction programmes, with each country responsible for setting its own plan. This shift 
towards poverty reduction – as opposed to growth –  was a necessary step to re-establish the 
legitimacy of donor engagement that had lost credibility during structural adjustment.  
At the same time, the 1990s saw dramatic political changes that also propelled 
development cooperation into a new direction. The end of the Cold War and the political 
transformations that succeeded it gave rise to hopes that democracies and peace would 
spread all around the globe.193 While multilateral donors started to emphasise civil society 
participation as a means of making economic reform more reflective of citizens’ needs, 
bilateral donors’ cooperation increasingly turned towards the promotion of democratisation 
and good governance. As the international finance institutions are restricted to their 
economic mandate, they cannot directly support democratisation where it is a purely political 
goal. However, the promotion of democratic accountability in fiscal management could be 
perceived as a means of institutional reform that aimed at making aid delivery more efficient 
and economic reform more effective. Similarly, civil society participation, while contributing 
towards democratic responsiveness, was seen as a tool to make economic reform more pro-
poor. Both tools thus neatly served a double purpose: they were necessary institutional 
reform mechanisms to make economic reform sustainable in the long run, while contributing 
to the democratisation of recipient governments. At the same time, the argument for 
institutional reform enabled the World Bank and the IMF to depoliticise its interest in 
democratic accountability and civil society participation.  
A serious side effect of structural adjustment lending was that foreign debt of many 
recipient countries increased significantly. In Africa, for example, the debt to export ratio 
sprung from 91 percent in 1980 to 254 percent in 1994.194 In addition, it became apparent 
that policy reform was much slower than expected. By the mid-1990s, donors and academics 
alike became increasingly convinced that conditionality – of the kind pursued by structural 
adjustment policies – was not working as an incentive to achieve sustainable economic 
                                                 
193  The argument that democratic states do not wage wars against each other is built on Jack S. Levy (1989): "The Causes of 
War: A Review of Theories and Evidence", in: Philip E.  Tetlock, et al. (eds.), Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War. New York: 
Oxford University Press: 224-243; Steve Chan (1997): "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise", in: 
Mershon International Studies Review, 41 (1): 59-91. 
194  Peter Burnell (1997): Foreign Aid in a Changing World. Issues in Third World Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press: 
95. 
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reforms.195 Political leaders proved unwilling to implement the reforms they had committed 
to in order to receive conditionality-based lending. The HIPC initiative that the IMF came up 
with was a new tool to rectify both problems simultaneously. After an initial first round of 
HIPC debt relief, the Enhanced HIPC initiative – HIPC II – required that eligible countries 
produce a PRSP in consultation with their civil society organisations as a means of assuring 
implementation and sustainability. Here, the civil society argument was used with the idea 
that a broad-based national consensus was better able to ensure political will for reforms than 
donor-imposed conditionality. In the words of the World Bank President in his address in 
1997:  
Development requires much too much sustained political will to be 
externally imposed. It cannot be donor-driven. 196 
Conditionality-induced reform measures were slowly being replaced with approaches 
that stressed recipient ownership in order to make reforms sustainable. A major component 
of this reorientation was the donors’ attempt to harmonise their assistance in order to free 
the recipient government’s scarce development management resources and to make aid more 
predictable. 197 The PRSP became a major vehicle of these donor harmonisation efforts. The 
intention was not only to coordinate donor efforts to make them more manageable and 
transparent for the recipient government: the PRSP have now also become a vehicle to 
harmonise donor efforts towards the recipient government’s development agenda. On top of 
the multiple reasons for its original creation, the PRSP have evolved into a central platform 
for donor harmonisation.198   
3 . 1 . 4  T h e  P o v e r t y  R e d u c t i o n  S t r a t e g y  P a p e r s  
The World Bank and the IMF envisaged the PRSP as the “centrepiece for dialogue in all 
countries receiving concessional lending flows from the World Bank and the IMF, [intended 
to be] country driven.”199 This statement exemplifies the donors’ balancing act between 
                                                 
195  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1995): "Development Cooperation, Efforts and Policies of 
the Members of the Development Assistance Committee", 1994 Report, Paris.  
196  James Wolfensohn (1997): "The Challenge of Inclusion", Annual Meeting's Address by the President of the World Bank 
on 23 September, Hong Kong, China. 
197  For example, this was one of the commitments that the donor community made in the Consultative Group Meetings 
following the Helleiner report on improving donor-recipient relationships. Gerald K. Helleiner, Tony Killick, et al. (1995): 
"Report of the Group of Independent Advisers on Development Cooperation Issues Between Tanzania and Its Aid 
Donors", June, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
198  The degree of donor coordination and harmonisation around the PRSP depended largely on individual initiatives on the 
country level. In Ghana, the PRSP harmonisation effect was limited due to the then World Bank representative attempt to 
advocate a hands-off approach.  
199  World Bank (2000): "Fixing ESW: Where Are We?" draft report prepared by Operations Policy and Strategy Group for 
the meeting of the Committee on Development Effectiveness, Washington, DC. 
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promoting local ownership and taking note of aid dependence. The PRSPs were an attempt 
to promote local ownership in an aid dependent context. The inclusion of participation as a 
key element marks a significant departure from the past practices of the World Bank and the 
IMF. An important background series of studies, Voices of the Poor, developed and stressed the 
proposition that civil society participation in national policy formulation helps to achieve 
better pro-poor policies for development.200 The key point of this argument was that civil 
society should be involved in drawing up and monitoring economic policies to ensure a pro-
poor focus. In short, the ideal situation is one where recipient governments decide upon 
economic policies based on broad participation from society at large to ensure their pro-poor 
character. However, though not immediately obvious, the PRSP contains a paradox that 
substantially flaws its design. The recipient country – government and civil society together – 
have to fulfil two requirements that are fundamentally different and possibly contradictory. 
The World Bank and the IMF require that the process of PRSP formulation has to be 
participatory. In other words, it has to take the input of civil society into account. This is a 
methodological conditionality. On the other hand, with respect to content, the PRSP has to be 
a long-term development plan that focuses on poverty reduction. This is a thematic 
conditionality.  
Table 3:  Conceptual Paradox of the PRSP Requirements 
 
If civil society participates at a national level to voice what matters most to them, how can 
the content already be defined? One can imagine many situations in which civil society is 
indeed most concerned with poverty reduction – but that is certainly not a given. Even if the 
PRSP were a government-only strategy, a definition of content (poverty reduction) already 
takes away from the ‘ownership’ an internally originated idea would have had.  
On top of this, a clear definition of who constitutes civil society did not exist, neither 
among donors nor from an academic perspective. Even in its sourcebook for PRSP 
formulation, the World Bank avoided to specify what “broad-based civil society 
                                                 
200  The series comprises three volumes: Deepa Narayan, Raj Patel, et al. (eds.) (2000): Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices of the 
Poor, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press., Robert Chambers, Deepa Narayan, et al. (eds.) (2000): Crying Out for 
Change. Voices of the Poor, Vol. 2, New York: Oxford University Press., and Deepa Narayan and Patti Petesch (eds.) 
(2000): From Many Lands. Voices of the Poor, Vol. 3, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Methodological Conditionality Thematic Conditionality 
Process:  participatory Content:  long-term, pro-poor 
development plan
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participation” means.201 It simply required the individual recipient to come up with a 
definition for its own country context within the framework of the PRSP. This lack of 
definition already is an indication that the content of civil society participation does not 
matter as much as the fact that civil society participation – in whatever shape or form – had 
taken place.  
In sum, the PRSPs had evolved into the major vehicle for donor harmonisation at 
the country level, with the aim of increasing recipient ownership. Yet, on several fronts, the 
donors were unwilling to loose control over the process. Donor-recipient relationships in 
Bolivia and Ghana are an expression of this dilemma, as I will show in the following sections.    
3 . 2  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  B o l i v i a  
By the 1990s, Bolivia had become an ‘aid-dependent’ country. A country’s dependency on aid 
is often measured by the relationship between aid and the country’s GDP.202 I use this proxy 
of aid dependency simply to show that Bolivia currently cannot pursue vital functions of 
government without the help of external donors.  
Table 4:  Aid Intensity in Bolivia 
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201  See the chapter on participation, World Bank (2001): Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook. 2 vols., Washington, DC: The 
World Bank Group: 237-248. 
202  Several scholars have tried to come to terms with the concept of aid dependence and proposed different definitions and 
measures for it. For a good overview of the discussion see R.  Lensink and H. White (1999): "Aid Dependence: Issues and 
Indicators", Expert Group on Development Issues Study No. 2, Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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By 2005, Bolivia was still close to being an aid dependent country, with aid as a 
percentage of the GDP slightly below 10 percent. In 2005, Bolivia was the second largest 
recipient of official development assistance in the Latin America and Caribbean region. 
Between 1989 and 1999, it received an average of US$ 80 per capita per year. Official 
development assistance increased from US$ 480 million (representing 11.4 percent of the 
GDP) to US$ 560 million (6.8 percent of GDP). This was a result of the positive reputation 
Bolivia had gained as a model recipient. Bolivian efforts during the 1980s and 1990s to create 
a positive policy environment for democratic development, economic growth and poverty 
alleviation have been celebrated internationally. So much so, that the international 
development community has highlighted Bolivia as an example of ‘good practice’ for other 
developing countries to follow.203  
3 . 2 . 1  B o l i v i a ’ s  H i s t o r y  a s  a  R e c i p i e n t  
In the early 1950s, Bolivia faced a bankrupt economy and an inability to feed its people after 
the difficulties in agricultural production that followed the National Revolution. The Bolivian 
government thus turned towards the United States to seek financial assistance. In support of 
its plead, it compensated the three biggest American tin owning companies for their loss 
during nationalisation.204 After having signed a minerals purchasing contract with Bolivia, the 
United States government announced a doubling of its previous aid programme and the 
immediate shipment of US$ five million worth of food. By the end of the decade, Bolivia had 
received US$ 100 million of aid from the US – making it the largest single recipient of foreign 
aid in Latin America at the time and the highest per capita in the world.205 On the other hand, 
the United States demanded support for its companies operating overseas. The new 
petroleum code from 1953 enabled some ten oil companies to operate in Bolivia. By 1957, 
Bolivia accepted a US-developed ‘stabilisation plan’ under the auspices of the IMF. The plan 
contained conditionalities regarding the budget, wages, subsidies and the exchange rate that 
were extreme for its time. Economically, the plan was successful but led to a political 
reshuffle in Bolivia. Despite IMF involvement, the United States remained Bolivia’s largest 
donor until the late 1970s. This can partly be explained by economic relations around tin and 
                                                 
203  See, for example: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001): "The DAC Guidelines: Strategies 
for Sustainable Development", International Development, Paris. 
204  Apart from these three, the smaller tin owners were never compensated.  
205  Herbert S. Klein (1992): Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 217-222. 
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later petrol but also because of Bolivia’s geo-political importance in Latin America during the 
Cold War.206  
Table 5:  Official Development Assistance to Bolivia 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
re
al 
ne
t O
D
A
 in
 m
ill
io
n 
19
80
 U
S$
Bilateral Multilateral Total Grants
 
Source: Compiled from data (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2004) 
The situation changed drastically in the early 1980s, when Bolivia was confronted 
with a severe economic crisis and consequent hyperinflation. In 1985, the incoming 
government launched the New Economic Policy, introducing an economic stabilisation 
programme that became the first step in Bolivia’s structural reform agenda. Because of this, 
Bolivia turned into a ‘model’ structural adjustment reformer with a large variety of donors:  
Bolivian investment was always very tied and very dependent on foreign 
assistance – not only from multilaterals but also from bilaterals – which in 
this period was basically a combination of donations and loans: the Japanese, 
American, German cooperation. But then, each time there were more 
donations and fewer loans from the bilaterals, and the multilaterals always 
with long-term loans, with low concessional interest rates, particularly from 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, somehow the 
Fund. But this was more structural adjustment support for determined 
policies.207  
In addition to economic reforms, international aid donors were eager to support Bolivia’s 
process of democratisation, which had equally become recognised as a ‘model’ process. The 
                                                 
206  For a comprehensive account of US-Bolivian relations, see Kenneth D. Lehman (1999): Bolivia and the United States: A 
Limited Partnership. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
207  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004.  
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government’s Law of Popular Participation – passed in 1994 – was a government-owned 
initiative to make political decision-making more decentralised and accountable.  
Although external debt was high during the 1990s, it remained more or less constant, 
at a level of US$ 4 billion. This has only been possible because of various rounds of debt 
forgiveness. Between 1990 and 1997, the Paris Club creditors forgave around US$ 900 
million. With the HIPC I completion point reached in 1998, Bolivia received debt relief of 
US$ 448 million, and another US$ 854 million in 2001 by means of HIPC II.208 Despite all 
this assistance, Bolivia experienced an economic crisis at the beginning of the new 
millennium. A government representative described this as a paradox:  
In Washington, Bolivia is a paradox because it has followed the recipes of 
the Monetary Fund and it is disaster. So, what happened? This is the paradox 
and in reality it is not so paradoxical, because things have been done that 
didn’t make much sense. They were not very close to the Bolivian reality, in 
the Bolivian moment.209  
In other words, government representatives criticised the IMF policies because they did 
respond to a through problem analysis of the Bolivian context. Instead, they were a one-size-
fits-all recipe that ignored some of the intricacies of the Bolivian case, namely the socio-
economic inequalities in the country. Among my interviewees, the unsatisfactory outcome of 
Bolivia’s economic reforms was often cited as a showcase for the mismatch between the way 
in which the IMF perceived the situation in Bolivia and the actual context.  
3 . 2 . 2  A i d  S t r a t e g i e s  o f  D o n o r s  t o  B o l i v i a  
Broadly speaking, three periods of development cooperation can be distinguished since 
Bolivia’s national revolution: US-dominated bilateral cooperation (1952-1985), support 
towards first and second generation reforms since democratisation (1985-1999), and the 
HIPC and PRSP process (since 2000).210 The so-called first generation reforms after Bolivia’s 
transition to democracy in 1985 mainly included structural-adjustment type economic 
reforms. Official development assistance towards Bolivia was highly concentrated on balance 
of payments transfers and the support of IMF-style structural reforms such as the elimination 
of barriers to trade, economic stabilisation through fiscal austerity, and the development of 
                                                 
208  Lykke E. Andersen and Osvaldo Nina (2001): "The HIPC Initiative in Bolivia", in: Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 
21 (2): 343 – 376. 
209  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004.  
210  These periods are based on the three periods developed in George Gray Molina and Gonzalo Chávez (2001): "Technical 
Cooperation and Capacity Development in Bolivia", draft executive summary of the presentation at the second 
roundtable on Reforming Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development, 6 and 7 December, Turin: United Nations 
Development Programme. 
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financial markets.211 Only after 1993 were democratic and social reforms put back on the 
agenda – with the so-called second generation reforms. Official development assistance then 
highly concentrated on institutional reforms, such as privatisation, decentralisation, 
education, and judicial reform. Second generation reforms were intended to remould the 
state and its role in relation to social production as well as the development of new state/civil 
society relations. In the words of the representative of an international non-governmental 
organisation, “The main goal was to dismantle the populist (centralized, bureaucratic, 
inefficient) state, and develop a shared responsibility with civil society for social service 
provision.”212 This statement reflects the hopes that the social reform of the 1990s had 
sparked among external actors. Particularly the Law of Popular Participation was perceived as 
a sign that Bolivia was firmly on the road towards democracy.213  
The second round of the HIPC debt relief initiative required the Bolivian 
government to develop a PRSP in order to be eligible. Bolivia became the first country in 
South America to join the HIPC initiative in 1997. The government elaborated the PRSP 
based on the output of the National Dialogue 2000 – in order to fulfil the required civil 
society consultation element of the initiative.214 The National Dialogue was widely advertised, 
with the hope that this would create a more favourable debt repayment climate and spur 
capital investment. Through the whole period, official development assistance was tightly 
focused on the HIPC II agreement, on the two National Dialogues, as well as on the Bolivian 
Poverty Reduction Strategy – the Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza (EBRP). 
Technical cooperation further increased, with a different relationship between donors, donor 
industry and government.215 This in turn, has led to a perception of donor over-involvement 
and provoked discussions about the ‘ownership’ mandate of such cooperation. In addition, 
increased technical cooperation sharpened a dual bureaucratic structure. The state 
bureaucracy was weakened while a new bureaucracy funded by donor projects evolved.216 A 
key requirement of HIPC funding was long-term (15-year) policy planning and continuous 
                                                 
211  Lykke E. Andersen and Osvaldo Nina (2001): "The HIPC Initiative in Bolivia", in: Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 
21 (2): 343 – 376: 3. 
212  Simon Ticehurst (1998): "Social Policy Reform and Participation in Latin America: The Bolivian Experiment", in: Development in 
Practice, 8 (3): 357-361: 357. 
213  Interview with a donor representative, No. 81, Frankfurt, 6. August 2003.  
214 World Bank (2001): Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook. 2 vols., Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 
215  It is worth noting that absolute levels of technical cooperation increased significantly, as official development assistance 
(ODA) dropped as a proportion of the GDP throughout the decade. Luis Carlos Jemio (2000): "Reformas, Crecimiento, 
Progreso Técnico y Empleo en Bolivia", in: Eduardo Antelo and Luis Carlos Jemio (eds.), Quince Años de Reformas 
Estructurales en Bolivia: Sus Impactos sobre Inversión, Crecimiento y Equidad. La Paz: CEPAL y UCB: 355-396. This has been a 
general trend worldwide, see Peter Hjertholm and Howard White (2000): "Foreign Aid in Historical Perspective:  
Background and Trends", in: Finn Tarp and Peter Hjertholm (eds.), Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and 
Directions for the Future. London: Routledge. 
216  George Gray Molina and Gonzalo Chávez (2001): "Technical Cooperation and Capacity Development in Bolivia", draft 
executive summary of the presentation at the second roundtable on Reforming Technical Cooperation for Capacity 
Development, 6 and 7 December, Turin: United Nations Development Programme. 
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consensus-building. One result was the multi-donor round tables that pooled donor efforts 
under the Bolivian PRSP. As increased local ownership was one of the objectives of the 
PRSP process, these roundtables had adverse effects: they constituted the single most 
influential lobby over domestic policymakers and focused attention on issues that were 
paramount for donor effectiveness. Among such issues were budgeting, reporting, and 
accounting mechanisms, for example, which were not necessarily seen as important for 
government effectiveness as decision-making, participation and inclusion mechanisms. 
Indeed, the Bolivian PRSP process further substantiated an apparent mismatch between the 
way that donors perceived and conceived of Bolivian politics and the way that politics 
actually worked in Bolivia.   
3 . 2 . 3  A c t o r s  i n  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n  i n  B o l i v i a  
Most multi- and bilateral development agencies have country offices, where a number of staff 
are involved in the every day proceedings of cooperation with the recipient country. A 
notable exception is the International Monetary Fund. It usually has a very small country 
office situated in the national central bank, staffed with a resident representative and a small 
number of administrative staff. The IMF’s Washington-based programme officers come on 
so-called missions to meet with the recipient government representatives once or twice a year 
to discuss progress of their cooperation. Unlike the IMF, the World Bank maintains a 
country offices in Bolivia, employing a large number of staff responsible for cooperation 
programmes and projects. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
operates similarly to the World Bank, with a large country office organised around particular 
programmes and projects.  
Besides the international finance institutions, the United Nations system constitutes 
the other big multilateral component in most recipient countries. The resident representative 
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) functions as the country 
coordinator for the whole United Nations (UN) system. Other prominent agencies that 
usually have country offices are the United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) or the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), to name a few. 
Albeit large in terms of programmes and number of staff, the UN agencies’ financial capacity 
is negligible in comparison to the international finance institutions or to big bilateral donors. 
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In 2003, Bolivia received a total of US $ 138.3 million in disbursements from the World Bank 
alone, compared to US $ 7.6 million from the whole UN system.217  
In addition to multilateral organisations, several bilateral donors exist and have 
country offices in Bolivia. In 2005, the nine largest donors were the United States of 
America, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden 
and France. The following table lists the mean total ODA for Bolivia between 1999 and 
2003: 
Table 6:  Official Development Assistance to the Bolivian Public Sector 
Agency Mean Disbursements, 1999-2003 
Multilateral Donors 216.6 
Inter-American Development Bank 92.5 
World Bank 90.1 
European Commission 35.6 
Other Multilateral Donors -1.6 
Bilateral Donors 461.4 
United States 141.1 
Germany 54.3 
Netherlands 49.3 
Japan 44.2 
Spain 29.9 
United Kingdom 26.5 
Denmark 25.6 
Sweden 18.4 
France 15.2 
Other Bilateral Donors 56.9 
TOTAL 678.0 
Note: Total ODA net, disbursements stated in millions of US dollars (2002 prices). 
Source: Own calculation, based on (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2005) 
The figure for other multilateral donors is negative because of current repayments to the 
IMF. Another external actor that does not appear in the above table is the Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF). The CAF is a multinational financial institution of which 
Bolivia is a shareholder. It is not shown because its loans do not conform to the definition of 
official development assistance (concessional in character, with at least a 25 percent grant 
element). Nonetheless, the CAF has evolved into one of Bolivia’s largest creditors towards 
the end of the 1990s. Its mean disbursement for the period 1998-2001 was US $ 77.3 million, 
with US $ 127.3 in 2001 and US $ 278.8 in 2002.218 One reason for such a rise was the 
ongoing economic crisis, during which most donors increased their levels of support. 
                                                 
217  These figures represent total ODA net, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005): Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1960-2003. International Development Statistics CD-ROM, Paris: OECD. 
218  Banco Mundial y Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2003): "Recursos de la Cooperación Internacional 2003-2006", 
Documento de trabajo, La Paz: Banco Mundial y Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. 
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Another reason however was the fact that – after HIPC II debt relief – the CAF had become 
Bolivia’s main external source of new credits. In addition to this, Bolivia also entertained 
policy dialogue with the Organisation of American States (OAS), represented through a 
country office, although the OAS is not a major financial donor. 
On the government side, the Bolivian Vice-Ministry of Public Investment and 
External Finance (VIPFE) deals with the financial aspects of development assistance 
although they are not expected to decide questions of content matter. VIPFE contains an 
external finance division headed by a director. Within this division, work is divided according 
to priority areas. Development planning is usually prepared by the government think-tank 
Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (UDAPE), which is also under the Ministry 
of Interior. Besides requirements that originate from development cooperation, UDAPE 
prepares a variety of economic analyses designed to inform the government’s economic and 
social policy. Furthermore, a Technical Secretariat of the National Dialogue was established 
in 2000 under the Ministry of the Presidency to organise the Bolivian National Dialogue 
2000, which served as the basis for the EBRP.219 In 2000, the government appointed a 
consultant who – with the help of a team from UDAPE – was given the task of elaborating 
the EBRP, based on the conclusions of the National Dialogue 2000.220 In 2003, a new 
Technical Secretariat was created to organise the Dialogue 2003/04 as an exercise to inform 
the revision of the EBRP. In fact, UDAPE had already prepared a preliminary Revised 
EBRP for the consultative group meeting – which are the coordination meetings between the 
recipient government and its major aid donors – in 2003 because of pressures from existing 
funding arrangements.221 However, the donors and several civil society organisations insisted 
that the upcoming National Dialogue 2003/04 inform the full revised EBRP.  
As the PRSP processes gained international prominence, the Bolivian EBRP became 
the central element of donor harmonisation efforts in Bolivia. The engagement between 
donors and government representatives thus mainly concentrated on the above mentioned 
governmental actors: VIPFE, UDAPE and the Technical Secretariat of the National 
Dialogue. To the donors, these entities were easily identifiable and contactable points of 
reference. However, the importance attributed to the EBRP and the National Dialogue by 
the donors was not echoed by government and societal representatives, as I will show in 
chapter seven. The PRSP process in Bolivia serves to illustrate how donor harmonisation 
                                                 
219  For a full account of the National Dialogue 2000, see Secretaría Técnica del Diálogo (2001): "Lucha contra la pobreza: 
Entre la deliberación y el tinku", Memoria del Diálogo 2000, La Paz: Proyecto Diálogo Nacional. 
220  República de Bolivia (2001): "Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza - EBRP", La Paz: UDAPE. 
221  República de Bolivia (2003): "Revisión de la Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza", XV Grupo Consultivo, 
París, 8 y 9 de octubre, La Paz: UDAPE. 
   78
won priority over negotiating politics between national actors and how this further 
contributed to widening the gap between actual and perceived politics in Bolivia.  
3 . 2 . 4  T h e  B o l i v i a n  S t r a t e g y  f o r  P o v e r t y  R e d u c t i o n  
Although the PRSP was a new instrument of international development cooperation, 
development planning was nothing new to the Bolivian government. Before the PRSP, the 
Bolivian Ministry of Economic Development prepared an annual socio-economic plan, the 
General Plan of Socio-Economic Development (PGD). Municipal development planning 
had been institutionalised by popular participation and administrative decentralisation. A 
government representative commented:  
We have everything: 314 municipal development plans and a district 
development plan, a socio-economic development plan and a national 
poverty reduction strategy! 222 
It is thus not surprising that Bolivians unanimously explained the creation of the EBRP as a 
response to donor requirements, not due to the recognition of need for a medium-term 
development framework. A Bolivian government representative reflected on the 
government’s dependence on the donors: 
In essence, in countries like ours that are very attached to the Monetary 
Fund, the real development plan is the macroeconomic framework, each 
time with more involvement in social issues. […] So, they began to get more 
involved in structural adjustment issues and less in strictly financial issues. 
Then came all this issue of HIPC and they asked Bolivia that, if it wanted to 
have access to these resources, it should prepare a poverty reduction 
strategy.223 
The EBRP was quickly regarded as yet another donor document that the government had to 
produce. Despite an extensive civil society consultation process, the EBRP was never 
perceived as a country-owned, or at least a government-owned strategy.  
The first version of the EBRP was formulated under the Banzer/Quiroga 
administration in 2001.224 Prior to this exercise, the government organised the National 
Dialogue 2000 to discuss poverty issues and to deliberate on how to use the HIPC funds. 
                                                 
222  Interview with a government representative, No. 134, La Paz, 22 January 2004. 
223  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
224  Booth provides an insightful analysis of the political context in which the EBRP formulation took place. He points out 
that the PRSP initiative was mainly taken up by Vice-President Quiroga at a time when the ageing President Banzer was 
already terminally ill. See David Booth and Laure-Hélène Piron (2004): "Politics and the PRSP Approach: Bolivia Case 
Study", February, London: PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project, Overseas Development Institute. 
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Later, the National Dialogue became to be perceived as the broad-based consultation to 
inform the EBRP formulation.225 One government representative questioned this account: 
In this dialogue, the distribution of HIPC II resources was discussed, a Law 
of the National Dialogue and a poverty reduction strategy emerged. But […] 
no one talked about the poverty reduction strategy in the dialogue. 
Washington communicates badly. People believe that the EBRP resulted 
from the dialogue. Yet nobody knew that a strategy was going to emerge!226 
Once Quiroga’s administration, which had always been very forthcoming towards the 
donors, was replaced by a new Sánchez de Lozada administration, enthusiasm for the EBRP 
within government ebbed. While Quiroga had always considered cooperation with the 
donors as one of his priorities, Sánchez de Lozada’s platform focused more on private sector 
development than poverty reduction. The donors responded by putting pressure on the 
government: 
When the cooperation realised that the government wasn’t interested in the 
EBRP there was a great uproar. There were meetings between the 
government and the international cooperation where the issue of a poverty 
reduction strategy was put back on the agenda.227 
The EBRP exercise was completed to appease the donors while government 
ownership remained low. A consultant was employed who worked with a team based in 
UDAPE, the government’s think tank. Even though the conclusions of the National 
Dialogue 2000 became one of the inputs into the EBRP, the two processes were not 
perceived as closely aligned:  
The PRSP was done by government consultants. There is no quality control 
by what happened during the dialogue.228 
Many complained that the EBRP was a donor-driven exercise, with little input from society. 
Critics commonly point to the disconnection between National Dialogue and EBRP.229 The 
donors have played their part to widen the gap. 
The donor community in Bolivia played a major role in commenting on the drafts of 
the EBRP. The government’s consultant circulated drafts of the EBRP to the donors who 
                                                 
225  República de Bolivia (2001): "Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza - EBRP", La Paz: UDAPE. 
226  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
227  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
228  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004. 
229  See for example Christian Aid (2002): "Participating in Dialogue? The Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de Pobreza", 
Christian Aid Policy Briefing, January, La Paz; Diana Sánchez and Katherine Cash (2003): "Reduciendo pobreza o 
repitiendo errores? Una critica de la sociedad civil a los Documentos de Estrategia de Lucha contra la Pobreza", 
Stockholm: Diakonia, La Acción Internacional de la Iglesia Sueca, Save the Children Sueca y La Red del Jubileo Sueca. 
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established working groups to comment on it. Indeed, rather than building it on the results of 
the National Dialogue – which were often vague and hard to operationalise – he had made 
sure to include most of the donors comments. As a result, donors and civil society 
representatives had very different opinions on the final EBRP: 
I believe that Bolivia had the bad luck that the international cooperation 
loved the PRSP, but civil society… not only don’t they love it, they hate it.230 
The government position in this was very ambivalent. On the one hand, it had raised 
civil society’s expectations by organising the National Dialogue 2000, having made sure that 
it was a more broad-based consultation process than the National Dialogue 1997. On the 
other hand, Quiroga’s administration had always taken particular care to accommodate the 
donor’s requirements and expectations. More than other HIPC countries, Bolivia had gone 
out of its way to make a consultation process possible, even prior to the formulation of the 
PRSP. Yet, for the completion of the final draft, it deemed the donors’ input more relevant 
than its own consultative processes. So, while donors and civil society were divided about the 
EBRP, government representatives were bitter about who was to blame: 
There is such an extreme separation between the international donors and 
civil society that is very difficult to reconcile. It is fascinating to see the 
reports of the international cooperation because systematically they are 
blaming the government for this.231 
This comes as a surprise if one considers that the government agreed to channel 
monies freed by HIPC debt relief directly to the municipalities. This decision, a consequence 
of the National Dialogue 2000, is in line with the mechanisms of popular participation and 
did not originate with the donors. It was a bold commitment of government at the time that 
made fiscal improvements more difficult, for the sake of responding to societal demands: 
You have to keep in mind that the HIPC resource will not improve the fiscal 
situation of the country. It’s not a resource like HIPC I that is forgiven with 
respect to particular targets, you don’t pay it anymore. In this case, you 
continue paying but instead […] they will give it to the municipalities. […] 
It’s like transforming external to internal debt. Therefore, that fiscal relief 
that people imagine just isn’t there.232 
Instead of freeing debt repayment resources to make them available at the national level, they 
are now being channelled to the municipal level. Nonetheless, Bolivia’s citizens took little 
                                                 
230  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
231  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
232  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
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note of debt relief and poverty reduction initiatives, even when they had participated in the 
round tables of the National Dialogue 2000: 
It’s so pathetic the fact that not even the prefectures knew what the EBRP 
was, after having completed [the dialogue round tables] in the municipalities. 
In the municipalities, since they had participated in the dialogue, some did 
know it, at least by name. But there was no process of appropriation and of 
understanding what the strategy was and what implications this document 
entailed.233 
In sum, despite wide-spread consultation processes, the EBRP managed to achieve little 
ownership in Bolivia.234 It was an openly criticised and rejected as a donor-driven exercise, 
while most governmental and societal actors continued to doubt the usefulness of the 
exercise. Although the EBRP certainly helped to harmonise donor efforts at the country 
level, it contributed to further widening the gap between perceived and actual politics in 
Bolivia.  
3 . 3  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  G h a n a  
Similarly to Bolivia, Ghana was still close to being an aid dependent country by 2005, with aid 
as a percentage of the GDP around 10 percent. The table below shows that ODA as a 
percentage of GDP has increased significantly throughout the 1980s and remained around 10 
percent through the 1990s.  
                                                 
233  Interview with a government representative, No. 79, La Paz, 29 March 2004. 
234  On Bolivian ownership of the PRSP, compare Rosalind Eyben (2004): "Who Owns a Poverty Reduction Strategy? A Case 
Study of Power, Instruments and Relationships in Bolivia", in: Leslie Groves and Rachel Hinton (eds.), Inclusive Aid: 
Changing Power and Relationships in International Development. London: Earthscan. 
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Table 7:  Aid Intensity in Ghana 
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Source: Compiled from data (World Bank 2004) 
The aid intensity reflects the fact that Ghana has become a ‘donor darling’ since the 
1980s, after showing strong commitment to economic stabilisation and structural adjustment 
reforms – policies that were promoted by the World Bank and the IMF at the time. 
However, intensified cooperation has both positive and negative effects. Recipients that 
commit themselves to donor-supported economic reforms attract significant aid inflows 
from international and bilateral donors. Yet, even though these foreign capital inflows can be 
beneficial to the dedicated programmes, some argue that they can also be counterproductive 
to economic stability. Such foreign exchange loans can result in an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, often in the form of domestic inflation rather than a nominal appreciation, 
and in effect distort the macro-economy. This phenomenon has been termed the ‘Dutch 
disease’, after experiences with large foreign exchange inflows from natural gas production 
into the Netherlands.235 The table above shows that Ghana has experienced high jumps in 
aid, while flows were sometimes volatile and unpredictable. Nonetheless, the government has 
so far managed to avoid Dutch disease, mainly by saving aid in periods when inflows were 
unusually high.236  
                                                 
235  For a general explanation of the Dutch Disease, see Sweder van Wijnbergen (1984): "The 'Dutch Disease': A Disease 
After All?" in: Economic Journal, 94 (373): 41-55; W. M. Cordon and J. P. Neary (1982): "Booming Sector and 
Deindustrialization in a Small Open Economy", in: Economic Journal, 92 (368): 825-848. Stephen Younger (1992): "Aid and 
the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When Everybody Loves You", in: World Development, 20 (11): 1587-
1597. offers a Ghana-specific discussion.  
236  Andy Berg (2005): "High Aid Inflows Case Study: Ghana", paper presented at the 'Seminar on Foreign Aid and 
Macroeconomic Management', organised by the IMF Institute and African Department, in Maputo, Mozambique, 
March 14-15. 
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3 . 3 . 1  G h a n a ’ s  H i s t o r y  a s  a  R e c i p i e n t  
Until the 1960s, the amount of aid flowing into Ghana was insignificant. Several authors 
explain this as the result of the Nkrumah government’s suspicion towards the former 
colonial powers.237 Besides, it did not seem necessary for the government to acquire aid until 
their balance of payments entered into crisis in 1961. In response, Nkrumah turned towards 
the Eastern block for assistance, but relationships worsened too quickly for disbursement to 
become substantial. The National Liberation Council (NLC) government that ousted 
Nkrumah eventually managed to secure assistance from the IMF. Together with a more 
prudent fiscal management and a currency devaluation, this attracted more aid, which the 
government mainly used to repay commercial debts of the previous government.  
Table 8:  Official Development Assistance to Ghana 
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Aid increased even further after the economic crisis during the 1970s. Most of these 
where multilateral loans, and Ghana’s foreign debt reached US$ 1,407 million in 1980, with 
the World Bank as Ghana’s major donor. The early part of the 1980s saw a gradual reduction 
in aid flows to Ghana. As a reaction to this and to the worsened state of affairs that the 
economic crisis had caused, the Rawlings government started an Economic Recovery 
Programme in 1983. The World Bank and the IMF approved this plan and the consultative 
                                                 
237  See for example Tony Killick (1978): Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana. London: 
Heinemann. 
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group to Ghana was reconvened. It was these reforms, in the fashion of the internationally 
advocated ‘structural adjustments’, that turned Ghana into a ‘donor darling’ in the late 
1980s.238 At the end of the 1980s, aid to Ghana was significant – Ghana was the largest aid 
recipient per capita in Africa.239 In the words of one donor: 
[Ghana is] getting a lot of assistance, […] to the tune of something like 450 
million dollars net basis, after servicing their debt here, coming on to the 
country and another 150 to 250 million in HIPC debt relief on top of that. 
So, obviously this is a poor country, per capita income of 300 dollars. And it 
has obviously had a very low savings rate, so it needs this donor support.240 
Apart from external aid flows, foreign debt was another financial issue that the 
Ghanaian governments were increasingly burdened with. At independence, only about five 
percent of Ghana’s GDP was owed to creditors.241 However, the financial commitments of 
independence spurred an unprecedented growth of Ghana’s public expenditures – 
“independence is expensive.”242 The debt reached 50 percent of GDP by 1964 and around 60 
percent by 1970. With the onset of economic reforms in the 1980s, Ghanaian borrowing 
shifted from domestic borrowing towards larger inflows of foreign resources. As a result, 
public debt reached 100 percent in 1992 and nearly 120 percent in 1998.243 On these grounds, 
Ghana became eligible for HIPC debt relief in 2001.  
In the early 1990s, aid has become a substantial portion of total government 
expenditure in Ghana – up to 90 percent.244 Statistically, aid as a percentage of government 
expenditure is said to be decreasing since the end of the structural adjustment era. This is 
largely due to an increased tax effort since the early 1990s.245 Nonetheless, aid flows to Ghana 
continued to be high and exert substantial pressure on the government to formulate policies 
in an internationally acceptable way. Government representatives are well aware of this 
dependency. When asked about the possibilities of proposing new initiatives to Ghana’s 
major donors, one senior civil servant responded, “we concern ourselves with what is 
                                                 
238  For a more comprehensive history of Ghana’s relationships with the multi- and bilateral donor see John Toye (1991): 
"Ghana", in: Paul Mosley, et al. (eds.), Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending. Volume 2: Case Studies. 
London: Routledge.: 150-200. 
239  Ernest Aryeetey and Aidan Cox (1997): "Aid Effectiveness in Ghana", in: Jerker Carlsson, et al. (eds.), Foreign Aid in Africa: 
Learning from Country Experiences. Stockholm: Motala Grafiska: 65-111. 
240  Interview with a donor representative, No. 4, Accra, 10 August 2004. 
241  In fact, of these 5 percent, 70 percent was internally held. See N. A. Cox-George (1961): Studies in Finance and Development: 
The Gold Coast (Ghana) Experience. London: Dennis Dobson. 
242  Nassem Ahmed (1967): Deficit Financing, Inflation and Capital Formation. München: Weltforum-Verlag: 21. 
243  Joe Amoako-Tuffour (2001): "The Growth of Public Debt in a Reforming Economy", in: Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang 
(ed.), IMF and World Bank Sponsored Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa: Ghana's Experience, 1983-1999. Aldershot: 
Ashgate: 41-76. 
244  Robert Osei, Oliver Morrissey and Tim Lloyd (2003): "Modelling the Fiscal Effects of Aid: An Impulse Response 
Analysis for Ghana", CREDIT Research Paper No. 03/10, Nottingham: Centre for Research in Economic Development 
and International Trade, University of Nottingham. 
245  Several stakeholders argue that this tax effort was indeed the result of pressures from the donors. Interview with a donor 
representative, No. 4, Accra, 10 August 2004. 
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doable.”246 Politics in Ghana are thus often shaped in response to donor expectations, 
similarly to the situation in Bolivia. Both countries had come to be model recipients partly 
because at given times their governments managed particularly well to respond to donor 
expectations.  
3 . 3 . 2  A i d  S t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h e  D o n o r s  t o  G h a n a  
Aid strategies of Ghana’s major donors have undergone several transitions since the 
beginning of cooperation. When aid flows to Ghana increased during the 1960s and 1970s 
and aid portfolios became more diverse, the focus was on infrastructure development, 
agriculture, health and education as well as poverty alleviation. A shift occurred during the 
1980s, towards programme lending based on structural adjustment policies, and away from 
traditional project lending. These programmes increasingly contained conditionality elements. 
Rawlings’ Economic Recovery Programme was the main economic strategy document on 
which the donors based their support, led by the World Bank. The focus there was on the 
rehabilitation of the economic and social infrastructure. From the mid-1980s onwards, donor 
policy also included civil service reform, privatisation as well as creating an enabling 
environment for the private sector.247  
However, the failure of the Economic Recovery Programme’s first phase to alleviate 
poverty sparked off concerns – in conjunction with increased worldwide criticism about the 
social dimensions of structural adjustment. As a result, the World Bank signed a second 
Structural Adjustment Credit with Ghana in 1989 to address the long term issues of poverty, 
population growth and food security.248 The learning experience of the structural adjustment 
era established poverty reduction on the agenda of the World Bank and other donors. One 
donor summed this up:  
If you try to look at it in a broad perspective, there was this period of 
structural adjustment that was necessary, actually worked in many ways, but 
definitely did not deliver what needed to be delivered to really pick up the 
economies and make a real impact on poverty.249 
Despite its flaws, cooperation around the Economic Recovery Programme did result 
in economic stabilisation and a moderate growth. Yet, while the World Bank and the IMF 
                                                 
246  Interview with a government representative, No. 84, Accra, 26 August 2004.  
247  Peter Quartey (2003): "Innovative Ways of Making Aid Effective in Ghana: Tied Aid versus Direct Budgetary Support", 
Paper Presented at the UNU/WIDER Conference on 'Sharing Global Prosperity', 6-7 September, Helsinki: World 
Institute for Development Economics Research. 
248  Jane Harrigan and Stephen Younger (2000): "Aid, Debt and Growth", in: Ernest Aryeetey, et al. (eds.), Economic Reforms in 
Ghana: The Miracle and the Mirage. London: James Currey: 185-208. 
249  Interview with a donor representative, No. 83, Accra, 31 August 2004.  
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lauded the Ghanaian ‘economic miracle’, some criticise that they were partly divided over 
how to evaluate the Ghana programme, and had little real comprehension of the nature of 
the regime and its agenda.250 Some aspects of reform that were addressed by the 
conditionality elements of structural adjustment continue to be unsuccessful until 2005. For 
example, the recently established Multi-Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) again 
incorporated civil service reform as one of its triggers – after a decade and a half of failed 
civil service reform.251  
In 1999, the World Bank launched a new initiative, the CDF, to promote greater 
coordination in development assistance at the country level.252 This new framework was 
established to harmonise donor practices and to move towards more coordinated donor 
support of government programmes and its development agenda. The broad idea behind the 
CDF was that government ownership was lacking in most of the donor-funded projects. At 
the same time, the consultative group meetings were shifted from Paris to Accra to facilitate 
greater country ownership through the engagement of civil society. For similar reasons, a 
‘mini’ consultative group was created at the country level, where government was supposed 
to meet the heads of the development partners in-country on a quarterly basis.253 
Furthermore, the donors established multi-donor sector-wide approach in health, education 
and possibly soon in agriculture, where a government agency is in charge of dispersing the 
funds.254 
The concept of ‘ownership’ featured prominently in all of these initiatives. The 
theoretical intention was to support the government in its own reform measures rather than 
imposing conditionalities as to where reforms should be heading. Similarly, the Ghanaian 
PRSP – Ghana’s development strategy to obtain HIPC debt relief – and the multi-donor 
budget support were both measures of improving government ownership. Nonetheless, 
there was an inherent contradiction since the elaboration of a country or government owned 
strategy was a condition for funding in both of these cases. This tension translated into a 
wait-and-see attitude within the government that defined donor-recipient relationships in 
Ghana at the time:  
                                                 
250  Eboe Hutchful (2002): Ghana's Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Oxford: James Currey: 140-196. 
251  Interview with a government representative, No. 110, Accra, 23 August 2004. See also Government of Ghana (204): 
"Towards a New Public Service for Ghana: A Working Document", Accra: Office of the Senior Minister - Public Sector 
Reform Secretariat. 
252  World Bank (2003): Towards Country-led Development: A Multi-Partner Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework. 
Synthesis Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
253  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004.  
254  Interview with government representative, No. 30, Accra, 4 August 2004.  
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An ongoing concern between the donor countries and the Government of 
Ghana is that the Government of Ghana has engaged in a sort of strategy, 
for the lack of a better word. They have refused to be proactive… […] It is 
not that it doesn’t reflect their priorities but it’s a case of trying to bring 
everything down to a minimum instead of the Government of Ghana 
holistically looking at what resources they got, what their priorities are across 
governments and “this is what we want to achieve this year” and take it to 
the development partners to discuss. […] And when you talk about the 
government to be in the driver’s seat, I think this is an area of real concern.255  
While the Ghanaian government officially modelled the political landscape according to the 
expectations of the donors, everyday politics were marked by non-formalisation and a 
muddling-through. Instead of proposing and formalising new initiatives as many donors 
would have liked to see, politicians often preferred less formalised and less visible means of 
political engagement whenever their and their constituencies’ interests might have been in 
contradiction to the donors’.  
3 . 3 . 3  A c t o r s  i n  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n  i n  G h a n a  
Similarly to Bolivia, Ghana is home to a large number of country offices of many multi- and 
bilateral donors. The World Bank is Ghana’s largest donor with a permanent country office, 
while the IMF operates with a small office based in the central bank like in Bolivia. For the 
regional development bank, the picture looks a bit different. The African Development Bank 
(ADB) in Ghana operates similarly to the IMF.256 Instead of maintaining a country office, a 
representative is usually seconded into the Ghanaian Ministry of Finance. In 2004, however, 
even the ADB representative in the Ministry of Finance had returned to the headquarters of 
the ADB. Like the IMF, the ADB upholds its relations with the Ghanaian government by 
means of regular missions. The difference between the in-country organisation of the IDB 
and the ADB is probably due to questions of funding, as it is much more expensive to staff 
and run full-blown country offices. The United Nations system is present and very 
prominent in Ghana, although it’s financial contribution to official development assistance to 
Ghana is equally negligible. In 2003, Ghana received US $ 196.6 million from the World 
Bank and only US $ 13.3 million from the whole UN system.257 The largest bilateral donors 
in Ghana during the period between 1999 and 2003 were the United Kingdom, the United 
                                                 
255  Interview with a donor representative, No. 51, Accra, 5 August 2004. 
256  African Development Bank is sometimes abbreviated ‘AfDB’ to distinguish it from the Asian Development Bank. 
However, since my research does not include member countries of the Asian Development Bank, I prefer to use the 
African Development Bank’s official abbreviation ADB.  
257  These figures represent total ODA net, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005): Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients: 1960-2003. International Development Statistics CD-ROM, Paris: OECD. 
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States, Japan, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Canada, Spain and France. The 
European Union contributed an amount comparable to that of the ADB:  
Table 9:  Official Development Assistance to the Ghanaian Public Sector  
Agency Mean Disbursements, 1999-2003 
Multilateral Donors 275.9 
World Bank 162.0 
European Commission 34.7 
African Development Bank 34.3 
Other Multilateral Donors 44.9 
Bilateral Donors 406.1 
United Kingdom 104.9 
United States 62.1 
Japan 58.5 
Netherlands 55.8 
Denmark 44.6 
Germany 34.8 
Canada 14.6 
Spain 8.9 
France 8.0 
Other Bilateral Donors 13.7 
TOTAL 682.0 
Note: Total ODA net, disbursements stated in millions of US dollars (2002 prices). 
Source: Own calculation, based on (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2005) 
Ghana is a member of the African Union (AU) – like Bolivia is of the OAS – but the AU 
does not maintain a country office in Ghana. This is probably due to the fact that the 
resources of the AU are far more limited. In sum, both Bolivia and Ghana are entertaining 
policy dialogue and development cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank as well as 
with one regional development bank. In Bolivia, financial cooperation also takes place with 
the CAF and policy dialogue includes the OAS. In addition to these multilateral 
commitments, both countries have about ten bilateral donors with whom they cooperate.  
On the government side, the set-ups are quite distinct between Bolivia and Ghana. In 
Ghana, cooperation agencies increasingly focus their interaction on the Ministry of Finance 
and on a National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) to coordinate budget 
support and development planning. Several donors view the Ministry of Finance as the entity 
to coordinate the delivery of aid, while the NDPC’s role is to establish the governments’ 
long-term development plans. Exceptions were the sector-wide approaches on health and 
education, which were coordinated directly with the respective ministries. The NDPC has 
elaborated the Ghana Vision 2020, which serves as Ghana’s medium-term development 
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strategy.258 The NDPC was also the agency responsible for coordinating the elaboration of 
the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) and is currently putting together working 
groups to revise the GPRS.259 In fact, the NDPC was the economic planning division of the 
Ministry of Finance until it was split off from the Ministry in 1992. After several further 
government reshuffles, the NDPC was again under the supervision of what was by 2005 
known as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, only this time as an independent 
agency. To cooperate effectively with the donors, the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning contained a department responsible for external resource mobilisation. This 
department in turn was composed of a multilateral and a bilateral division, each headed by a 
director. The multilateral division contained five desks: for the World Bank, the ADB, the 
European Union, the UN system, and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). In the bilateral division, two or three bilateral donors were usually grouped together 
under one desk. An exception was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) desk 
created in 2003, which was responsible for developing a Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA) proposal that the Government of Ghana planned to present to the MCC – a new 
American development cooperation initiative created by the Bush administration. On top of 
this, the ministry had established a ‘Multi-Donor Budgetary Support and Consultative Group 
Secretariat’ and a ‘National Economic Dialogue Secretariat’, which were double-headed by an 
advisor to the minister. This ‘donor’ secretariat deals with all overarching issues that concern 
the donor community: the multi-donor budget support and the consultative group on the 
one hand, and the ‘National Economic Dialogue’ that served as the required civil society 
participation input to the GPRS on the other.  
In sum, both governments’ organisational structure partly responded to donor 
requirements, particularly in the Ministry of Finance and in response to specific requirements 
arising from cooperation. In addition, the Ministry of Finance of a recipient government was 
increasingly responsible for initiating and managing coordination and harmonisation efforts 
between donors and governments. This is a difficult task not only because aid donors have 
very different organisational structures and procedures, but also because policy priorities and 
approaches to development differ greatly between donors. Donor harmonisation efforts in 
Ghana centred on  the GPRS and even more on the multi-donor budget support mechanism 
                                                 
258  Vision 2020 is “Ghana's road map to achieving middle-income country status by the year 2020.” The first phase of the 
Vision 2020 plan is laid out in detail in Government of Ghana (1997): "Ghana Vision 2020: The First Medium-Term 
Development Plan (1997-2000)", Accra: National Development Planning Commission.  
259  The original GPRS is laid out in Government of Ghana (2003): "Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005: An 
Agenda for Growth and Prosperity", Volume 1: Analysis and Policy Statement, Accra: National Development Planning 
Commission. In addition, the NDPC has produced two annual progress reports Government of Ghana (2004): 
"Implementation of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy: 2003 Annual Progress Report", Accra: National 
Development Planning Commission; Government of Ghana (2003): "Implementation of the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy: 2002 Annual Progress Report", Accra: National Development Planning Commission. 
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that built on it. The MDBS became the main tool for donor harmonisation, while political 
negotiation between national stakeholders as to what should be the spending priorities of the 
government was neglected. The GPRS and MDBS process serve to illustrate this point.  
3 . 3 . 4  T h e  G h a n a  P o v e r t y  R e d u c t i o n  S t r a t e g y  
Development planning in Ghana had undergone several phases during the 1990s. In 1995, 
the outgoing government formulated the Ghana Vision 2020, originally entitled National 
Development Policy Framework. On the basis of the Vision 2020, the government developed a 
first medium-term development plan in 1997.260 Later, it argued that this twenty-five year 
development plan was the basis on which the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy was built.261 
Donors shared this view: 
This current GPRS did really come out of the Vision 2020. It is just that the 
problem probably with the Vision 2020 is that it set too ambitious targets. 
For example, they had like a seven percent growth rate in there.262 
In 2000, the outgoing Ghanaian government submitted an Interim PRSP to the IMF.263 The 
GPRS for 2003 to 2005 builds on the Interim PRSP. The aim of the GPRS was to outline 
how debt relief money could be used more effectively for poverty reduction. As with all 
PRSPs, the GPRS was a requirement for Ghana to reach the HIPC II completion point.264  
The first version of the original GPRS was actually formulated by the outgoing 
Rawlings government. The NDPC, a central government agency, formed five core teams on 
(1) the macro-economy, (2) gainful employment and production, (3) human resource 
development and basic services, (4) vulnerability and exclusion, and (5) governance: 
NDPC formed committees of each sector and the sectors have 
representatives of the various ministries. NDPC was leading the process.265 
                                                 
260  See Government of Ghana (1997): "Ghana Vision 2020: The First Medium-Term Development Plan (1997-2000)", 
Accra: National Development Planning Commission; Government of Ghana (1998): "Programme of Action for the 
Implementation of Medium-Term Development Plan (1997-2000)", First Plan under Ghana-Vision 2020, Accra: National 
Development Planning Commission. 
261  See the introduction of Government of Ghana (2003): "Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005: An Agenda for 
Growth and Prosperity", Volume 1: Analysis and Policy Statement, Accra: National Development Planning Commission. 
262  Interview with a donor representative, No. 4, Accra, 10 August 2004. 
263  Government of Ghana (2000): "Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2000-2002", June, Accra: Ministry of Finance. 
264  Several authors have analysed whether the debt relief under HIPC can actually effectively translate into poverty reduction. 
See for example, Robert Osei and Peter Quartey (2001): "The HIPC Initiative and Poverty Reduction in Ghana: An 
Assessment", Discussion Paper No. 2001/119, November, Helsinki: United Nations University - World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. The general conclusion is that the poverty reduction effect of debt relief will be 
relatively small, for example in comparison to export growth. 
265  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004.  
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The teams comprised government personnel and private sector representatives as well as 
local experts, with limited technical support from the donors – most notably in the macro-
economy group. Indeed, the donors had made a conscious effort to not engage much in what 
was supposed to be a country-owned exercise.266  
In essence, the GPRS formulation was initially a centrally driven exercise, with little 
consultation and deliberation.267 However, unlike in Bolivia, donors consciously refrained 
from interfering in the drafting of the GPRS to ensure it was a government-owned strategy. 
When Kuffour’s administration took over in 2000, they adjusted the GPRS to better reflect 
the priorities of the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) election campaigning programme. They also 
responded to prior criticism by the IMF and the World Bank. A donor representative 
explained: 
Both the macro-economic framework has changed to the figures of the IMF 
and the World Bank, as internally within the cabinet the framework has 
changed and geared it much more towards their own political premises. […] 
In a way what the then senior minister had done was to make sure that the 
GPRS had much more linkages with their own election mandate.268 
This post-election adaptation contributed to a certain appropriation of the document by the 
new government. However, sceptics said that, even though the cabinet eventually backed the 
GPRS, ministries, departments and agencies certainly operated according to their own, often 
independent priorities: 
The problem was that when they started preparing the GPRS, the various 
ministries were to send representatives to NDPC to prepare the GPRS, they 
were sending very junior representatives. So, the document was written. But 
when you go to the ministries and you look at their sector policies and 
strategies they vary. When you ask NDPC about that they say, “Well, we 
asked them for input and the people who came, these are the things they 
said.” [.…] What also happens is that you find high turnover of chief 
directors and ministers also. And they also come out with new ideas and 
strategies of what to do in each sector, in each ministry. So, you find the 
ministry within the past two years with a different strategy! Without even 
consulting with the GPRS, with what they have discussed initially.269 
                                                 
266  Interview with a donor representative, No. 72, Accra, 22 July 2004 
267  For a good critique of the early process, see Tony Killick (2001): "Poverty-Reducing Institutional Change and the PRSP 
Process: The Ghana Case", Discussion Paper No. 2001/70, August, Helsinki: United Nations University - World Institute 
for Development Economics Research. 
268  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. Indeed, instead of thoroughly revising the whole 
GPRS, the NPP focused on the executive summary to reflect its campaigning platform. I thank Tony Killick for this 
observation.  
269  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
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At the operational level, information about the GPRS was often overlooked nor was 
ministerial information fed back to the NDPC. As noted earlier, this might be a general 
problem of Ghana’s civil service, not so much a GPRS specific problem. It did however 
affect the degree of appropriation of the GPRS by the ministries, departments and agencies. 
Ministerial personnel consulted very little with the GPRS as an overall framework to 
structure their own implementation strategies.270 
Even though appropriation of the GPRS by ministries, departments and agencies 
personnel was weak, ministers and chief directors recognised the GPRS’s importance for 
resource allocation. After an initial period of ignorance, ministries and chief directors took 
note of the GPRS once they became aware of its relevance for future donor funding.271 With 
this realisation, most ministers made sure to have their portfolio’s priorities included in the 
GPRS. However, while everyone’s priorities were included in the GPRS, the government 
avoided a political settlement as to what issues would come first if resources were scare. Such 
a negotiation was probably not considered necessary because (aid) resources to fund the 
implementation of the GPRS were perceived as infinite.  
So, in sum, the GPRS did turn out to reflect government’s priorities but it lacked 
prioritisation between items. As one would expect, opinions about whether this was good or 
bad varied. One donor representative commented:  
The GPRS is an incredibly big and broad document. You can really make the 
case that everything is in line with the GPRS, no matter what you do.272 
The GPRS was certainly not the result of power brokerage within cabinet, or even within 
parliament, on the appropriate use of Ghana’s resources. Nonetheless, as a declaration of 
intent, the GPRS served a purpose. Different parts of government appreciated it for this:  
The GPRS is a negotiation of many stakeholders, so it necessarily has to be 
broad. That’s ok.273 
Indeed, this was the main purpose of the GPRS from the point of view of the government: 
to state its good intentions on poverty reduction and to provide a document on which 
Ghana’s donors could base debt relief. While the government was thus generally fine with 
the GPRS, the official lack of prioritisation posed problems to the donors, particularly when 
                                                 
270  For example, the sector plans for health or education had been established before the GPRS was formulated and 
continued to define the sectoral strategies until 2004. Interview with a government representative, No. 74, Accra, 23 
August 2004. 
271  Interview with a donor representative, No. 23, Accra, 22 July 2004.  
272  Interview with a donor representative, No. 128, Accra, 14 July 2004. 
273  Interview with a government representative, No. 30, Accra, 4 August 2004. 
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it came to assessing the performance of the GPRS. Even more problematically, the 
subsequent multi-donor budget support was based on the principles of the GPRS. Thus, the 
lack of spending priorities of the GPRS translated into an imprecise mechanism to allocate 
public resources. While this was not apparent during the initial phase of the MDBS which 
operated relatively independent from GPRS priorities, the substantial gap between declared 
and actual political priorities will become more and more apparent when MDBS 
disbursement triggers are more closely linked to GPRS priorities.  
3 . 4  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
Tracing donor harmonisation efforts in Bolivia and Ghana shows how donor-recipient 
relationships have altered every-day politics in both countries. What is more, in some cases 
the politics of development cooperation have affected the very way in which national politics 
are perceived by the donors. In the case of the National Dialogue in Bolivia and with the 
multi-donor budget support in Ghana, donor initiatives have resulted in a perception of 
existing political reality that substantially differs from the reality on the ground. A main factor 
for the forces behind these gaps is that aims and objectives sometimes differ between donor 
agencies and recipient governments. Some authors suggest that a conflict of interest between 
these two parties must generally be expected to be the case, for several reasons. First, donor 
agencies and recipient governments operate against the background of differing traditions 
and institutional constraints. Because of this, they are also answerable to radically contrasting 
constituencies and their respective remits differ accordingly. In addition, donors and 
governments have to respond to divergent exigencies of maintaining internal political 
balance. To an external agency with an exit option, internal political networks present 
themselves in different ways than to a domestic actor or agency.274 Furthermore, the recipient 
government may see it in their interest to make insincere policy promises in order to secure 
financial support. On the other hand, donor agencies often forget that the costs of mistakes 
fall almost exclusively on recipient governments and their citizens, even when the donor 
agencies are responsible for the mistake. This tends to make governments more risk-adverse 
then donors when undertaking new programmes. 275  
The imbalance in power relations between aid donors and recipients clearly results 
from financial dependence as well as the donors’ exit option that the recipient does not have. 
                                                 
274  For example, pressure groups present a very different obstacle to a government than to donors who do not reside in the 
country for an extended period.  
275  Tony Killick (1998): Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change. London: Routledge: 91-93. 
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An overuse of terms like partnership and cooperation only blurs this fact in an unhelpful 
way. The strong link between donor-recipient policy dialogue and financial assistance, with its 
implications of unequal bargaining power, may well get in the way of elaborating constructive 
solutions. Because of this, I argue that there is a divide between development cooperation 
understood as consultation, advice and policy dialogue on the one hand, and cooperation in 
terms of lending and policy conditionality on the other. Attempts do give the recipients more 
freedom to disburse funds independently – such as the multi-donor budgetary support – are 
laudable but they present donor agencies with the challenge to justify this to their 
constituencies. Donor harmonisation generally is a step in the right direction but donors 
must be careful not to confuse harmonisation of their agendas with harmonisation of 
reporting and accounting mechanisms. Recipient governments that face a harmonised donor 
agenda are ever more likely to trade reform ownership for the receipt of funds; while 
divergent accounting structures continue to tie up recipients’ human resources.  
In terms of ownership, a crucial determinant of its presence is how ownership is 
understood. Donor agencies that aim to foster government ownership have to be careful to 
distinguish between government ‘efforts’ towards consensus-building among various 
constituencies and actual consensus among various constituencies. Donors in Bolivia – and 
probably the government as well – made the mistake of equating the two. Because of this, 
the National Dialogue 2000 was designed in a way that aimed at consensus over the long-
term development strategy but which ultimately disappointed participants because not all 
voices were taken on board. Cooperation with recipient governments is fundamentally 
different from cooperation with recipient governments’ citizens. Donor agencies have to 
accept that ownership by a recipient government does not automatically entail ownership by 
the citizens and vice versa. In fact, both might be contradictory forces, as power relations 
between political elites and their citizens are often conflicting. Nonetheless, poverty 
reduction through civil society participation has now taken the centre stage in the 
development efforts of the bilateral as well as the multilateral donor community. I argue that 
the concept of civil society participation employed by international donors is not only 
problematic and insufficiently defined; different actors also utilize it in different ways and to 
different ends. 
However, my point here is not to evaluate or judge different degrees of ownership in 
various circumstances. Ownership is too vague and too normative a concept to be adequately 
measured. Rather, I want to show that ownership and harmonisation are terms that serve to 
legitimate donor intervention to their constituencies at home as well as to the recipients. 
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What is notable is that the use of the term ownership has an effect on the mismatch between 
the donors’ perception of existing political systems and the political reality on the ground. It 
widens the gap between perception and reality because recipients need to demonstrate and 
donors need to believe that the recipients ‘own’ a programme, whether or not this is actually 
true.  
To conclude, two aspects have evolved as particularly relevant to analyse the politics 
of development cooperation: the multi-donor budget support in Ghana and the national 
dialogue process in Bolivia. These two processes touch on question of budgetary autonomy 
and of the way in which civil society participation is facilitated. Budgetary autonomy relates 
to government ownership over the use of its resources, while civil society participation relates 
to the efforts that a government has made to build approval of its policies among the 
citizenry. These two aspects will be evaluated in much greater detail in part two and part 
three of the thesis, using the Bolivian and Ghanaian experience as examples.  
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C H A P T E R  4   –  T H E  S T A T E  A N D  N A T I O N A L  
P O L I T I C S  
 As I have outlined in chapters two and three, I devote part two of this thesis to the analysis 
of a distinct tool of development cooperation that aims to foster ownership: budgetary 
support. I do this in order to discuss questions of government ownership, defined as 
ownership of development cooperation by government agents. To be able to do so, I use this 
chapter to first establish an overview of the state and national politics in Ghana and Bolivia. I 
pick up the political sociology perspective developed in chapter two to discuss how particular 
features of the state are embedded in a socio-political context, paying particular attention to 
informal political processes. With this type of state analysis, I argue that the interplay between 
political realities and wishful thinking of how institutions should be in Ghana and Bolivia 
matters for the effectiveness and sustainability of development cooperation programmes that 
aim to tackle political reform. In the chapter five, I go on to specifically look at direct budget 
support mechanisms in development cooperation as a tool for policy dialogue around public 
sector management reform. I argue that government ownership of multi-donor funded 
programmes depends on the degree to which institutional reform measures address political 
realities within national politics.  
As I have argued in chapter two, a historical approach allows an account of societal 
and institutional structures but remains committed to a long-term analysis that views 
individual actors’ preferences and decision-making within the context of their institutional 
constraints. It helps to elucidate the relationship between state formation and issues of 
development cooperation on political reform in a developing country. Much of today’s 
politics in Ghana and Bolivia can be explained by historical legacies, even though Ghana and 
Bolivia’s historic trajectories were quite different. Ghana’s political landscape is still 
profoundly affected by socio-political legacies of the colonial period, while Bolivian politics 
continue to respond to historic social cleavages and clientelistic patterns that emerged from 
and after the national revolution in 1952. These events have shaped the public realm in both 
countries and help to explain distinct features of political clientelism that exist in Ghana and 
Bolivia. As I have argued in chapter two, I am avoiding a cultural explanation of clientelism 
and patronage politics. Instead, I want to explore the socio-political history and collective 
memories to explain current political networks. Analysing the public realm and the way in 
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which the state is embedded in social networks helps to investigate whether a weak or a 
strong state exists in Ghana and Bolivia.  
Based on this analysis of the state and national politics, I evaluate past attempts to 
reform state institutions in Ghana and Bolivia, paying particular attention to public 
management reform and measures to improve budget accountability. In both Ghana and 
Bolivia, political debates have long been ongoing about the limits of state capacity to deliver 
particular services and about the role of clientelism and corruption with respect to these 
weaknesses. It has become more and more difficult for Ghanaian and Bolivian governments 
to justify their legitimate rule to their populace and to international donors against the 
background of these shortcomings. 276 In addition, international donors, particularly the 
World Bank, have increasingly incorporated institutional reform as a conditionality for 
continued financial support since the structural adjustment era in the 1980s.277 In particular, 
public management reform was deemed as a particular area where reforms would improve 
the service delivery capabilities of the state. Public management is concerned with the way 
that the government functions and the aim of public management reform is to make 
government function more efficiently and effectively. Such reforms, aimed at enforcing 
greater accountability to the benefit of the citizens as the objects of expenditure, are 
characteristically bureaucratic – as opposed to personalistic or clientelistic politics.278 More 
recently, the budget process has become the focus of attention to make governments more 
accountable and thereby reduce clientelism and corruption.279 In essence, the budget is a 
financial plan that authorises the government to effect expenditures, raise revenues and incur 
debts, once it is approved by parliament. Theoretically, the approval of parliament ensures 
government accountability to its citizens, of which the members of parliament are the elected 
representatives. However, in practice, there are many ways in which transparency and 
accountability can be flawed despite a formal budget process. Despite comprehensive public 
management reforms in both Ghana and Bolivia, both countries are far from achieving such 
an ideal administration and budget process. In other words, evaluating past attempts to 
reform Ghana and Bolivia’s state institutions allows a first glimpse at the mismatch between 
                                                 
276  Development theorists have highlighted the need to improve government performance because of an increasing 
consensus that neither markets nor democracies could function well unless governments’ efficiency, effectiveness, and 
responsiveness were improved. Merilee S. Grindle (1997): Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public 
Sectors of Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
277  Indeed, following these discussions, the poverty reduction strategy papers highlighted the need for more efficient public 
management in order to effectively tackle poverty alleviation. David Booth and Henry Lucas (2002): "Good Practice in 
the Development of PRSP Indicators and Monitoring Systems", ODI Working Paper 172, London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
278  John Roberts (2003): "Managing Public Expenditure for Development Results: A Role for Results-Oriented Public 
Expenditure Management", in: Development Policy Review, 22 (6): 623-651. 
279  Mick  Foster and Adrian Fozzard (2000): "Aid and Public Expenditure: A Guide", ODI Working Paper No. 141, London: 
Overseas Development Institute. 
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how political institutions are perceived and how politics actually operate.  Evaluating these 
reform attempts is a necessary precondition to understand the mechanisms that impact on 
policy dialogue in development cooperation and on donors’ direct budget support initiatives. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I investigate the case of 
Ghana. The second section is devoted to the case of Bolivia. Within each section, I first 
analyse the political legacies that continue to determine particular features of the state. I look 
at different groups of actors in the public realm in both countries, discuss political clientelism 
and give a general evaluation of state power in both countries – defined as the capacity of the 
state to legitimise its domination of authority. In a second step, I analyse previous attempts 
by national policy-makers to reform the institutions of the state and discuss their success, 
paying particular attention to public management reforms and to the budget process in both 
countries. In the final section, I conclude that that the public realm in both countries 
constitutes an important element of national politics. If institutional reform programmes are 
to be effective, political realities like clientelism and contestations of state power need to be 
taken into account when designing such reforms. As these aspects have been overlooked in 
both Ghana and Bolivia, public management reforms and measures to increase budget 
accountability have failed to create sustainable results and have only widened the gap 
between perceived and actual politics.  
4 . 1  T h e  S t a t e  a n d  N a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s  i n  
G h a n a  
Ghana shares several features with other post-colonial African countries. One is the existence 
of ‘two publics’, a concept developed by Peter Ekeh and introduced in chapter two.280 
Because the civic public in Ghana continues to be largely amoral, the state has very little 
ability to resist capture by patronage networks, within which private and primordial moral 
principles prevail: 
It is concerning that many problem areas cannot be discussed openly – […] 
the striking income inequalities, that some earn enormous amounts of 
money while others have almost nothing. And that these income inequalities 
should be taxed, that is not something that is being discussed. It is quasi a 
taboo topic.281  
                                                 
280  Peter P. Ekeh (1975): "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement", in: Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 17 (1): 91-112. 
281  Interview with a donor representative, No. 28, Accra, 16 July 2004. 281   
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It is important to note that in such a state – which is dominated by patronage networks – the 
government typically has very limited policy autonomy. The ability of public officials to 
formulate and to carry out policies in accordance with the public interest – such as civil 
service reform, decentralisation, or poverty reduction – is heavily constrained by the 
requirement to service the different patronage networks.282 In addition, a particular kind of 
‘rent-seeking’ developed within the Ghanaian state. Beyond conventional corruption, the 
Ghanaian government created large-scale state employment and a dependent business sector 
as a way to share government-sought rents with supporting groups in society. Since 
independence, each political regime has produced its own particular section of the private 
sector that it favoured.283  
4 . 1 . 1  P o l i t i c a l  L e g a c i e s  i n  G h a n a  
What is more, the different political regimes in Ghana resulted in substantial institutional 
multiplicity, presenting considerable challenges to policy-makers. Ghanaian government 
officials were well aware that conflicting institutions impede the effectiveness of government 
policy:  
The challenge we have had have been the conflicting legal frameworks. 
Whether or not you have political will, for me the major problem are the 
conflicting legal frameworks. You want to move but you hit a wall.284  
For example, the status of Ghana’s traditional authorities – in the local territorial order, in the 
boundaries of chiefdoms, districts and constituencies – is a particular facet of the longue durée 
of structures that were created previously. In many parts of Ghana, the chieftaincy was a 
colonial creation, even though many of these chiefs descended from rulers who, centuries 
ago, administered autonomous traditional states.285 British colonial rule changed and distorted 
the character of chieftaincy in Ghana. Through the British system of indirect rule, the chiefs 
became part of the colonial system of rule, which was largely autocratic. The chiefs’ position 
became less dependent on the will of the people, with the result that traditional processes of 
consultation eventually broke down.286 Today, chieftaincy is a contested and highly political 
                                                 
282  David Booth, Richard Crook, et al. (2004): "Drivers of Change in Ghana: Overview Report", May, Ghana / London: Center for 
Democratic Development / Overseas Development Institute. 6-16.   
283  For an in-depth discussion, see Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (1999): "Ghana: The Challenges of Consolidating Democracy", 
in: Richard Joseph (ed.), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa. London: Lynne Rienner: 409-427.   
284 Interview with a government representative, No. 75, Accra, 13 September 2004. 
285  See Ranger for an excellent account of how the British coloniser invented African traditions, thereby transforming flexible 
custom into hard prescription, in order to incorporate African ‘chiefs’ into their monarchical tradition. Terence Ranger 
(1983): "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa", in: Eric  Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of 
Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 211-262.    
286  F. K. Drah (1987): "Aspects of the Akan State System: Precolonial And Colonial", in: Kwame Akon Ninsin and F. K. 
Drah (eds.), The Search for Democracy in Ghana: A Case Study of Political Instability in Africa. Accra: Asempa Publishers: 33-54.    
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institution in Ghanaian national politics, because if its associations with authority and power, 
and as a result of its politicisation by successive governments and parties.287  
4.1.1.1 The Public Realm  
After independence, Nkrumah and his movement heavily curtailed independent chieftaincy - 
one of the most fundamental changes in the history of Ghana. The Convention People’s 
Party (CPP) was committed not only to the rapid termination of British colonial rule, but also 
to the elimination of chiefly power in order to wrest administrative control of the Ghanaian 
countryside from the chiefs. Between 1951 and the creation of the First Republic in 1960, 
Ghanaian governments sought to discard the chiefly principle in local government, then to 
weaken chieftaincy by attrition and eventually, by altering the legal basis of chieftaincy, to 
incorporate and control a considerably altered chieftaincy. For example, in 1951 the largely 
unregulated Native Court system was reformed, with ‘chiefly benches’ being replaced by paid 
magistrates. Chiefs’ control over stool288 revenues was also whittled away. Further, their role 
in national politics was marginalized by the creation of regional Houses Of Chiefs, which 
could consider only matters referred to them by government ministers or the national 
assembly, and even then their role was virtually limited to proffering advice to government. 
Through other constitutional means, the independent power of chiefs was methodically 
eroded. Any chief who was suspected of sympathising with the National Liberation 
Movement opposition party lived under fear of destoolment.289 This was the way of the 
ruling government to dominate the influence of the chieftaincies, by co-opting them into the 
political party system of the post-colonial state.  
Nonetheless, there has been a revival, or reinforcement, of ‘traditional rule’ across 
Africa, a trend that Chabal and Daloz referred to as ‘re-traditionalisation’.290 An argument can 
be made for the integration of traditional authorities into democratic institutions in that they 
exert a stabilising influence, particularly encountering the inadequacies of many post-colonial 
African states. However, it has been argued that regime transformation heightens ethnic 
considerations and provokes defensive postures by politically dominant groups.291 After 
independence, political instability was partly a result of the highly heterogeneous character 
                                                 
287  Richard Crook (2005): "The Role of Traditional Institutions in Political Change and Development", CDD/ODI Policy 
Brief No. 4, November, Accra: Center for Democratic Development. 
288  A stool is the symbol of chieftancy.    
289  For an in-depth study of this long and bitter campaign and the opposition mounted by many southern chiefs to resist 
their political marginalization, see Richard J. A. R. Rathbone (2000): Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in 
Ghana, 1951-1960. Oxford: James Currey.    
290  Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999): Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: International African 
Institute.    
291  Marina Ottaway (1999): "Ethnic Politics in Africa: Change and Continuity", in: Richard A. Joseph (ed.), State, Conflict, and 
Democracy in Africa. London: Lynne Rienner: 299-318.    
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that colonially-ruled Ghana displayed. After independence, this created many different forms 
of social identities that could be mobilised politically. As a result, no single societal group 
could establish itself as indispensable to the ruling elites and no ruling elite was able to remain 
in power uncontested. Competition continued around access to political decision-making 
power and access to economic resources. .Policy-makers in Ghana thus have to consider a 
wide variety of constituents and respond to different types of societal demands, whenever 
they take political reform projects.   
See, the government machinery is not like a corporate entity where decisions 
are made based on economic rationality. In the government sector, decisions 
are also influenced by political calculations. And therefore you cannot just go 
there and say: “Oh well, my balance sheet says that I am making a loss on 
this. Therefore, let me go into labour and reduce labour costs and then 
balance it quickly and go away.” In government, if you do that you know the 
political implications and social reactions associated with that.292  
Like in other parts of Africa, traditional authorities in Ghana compete for authority 
within the country’s new democratic institutions. Multiple institutions continue to exist 
within Ghana.293 Ghana continued to display a complex relationship between national politics 
and local conflict. Even after democratisation, party competition at the national level 
continued to often be the arena in which local contestations between different chieftaincies 
are fought out. However, regional identities competed with class-based and social identities in 
Ghana. Social identities were heterogeneous and multi-facetted.294 Fortunately, many of these 
identities were overlapping, so that political mobilisation never managed to draw dangerous 
cleavages through society.295  
4.1.1.2 Clientelism 
Despite the positive developments in recent years, Ghana’s political history presents a 
paradox: the country became a model of economic and political transformation, only to “slip 
back into its familiar ‘patrimonial’ mould.”296 As I have shown in chapter two, the state in 
sub-Saharan African states like Ghana is often characterised by hybrid political systems in 
                                                 
292  Interview with government official, No. 106, Accra, 27. August 2004.    
293  For the relationship between democratic transition, institutional multiplicity and traditional authority, see Jo Beall, 
Sibongiseni Mkhize and Shahid Vawda (2004): "Traditional Authority, Institutional Multiplicity and Political Transition in 
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Development and Political Legitimacy", in: American Political Science Review, 53 (1): 69-105: 97.   
296  Eboe Hutchful (2002): Ghana's Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Oxford: James Currey.   
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which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with rational-legal institutions of 
the modern state. As a result, personal or private networks in the hands of dominant patrons 
are likely to capture the resources of the modern state, including the power to allocate rents, 
provide services, determine policies and their beneficiaries, and to allocate bureaucratic 
positions. To be able to do so, information is  used as an instrument of control and influence. 
Its flow is not determined by efficiency concerns as external donors would like it to be. A 
donor representative in Ghana describes the situation as follows: 
Internal communication is a big issue. Sometimes even here you send a note 
to the chief director or the minister on issues when they attend meetings 
here. And one would expect that they go back to write a memo to let staff 
know what has happened […]. They don’t. They put it in their file in their 
office and that is it. And you meet the director of that same ministry and 
then a month or two later you talk about decisions reached with the minister 
and he is not aware! It is a big issue.297  
The prefix ‘neo’ indicates that there is a hybrid character of the patrimonial states in 
Africa today: the most important parts of the patronage system are illegal and clash with the 
formal structure of the state. The mechanisms of patrimonialism are in conflict with, and 
frequently challenged by, formal commitments to ‘legal-rational’ or bureaucratic state 
operation. For example, the employment of civil servants is usually determined by 
patrimonial ties and not by who would help to make a ministry operate more effectively. In 
the words of a frustrated donor representative:  
I asked [a person] from the ministry […]. And he might have been a bit 
cynical but he said that there were about 15 people that are actually working 
in the ministry…298  
On this view, instead of the state being an instrument governed by explicit objectives and 
legal rules, it is effectively an apparatus serving the interests of the particular groups that 
control it. Even fundamental political institutions such as the Ghanaian constitution, and the 
resulting political system, clash with traditional patrimonial forms of social organisation.299 It 
is quite likely to be regarded as morally more defensible to ‘chop’300 public resources in order 
to share the benefits of one’s success with one’s kinship group, than the alternative of turning 
one’s back on one’s community of origin in the name of an abstract concept of public 
                                                 
297  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004.   
298  Interview with a donor representative, No. 51, Accra, 5. August 2004.   
299  For a perceptive analysis of neo-patrimonial rule in Ghana under the NDC, see Richard Sandbrook and Jay Oelbaum 
(1999): "Reforming the Political Kingdom: Governance and Development in Ghana's Fourth Republic", Critical 
Perspectives, June, Accra: Centre for Democracy and Development. 
300  The word to ‘chop’ literally means to eat in Twi, which is the lingua franca in Ghana. ‘Chopping’ is a colloquial term in 
Ghana to describe someone gorging.   
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service.301 In that respect, the neo-patrimonial state is substantially anti-developmental. It 
emphasises the short-term appropriation and distribution of resources by the state and it can 
threaten property rights guaranteed by the rule of law. In a neo-patrimonial state, the policy 
environment depends on personalities rather than formal institutional procedures:  
[A person from the Office of the President] thought that monitoring and 
evaluation was so badly done in the ministries, departments and agencies that 
he wanted to recreate it in the Office of the President! […] And a lot of 
different governments think that, if they don’t see things with their own eyes, 
the information is not valid. […] I think there is a tendency in government 
for people to want to expand the protection of truth, recreation of truth.302  
Neo-patrimonial states are usually marked by an inefficient and expanded state, 
where financial liberalisation and credit decisions are politicised to favour cheap loans to 
supporters. In the early 1990s, a Ghanaian economist Frimpong-Ansah went as far as 
describing Ghana’s political economy as that of a ‘vampire state’.303  
However, more and more frequently in Ghana, ‘vertical’ loyalties implied by patron-
client relationships are challenged by ‘horizontal’ identities. Since democratisation in 1992, 
patronage networks of the military continue to loose influence.304 Horizontal identities can be 
based on common interests emanating from a similar socio-economic position or profession 
or might be founded in particular ideological or religious commitments.305 Formal structures 
of the Ghanaian state challenge the informal patron-client relationships just as much as the 
other way around.306 Sandbrook and Oelbaum argue that influential groups have been 
championing civil and political rights against both colonial and military regimes.307 Several 
authors argue that societal organisations increasingly play a key role in Ghanaian democratic 
development, particularly during the elections in 2000 and 2004.308 While clientelism should 
not be overlooked as shaping national politics, democratic institutions equally impact on 
political deliberation in Ghana.     
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4.1.1.3 State Power 
Following independence, Ghana was heralded as an exemplary post-colonial state. It was the 
political leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who was to become Ghana’s first president after 
independence, that established the base for the domination of the Ghanaian state as it exists 
today. Nkrumah remained the dominant political figure in Ghanaian politics between 1948 
and 1966. From 1948 to 1957, his leadership was within the context of British colonial 
authority. From independence onwards and with considerable popular support, Nkrumah 
and his CPP attempted to radically transform Ghanaian society. Nkrumah’s approach to 
transformation has been described as ‘economic nationalism’ because it contained elements 
of rapid industrialisation while advocating a strong role for the state in a market economy, as 
the main motor of development.309 Despite some early successes in terms of socio-economic 
development, Nkrumah’s ‘great transformation’ failed to evolve into a sustainable 
development strategy. Even though he managed to break the influence of the previously 
influential chiefs, he provoked an intra-elite conflict over what development path Ghana 
should take.310 In 1966, President Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana’s first military coup. 
The National Liberation Council (NLC) established a new government. This marked a 
turning point in Ghana’s development history. The coup marked the culminating point of 
antagonism between one elite group seeking to radically evolve a new set of institutions for 
politics and society and another seeking to hold on to the inherited colonial socio-economic 
and political order.311 Several authors argue that the systematic attempts to reverse 
Nkrumah’s socialist production system reflect the fundamental conflict within state and 
society between two main elite groups over ideology as to what direction Ghana’s political 
and socio-economic development should take.312  
In 1969, the NLC withdrew itself from politics and handed over power to a civilian 
government. K. A. Busia was elected President and the NLC was confident that the 
incoming government was liberal enough to continue its previous policies. Yet, only three 
years later, the military ousted the civilian government with another coup, led by Colonel 
Acheampong. This put the National Redemption Council (NRC) into power, until it was also 
overthrown through another military coup in 1978. Led by General Akuffo, this inaugurated 
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the brief interlude rule of the Supreme Military Council (SMC). In the words of one 
interviewee:  
From the 1970s up to 1988, things started decaying: massive corruption at 
the centre, so many coups were happening. People were dissatisfied with the 
system.313  
The decade between 1969 and 1979 saw two main regimes imposing two contrasting 
development ideologies on Ghana. Both regimes failed. The first, Busia’s Progress 
Government, was overthrown because its policies, which sought economic efficiency, 
directly struck at the interests of the ‘urban coalition’ that wanted to reassert Nkrumah’s re-
distributive social production system. The other regime, the NRC-SMC, fell because it was 
too interested in re-distributive politics to guarantee its survival, against the background of 
economic decline.314 Comparing these times with today, one interviewee remarked:  
Ghana has actually improved a lot, although many people fail to notice and 
complain. Before, people needed connections to buy a bottle of Coke!315  
In 1979, another military revolt, led by Flight Lieutenant Rawlings, established a new 
military regime. Even though Rawlings handed over power to a civilian government in 1979, 
he staged a second coup in 1981 to take it back again.316 His party, the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC), pursued new ways to grapple with Ghana’s development 
problem. His era marked the final turn from the populist revolution that Nkrumah initiated 
to neoliberal solutions. The worsening economic crisis led the PNDC to finally embrace the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s structural adjustment programme as a 
new attempt to regenerate economically. In 1983, Rawlings’ government thus formulated its 
Economic Recovery Programme as a means to respond to the requirements of the 
international finance institutions.317 During this period, international donors learned to 
consider Ghana as a ‘role model’ for structural adjustment, with a steady growth rate of 
around five percent during the 1990s. Ghana has arguably been more successful with 
stabilization than with adjustment. Ghana's case has come to focus many of the controversies 
about adjustment in Africa. Hutchful concludes that Ghana's adjustment strategy was flawed 
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and unsustainable as well subject to frequent revision by the international financial 
institutions.318  
However, several authors argue that, as a reaction to the ruling regime’s repression 
and depoliticisation in the process of economic restructuring, reawakening societal forces 
pushed the PNDC regime towards ‘political liberalisation’.319 Ghana returned to a multi-party 
system in 1992, when the PNDC regime agreed to adopt a new constitution by referendum. 
It subsequently held national elections that were judged as generally free and fair.320 In 1996, 
the democratic offspring of the PNDC – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) – 
managed to stay in power.321 Even though elections were again judged as free and fair, a 
common complaint was that the NDC exploited advantages of incumbency.322 In contrast to 
the opposition, the government had highly disproportionate resources available.323 Although 
the military structures established during the period of non-constitutional governance 
continued to persist for several years,324 the presidential elections in 2000 eventually resulted 
in a peaceful turnover from the NDC to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Authors are 
optimistic that this transfer of power presented the first test of workability of the 
constitutional limits on presidential tenure.325 In terms of political stability, the electoral 
successes of the NPP in 2000 and recently in 2004 prove that clientelistic relationships of 
incumbents are not the only determinants of political success in Ghana. Ghana passed these 
“first tests of the workability of the constitutional limits on presidential tenure”,326 while the 
political system remained stable enough to further a peaceful transition from personalist to 
democratic rule.327 
                                                 
318  Eboe Hutchful (2002): Ghana's Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
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319  Naomi Chazan (1992): "Liberalization, Governance and Political Space in Ghana", in: Göran Hyden and Michael Bratton 
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Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: Routledge: 92-115. 
  108
4 . 1 . 2  R e f o r m i n g  S t a t e  I n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  G h a n a  
Since 1992, Ghana’s formal political institutions are thus democratic with a constitution that 
allows multi-party elections. A problem with the Ghanaian constitutional system is that it is 
not clear as to whether the political executive should operate as a presidency or a cabinet. 
Even though the cabinet has far-reaching powers with respect to public management and 
fiscal accountability, the president can decide on substantial issues unilaterally.328 In 2005, 
public expenditure management systems in Ghana were based on tenets outlined in the 
Financial Administration Decree and the Financial Administration Regulation of 1979, with 
some innovations introduced by the Economic Management Support Project in 1991 and the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework since 1999. The cabinet’s primary financial role is to 
ensure that the budget reflects the priorities of government. According to the law, it approves 
sectoral allocations recommended by the Ministry of Finance before they are submitted to 
parliament. In 2000, an economic management team consisting of five ministers has been set 
up under the leadership of a Senior Minister. Its role was to consider the budget and the 
economic policy generally and to coordinate economic management within the government. 
It is said to be an important institutional bridge within the whole public expenditure 
management system.329 Nonetheless, the ambiguity of Ghana’s formalised institutions reflects 
the fact that an institutional multiplicity continued to govern national politics well into 
democratic consolidation.  
4.1.2.1 Public Management Reform  
On a superficial level, the workings of government in the past seemed to depend upon which 
party is in power and which minister governs which ministry. Yet, the efficiency of 
government largely depended on how policies were implemented by the civil service. In 
Ghana, employment in the civil service had become an important means of servicing 
patronage networks. Government salaries and selective distribution of resources had become 
a very common way of servicing principal-agent relationships. In response, the Structural 
Adjustment Programme of the 1980s stated that “a reconstruction of the Ghana Civil Service 
machinery was absolutely necessary if appreciable results were to be obtained.”330 Yet, a 
                                                 
328  For a discussion of these obstacles, see Colin Campbell, Bidhya Bowornwathana, et al. (2000): "Failure of Ministerial 
Responsibility and Its Consequences for Policy Competence", Paper presented at the 'First Düsseldorf Seminar on the 
Center of Government, 23-26 November, Düsseldorf: University of Düsseldorf. 
329  Kojo Oduro (2003): "Results-Oriented Public Expenditure Management: Case Study of Ghana", Working Paper 2008, 
London: Overseas Development Institute. 
330  Government of Ghana (2004): "Towards a New Public Service for Ghana: A Working Document", Accra: Office of the 
Senior Minister - Public Sector Reform Secretariat. 8.    
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government representative stressed that informal political processes would need to be taken 
into account 
You know it is like… you want to reengineer the system. That requires a 
very careful understanding of how things are connected. So I think it is 
something that needs very careful steps. It is not something that should be 
seen as ‘downsizing’ or – those are the jargons – ‘rightsizing’. That’s not the 
idea.331 
Since 1987, numerous reform efforts had been made to address the various issues 
impeding efficient service delivery to the public. Most of them only achieved mixed results. A 
recent examination of public sector reform was undertaken by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
The study raised “doubts about the relevance and worth of the reforms,” drawing attention 
to the capacity gaps, low morale in the public service, weak human resources management, 
and a lack of ownership of the reforms as well as an inability to institutionalise change.332 A 
similar study put forward a similar assessment and pointed out that the reform agenda was 
“too massive for effective coordination.”333 Often, international donors were disappointed by 
the limited scope that actual reforms had. One donor representative commented on the 
public service reform:  
Two or three weeks ago – and more than half a year after they said they 
would – cabinet agreed on the reform of the public service, which they 
thinned down to an incentive package for managing directors in the public 
service. That wasn’t really what it was meant to be.334  
These disappointing results of the reform efforts do not surprise if one keeps in mind that 
there is a continuing pattern of discontinuing moral imperatives between the private and the 
public sphere in Ghana’s state-society relationships. That explains why the Government of 
Ghana has been so reluctant to tackle the efficiency problems of the state sector. Even 
though it might have been obvious that the formal structures of government institutions 
were not functioning effectively, the government could not efficiently tackle efficiency 
problems because of underlying informal political processes. One government representative 
commented:  
[A drastic reform project] requires a very careful analysis and a very careful 
balance. So, the public sector reform should not be done in a rush. It should 
be done with caution and with serious consideration of the various 
                                                 
331 Interview with a government representative, No. 106, Accra, 27 August 2004. 
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parameters involved, and making it very clear that it doesn’t actually create 
any social unrests or social imbalances.335   
A common view in Ghana is that the different public sector reforms had been the “brain-
children of various donors, with weak governmental ownership, leading to the usual 
complaint of weak political commitment.”336 For example, a concerted effort, led by the 
World Bank, managed to downsize the civil service during the 1990s, only for it to 
“mushroom out of proportion”337 again after the 2000 elections. At the time, the new 
incoming government had to give away positions within the government’s civil service to its 
supporters; civil service reform became a secondary issue. The continuing amorality of the 
civil public presents a substantial hurdle to public management reform in Ghana, even when 
it is government-initiated.   
4.1.2.2 Budget Accountability 
In 2004, the Ghanaian government displayed a substantial fragmentation of responsibilities in 
fiscal policy, budgeting and management systems.338 Institutionally, the Ministry of Finance 
was responsible for the budget and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional 
Cooperation and the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) for planning. 
These arrangements had lead to institutional rivalry. In addition, there was a general 
misunderstanding about the role of the Ministry of Finance among donors. They seemed to 
perceive the Ministry of Finance as the main actor determining spending priorities. In 2004, 
the majority of cooperation programmes were anchored in the Ministry of Finance. In fact, 
the Ministry had an External Resource Mobilisation Division subdivided in desks that 
serviced cooperation with the government’s major donors. Since Multi-Donor Budget 
Support was initiated, the Ministry of Finance was usually the donor’s first point of contact 
to negotiate cooperation programmes and funding priorities. This might have originally been 
a stopgap solution, considering the scarce resources in the line ministries and their lack of 
decision-making authority. Consequentially, the priorities of an all encompassing support 
programme like the Multi-Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) were supposed to be managed 
by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry, however, had shied away from determining the 
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338 For a discussion of these obstacles, see Colin Campbell, Bidhya Bowornwathana, et al. (2000): "Failure of Ministerial 
Responsibility and Its Consequences for Policy Competence", Paper presented at the 'First Düsseldorf Seminar on the 
Center of Government, 23-26 November, Düsseldorf: University of Düsseldorf.   
  111
government’s priorities for funding, as that would have opened the space for contestation of 
its decisions.339 One donor representative argued: 
The Ministry of Finance is more of a gate keeper than a [decision-maker] 
determining the priorities. In fact, they are doing that by the allocation of 
funding but it should be the other way around.340  
This observer spotted the easy way in which the ministry had avoided inter-cabinet 
confrontation about allocation of funds, while still being able to influence the 
implementation of favoured policies through the de facto allocation of funds.  
According to the constitution, parliament passes the Annual Appropriation Bill that 
sets out all government expenditures for the year to hold the government accountable.341 
However, there were complaints that government expenditure did not reflect the budget that 
was agreed on in parliament.342 In addition, members of parliament were not normally 
effective in debating the budget because, most of the time, they receive the budget only a few 
days before the hearing and were therefore not able to read it critically.343 Government 
expenditure was governed both by the formal needs of efficient service delivery and a 
formalised budgetary process, and by informal requirements of elaborate patronage 
networks. This is a common problem in many African countries. Government has to subject 
itself to the resource allocation decisions of parliament but does not necessarily adhere to 
these decisions afterwards. In a country like Ghana, where accountability was still low, there 
were few ways to hold a government accountable to its budget plan. This problem was only 
worsened by the vast array of donor-funded programmes with their particular accounting 
mechanisms. Concern was on the rise that government accountability to the donors would 
replace government accountability to their national constituents:  
Accountability must come back to the government, the constituents should 
be stronger. There are sometimes conflicts that arise because of these 
particular arrangements. Sometimes the government is torn between the 
donors on the one hand and their constituents on the other.344  
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Often donors programmes did not show in the official budget of the government. In fact, 
donor-funded programmes had become one useful way of diverting funds to different 
sectors without acknowledgement in the budget. For example, in the education sector, the 
national budget allocated hardly any resources to infrastructure, only to salaries.345 Since 
education was always a major concern to international donors, the government counted on 
external funds for infrastructural items and used its own funds exclusively to maintain the 
extended public sector that underpinned Ghanaian patronage networks.  
In 2001, the NPP government introduced a Comprehensive Management Reform 
Action Plan, to address the weak budget formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation, poor flows of information, deficiencies in accounting and auditing practices, the 
too many existing government accounts, and the lack of awareness on the part of 
government employees of the need to be accountable for their financial responsibilities.346 
Nonetheless, studies have revealed that the budgetary process in Ghana was still largely non-
transparent, with a large discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures. Evidence 
suggests that biases between estimates on the budget and actual expenditure were relatively 
systematic.347 There were several key causes for this problem: necessary information for 
budget monitoring and control did not exist; the budget structure was inflexible and did not 
allow for adaptations during the fiscal year; and large amounts of allocated funds never 
reached their point of service delivery. The deviations between budget estimates and actual 
dispersals were considerable. For example, Killick’s study found that for the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Health, the mean deviations between 2001 and 2003 were ±42 
and ±68, respectively.348 In a less important government agency, the National Commission 
for Civil Education, the mean deviation during the same period was ±33. When these 
aggregations for the entire agency in question were split up into more disaggregated data, 
Killick’s study showed that – in the majority of cases – the budget underestimated spending 
on salaries and overestimated everything else. This is interesting to note in a case where 
personnel costs are suspected to be a major tool to service patronage networks.  
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Table 10:  Budget Deviations 
 Salaries 
Admini-
stration 
Services 
Capital 
Formation 
Ministry of Education +45 -26 -39 -56 
Ministry of Health +76 -48 -67 -80 
National Commission for 
Civil Education 
+20 -3 -39 -60 
Source: (Killick 2004: 6-7) 
With such deviations, it is impossible to maintain that the budget process is a relevant 
indicator for how government spends its resources. They support the claim of many critics 
that the budget was largely a “ritualised façade, bearing little relation to the actual pattern of 
state spending.”349 The fact that large sums of money disappeared before reaching service 
delivery is a problem common to many developing countries prone to corruption.350 
However, the two other causes – lack of information for budget monitoring and inflexible 
budget structures – further indicate that there was a discrepancy between formalised 
procedures and informal workings of the government. The inflexible budget structure was a 
response to formalised commitments of the government. There were statutory items of 
expenditure, such as interest payments on the public debt, that could not be reallocated 
easily. A high proportion of capital formation expenditures were also statutory obligations. 
This left only administration and services as the main discretionary elements. In practice, 
such a limitation made it difficult for any government to effectively work with the estimated 
budget. Sadly, it did not seem that the situation was improving through measures to make the 
budget more accountable, despite concerted donor efforts to reform the financial 
management system. “The budget is not taken seriously.”351 Again, the reason why 
government did not do well with its budgetary process lies in part in the neo-patrimonial 
structure of the state. A civil society representative commented:  
There are a lot of lapses of the MDAs overshooting their expenditure ceiling. 
But actually the biggest problem for Ghana has been controlling the wage 
line item, rather than the MDA allocation. And the wage number is actually 
not being driven by the MDAs. There is a controller general who is issuing 
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the cheques and he is reporting to the central government and not to the 
MDAs.352  
Wages are the most effective means for the government of ensuring strategic alliances with 
its clients. When patrons have to serve the interests of their clients that are in contradiction 
with their formalised role within the government structure, they have an interest in an 
obscure and non-transparent budgetary process. The skewed budgetary process in Ghana 
was one of the many facets of the public service problem that evolved out of tensions 
between a formalised procedures oriented towards the public good and an actual politics 
aimed at servicing patron-client relationships. As long as public debate remains largely amoral 
and does not demand  transparent budgetary processes, the government is unlikely to 
increase transparency just for the sake of it. In the context of a largely amoral public, Ghana’s 
political legacies of clientelism and patronage networks present severe obstacles to the goal of 
improved budget accountability.  
4 . 2  T h e  S t a t e  a n d  N a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s  i n  
B o l i v i a  
Similarly to Ghana, Bolivia experienced a history of colonial conquest.353 Like in Africa, 
colonialism resulted in a profound societal transformation, albeit in different ways. Bolivia 
gained independence from Spain already in 1809 but many Spanish settlers stayed on and 
formed a Spanish-speaking urban elite that came to dominate the indigenous peasant 
majority.354 What is more, the Spanish colonisation had transformed the region into a silver 
mining industry and converted parts of the indigenous peasant population into industrial 
labour. The independence movement in 1809 marked the beginning of nation-state creation 
for Bolivia, with several territorial and governmental reshuffles.355 Due to settlement patterns, 
Bolivia also inherited a system marked by extreme localism, with provincial elites – usually of 
European descent – more interested in their region than in the nation. Furthermore, the new 
republic also inherited a strong tradition of militarism and political violence as a result of 
independence and territorial wars. All these factors created the classic Latin American 
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phenomenon of caudillismo, in which regional strongmen dominated the political landscape, at 
least until the end of the nineteenth century.356 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
silver mining was replaced by tin and political parties started to develop.357 The caudillo regime 
was gradually replaced by early civilian oligarchic republican governments, dominated by a 
European-descended resource-owning elite.  
4 . 2 . 1  P o l i t i c a l  L e g a c i e s  i n  B o l i v i a  
Between 1932 and 1935 , the Chaco war with Paraguay – initially a conflict over oil fields in 
the Chaco region – destroyed the previous civilian political system, inaugurating several 
military juntas. Repression under these authoritarian regimes gave rise to a more radical leftist 
ideology and union organisation of the indigenous mining labour.358 It was in this context, 
and following an economic depression in late 1951, that the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR), in opposition to the military, opened up the armouries to the public to 
start the national revolution of 1952.359 The national revolution was won by the coalition of 
armed miners and the radical middle class elements in the MNR, which represented a new 
type of populist movement.360 It introduced universal suffrage and supported the miners 
when they set up a new national labour federation, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). The 
clientelistic orientation of the new political system was obvious:  
In 1952, the MNR created a political system that included the unions, in 
which it co-opted the people by means of clientelistic mechanisms.361  
Even though the COB was politically neutral, it became a powerful ally of the MNR.362 The 
early MNR leadership under presidents Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo 
nationalised the tin mines and large absentee-owned haciendas. In the countryside, peasants 
began to organise in unions, sindicatos, and seized all the lands in the highlands from the 
former landowning elite. This would set the grounds for a long period of corporatist state-
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building and political clientelism. However, the relatively unpopulated Santa Cruz region and 
southern medium-sized hacienda regions were little affected by land reform and the 
profound social transformations that it entailed due to its modest capital-intensive agriculture 
and no resident indigenous population.363 However, since then the Santa Cruz region was 
enjoying an economic boom, partly because of the discovery of oil reserves but much of it 
was due to the commercialisation of agriculture.364  
In 1964, the army replaced the re-elected president Paz Estenssoro by a military junta 
headed by the vice president, General Barrientos. From then on, the military remained the 
dominant force in politics until 1982.365 In 1971, another military coup followed that put 
General Banzer into power. Although he was initially supported by parts of the MNR, he 
eventually established a non-party government and exiled Paz Estenssoro in 1974. This break 
with representative traditions even during military rule was underpinned by national 
economic growth that created popular support despite authoritarian tendencies.366 Politically, 
military rule forged patron-client relations with campesino movements, which replaced the 
patronage ties that the MNR had established with the union movements.367 While the MNR 
forged strong clientelistic relationships with the miners unions, military governments built a 
corporatist state on a military-campesino pact. Corporatism appeared to be the most reliable 
way to avoid political destabilisation through regime-challenging social movements in 
Bolivia.368  
4.2.1.1 The Public Realm 
Since Bolivia’s economic development was always based on resource-dependent exports – 
silver, tin, and recently oil and gas – it failed to incorporate large parts of society. Bolivia’s 
history since the national revolution has been marked by corporatist state-building, relying on 
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pacts between the MNR and the union movements and later between the military 
governments and the peasant associations.369 Following the national revolution, peasant 
union movements have become stronger and more ethnically conscious. By 2004, around 40 
percent of Bolivia’s workforce was still employed in the agricultural sector, where only 15 
percent of the national income was generated.370 The few formerly excluded groups that 
managed to be included into the formal political system – most prominently the miners – had 
been incorporated from above rather than integrated as autonomous movements.371 Rarely, 
societal strongholds could pressure the government for inclusion in democratic politics. 
Because of this, an elitist parliamentary democracy continued to exist:  
This is a society with many privileges, very exclusive. It is easy to distinguish 
between the people and particular political and economic groups that enjoy 
many privileges.372  
A positive aspect of Bolivian social movements was that through them previously 
marginalized parts of society were increasingly participating in national politics. However, 
their participation had taken quite violent forms, outside of the realm of traditional politics. 
Street blockades had become the dominant form of protest and the resulting cost for 
Bolivia’s economy was high. The fundamental challenge for politics in Bolivia was to bridge 
the gulf between mass protest and the official policy process.373 These tensions culminated in 
2003 and 2005, when street protests and blockades forced two successive presidents to 
resign. Political mobilisation of the of the largely indigenous, union and syndicate dominated 
social movements led to the sweeping victory of Evo Morales, the leader of the leftist 
Movimiento al Socialimo (MAS), in the 2005 presidential elections. While the public realm in 
Bolivia continued to be defined by the tensions between resource-owning urban elites and 
largely indigenous social movements, the election of Evo Morales presented an opportunity 
to engage with these tensions by means of political deliberation.  
4.2.1.2 Clientelism 
Just like in Ghana, clientelistic relationships constituted a major obstacle to the consolidation 
of democratic institutions and to inclusive politics. Despite democratic reforms, the Bolivian 
state continued to be weak and coalition-dependent, while patterns of clientelistic politics, 
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prebendalismo in particular, persisted. The term prebendalismo comes from the Latin word 
præbenda, which originally denoted an endowment given to a member of the clergy. Max 
Weber speaks of prebendal more generally to denote the endowment of non-heredity 
sinecures to uphold personal relations.374 Prebendalismo denotes politics where an office in the 
bureaucracy of the state is granted in return for favours or political loyalty. An interviewee 
commented on the situation in Bolivia:  
The political parties get created to satisfy their appetites. So that, if for me 
eleven ministers are enough to rule the country, I need to deliver sixteen; 
because I have a buddy, another buddy and the quota is not enough. So, you 
don’t have a vision of development that depends on your objectives. You 
have a vision of your structural objectives in terms of ministerial design that 
responds to these objectives.375  
In Bolivia, political parties always depended more on the state than on the resources and 
support provided by developing linkages with society. So great has been the dependency on 
the state that some view Bolivian parties merely as extensions of the state. Without access to 
its sources of wealth, parties tended to disappear quickly.376 This was also true for the 
different institutionalised relationships that social and union movements have had with 
different governments over time. These co-gobierno or co-gestión arrangements have given the 
Bolivian state distinct corporatist features over time.377 
In the early 1990s, Sánchez de Lozada’s Law of Popular Participation was an attempt 
to weaken existing clientelistic relationships with the unions.378 It’s territorial focus of popular 
participation has challenged these clientelistic relationships as the only means of national-to-
local networks. Yet, particular forms of clientelism continued until the 1990s. To also secure 
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a legislative majority, Sánchez de Lozada pieced together a coalition agreement known as the 
‘Pact for Governability’. 379  
I think because of very exceptional people that were in government during 
that moment… Goni – even though he left in a very bad way – was 
nevertheless a very special guy. He was a special guy in that moment. Goni’s 
policy, like a good liberal… “Let’s see who sells the good ideas. What is there 
to buy?” […] That’s how Goni was, atypical, that’s not how presidents work 
in Bolivia.380  
Another part of Sánchez de Lozada’s electoral appeal at the time stemmed from his alliance 
with one of the most significant campesino parties, the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement 
of Liberation (MRTKL). This made the MRTKL leader Cárdenas the first indigenous vice-
president in Bolivia's history. Under their ‘Plan for Everyone’ platform, Sánchez de Lozada 
and Cárdenas campaigned with the promise of social and institutional reforms to improve 
the condition of Bolivia's historically neglected indigenous majority.381 Nonetheless, 
fragments of the past continued to influence and mould practices of the present and future.  
When campesino mayors under Popular Participation follow the sindicato 
tradition of rotating posts for office or local clienteles capture public office 
in the tradition of corporatist politics, we encounter the legacy of multi-
layered state building in its starkest form.382  
Bolivia’s political landscape continues to be marked by multiple traditions and informal 
politics that circumvent the formalised ‘rules of the game’ of the existing democratic system. 
4.2.1.3 State Power 
It is easy to take Bolivia’s centralist tradition and the political influence of the military until 
1982 as a sign of a strong state. Yet, in the sense of a state enjoying both autonomy and 
decision-making capacity, such a situation has not been the case. Until 2005, the Bolivian 
government proved to be unable to impose its policies on the national territory. Localism 
prevailed whenever local interests conflict with national ones. In 2004/2005, this had been 
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the case in the Santa Cruz region, where tensions between the Santa Cruz district and the 
central government had increased because of a proposed Law on Hydrocarbons. In 2005, the 
district was demanding autonomy from the Bolivian state.  
In 1997, congress re-elected General Banzer to the presidency. When Banzer died in 
2001, his vice president ‘Tuto’ Quiroga took office until the elections of 2002. In 2002, 
Sánchez de Lozada was re-elected president, but was forced out of office by social unrest in 
October 2003. He had not managed to secure the same support for his politics that he had 
from the indigenous majority during the 1990s. His vice president, Carlos Mesa, took office. 
Yet, Bolivia’s economic crisis worsened and public unrest continued to increase.383  
When coming into office, Carlos Mesa promised a national referendum on gas 
exports – the issue that had sparked unrest against Sánchez de Lozada. He also promised a 
Constituent Assembly to deliberate on Bolivia’s constitution and in order to open up a 
discussion about land issues and vertical divisions of power in Bolivia.384 By then, Santa Cruz 
had become the economically most potent of all districts in Bolivia, unaffected by the land 
reforms of the 1950s. It had developed large-scale agriculture and was extracting natural gas 
in the South, transforming the economic basis of Bolivia as a whole.385 The urban middle 
classes in Santa Cruz were thus weary of the constituent assembly; they feared that Santa 
Cruz would have to succumb to higher taxation and indigenous demands for land 
redistribution. When asked what issues were likely to be discussed by the constituent 
assembly proposed for 2005, a government representative responded in 2004:  
Well, in fact it will be land and territory, the political mission of the country – 
meaning liberalism, autonomy, etc. –, political reforms – that is to say direct 
election of the president, second term of office, direct election of the prefectos, 
election of uninominal candidates – , the special regimes, the armed forces, the 
police, economic development… all these elements will be there, for sure.386  
These fears led to urban protests in Santa Cruz in early 2005, which eventually forced Mesa 
to promise Santa Cruz a special arrangement outside of the constituent assembly. In a way, 
this undermined the whole constituent assembly process because the assembly’s 
recommendations could not be applied to the Santa Cruz district. Yet, Santa Cruz was 
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unwilling to support the national process and went as far as demanding autonomy from 
Bolivia. With that attitude, traditional localism continued to undermine national goals. A 
socio-political analysis of prospects for governance reform has to take these factors into 
account, as they determine the political realm – most evidently the possibilities for change 
proposed by the constituent assembly. On top of this, protests in 2005 continued to demand 
the nationalisation of the Bolivian gas industry – a proposal rejected by the resource-owning 
elite in Santa Cruz. Caught between two antagonistic pressure groups, Mesa resigned in May 
2005, arguing the country had become ungovernable.  
Another issue concerns the relatively limited constitutional power of the legislative. 
For example, the constitution allows key changes in economic policy to be introduced by the 
executive without parliamentary approval.387 But even in areas where Congress has 
constitutional responsibilities, its impact so far has been weak. This was partly due to poorly 
developed committee systems and representatives’ lack of sufficient staff. Yet, it also 
reflected the fact that party politics determine governmental approaches outside of formal 
institutional arrangements. Whenever possible, party leaders preferred to strike deals and to 
manage politics from the backstage instead of going through the tedious channels of 
established representative institutions.388 The political system that had evolved after 1985 has 
often been referred to as ‘pacted’ democracy. 389 Coalition governments were the norm 
because the proportional representation system rarely allowed for single parties to emerge as 
a governing majority. In conjunction with patronage tendencies in Bolivia, this tended to 
produce coalitions based on ‘deals’ rather than on programmatic or ideological affinity.390 In 
sum, political decision-making power of the executive as well as of the legislative was weak 
and frequently put into question.  
In October [2003], we have seen that the fundamental problems of our 
country are exclusion, injustice, racism. They have been reinforced by 
structural problems like corruption, civil insecurity, the crisis of political 
representation, the menace of drug traffic… Then these circumstantial 
problems have merged with these structural problems and have produced a 
social convulsion with enormous problems that oblige all Bolivians to re-
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define the social pact. That means redefining our constitution, with all the 
evident risks.391  
Social protest continued to challenge government decisions on the use of public resources, 
most prominently around the issues of gas or water. The opposition of middle classes in 
economically potent parts of the country limited the state’s ability to respond to these kinds 
of protest. By 2005, it had become apparent that the political unrest in Bolivia was not so 
much an antagonism between the state and society but rather an expression of tension and 
opposition between different societal groups. 
4 . 2 . 2  R e f o r m i n g  S t a t e  I n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  B o l i v i a  
Bolivia’s public administration has undergone substantial changes since democratisation in 
the 1980s. The process of state transformation and modernisation, which followed the 
programme of adjustment and economic stabilisation initiated in 1985, was oriented towards 
a regulatory state that facilitates private activity and towards more decentralised political 
processes. Most prominently, the Law of Popular Participation in 1994 aimed at 
decentralising to the level of municipality and at transforming the state-society relationship in 
order to create mechanisms to redistribute community resources, to articulate demands and 
to represent the organised community. In 1995, the law was complemented by the Law of 
Administrative Decentralisation. The two expanded the municipal jurisdiction to its rural 
areas, thus including formerly excluded parts of the population into local policy-making.392 
This reform process has received major attention from donors and academics worldwide.393 
However, up until the late 1990s, Bolivia’s central administration and budgeting and financial 
management processes generally remained unreformed.  
4.2.2.1 Public Management Reform  
Bolivia’s move towards a results-oriented budgeting and financial management approach 
began in the late 1980s. Building on earlier initiatives, the System of Fiscal Administration 
and Governmental Control Law (SAFCO) passed in 1990 became the centrepiece of public 
financial management legislation. It was intended to focus public managers on results, 
transparency, and accountability. The law covered various systems, including planning, 
personnel, accounting and controls. Its objective was to improve central oversight in order to 
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enable operational decentralisation. One of the most important requirements was that 
ministries were asked to develop annual operational plans (POAs), which contained lists of 
indicators and targets that would form the basis of budgeting decisions and performance 
evaluations. Sectoral reforms – like the education or health reform in 1994 and 1999, 
respectively – further bolstered these requirements by translating them into sectoral 
standards.394 Yet, these measures appeared to have little effect.395 The World Bank reacted 
with the establishment of an institutional reform appraisal document. Faced with these 
outside pressures and substantial public criticism of its corruption problem, the government 
prepared a National Integrity Plan and an Institutional Reform Project (PRI) in 1999. The 
programme included measures for improving the justice sector, modernising public 
administration, and developing new mechanisms to fight corruption. It aimed at improving 
the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of public administration “in order to strengthen 
the country’s ability to implement its economic and social development programs and thus to 
combat poverty”.396 A core element involved the competitive recruitment of all agency or 
ministry staff through private companies and agreements that would tie organisations to 
performance. Clearly, Bolivia’s institutional reform agenda throughout the past twenty years 
has been extraordinarily ambitious. However, implementation was uneven and 
disappointing.397 Yet, many donors in Bolivia were aware that their expectations had been 
unrealistic:  
Before, Bolivia was an ‘overachiever’ with respect to the requirements of the 
international donors. That led us to think that the social structure of this 
country could be changed overnight, in three years or something like that. 
But that’s not possible. […] Today, we are asking ourselves: What went 
wrong?398 
On a sectoral level such as education and health, partial successes have been made 
while some areas of reform have not been implemented at all. For example, the Monitoring 
and Evaluation System for Results-Based Public Management was implemented by the 
Ministry of the Presidency had generally not been integrated into core government processes. 
Performance monitoring was carried out in a perfunctory way, with little regard for the 
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quality of the information provided.399 In addition, targets were often not linked to budget 
allocation or to human resource availability. In other words, the façade of results-oriented 
management was kept up, while traditional norms and values continued to define how to get 
things done on an everyday basis. Some government representatives argued that international 
donors are also partly to blame for this divergence: 
Many times a national budget gets approved and then the [a donor] comes 
and says, “I have thirty million dollar.” Then, they do an agreement between 
the Ambassador, the Bolivian Vice-Minister, and between them, they’ll 
distribute the money to the regions – outside of the development plan, 
outside of the budget.400  
The formal reform rules seem to have achieved little management change in most areas of 
government, falling short of introducing effective personnel management, binding financial 
controls, accountability, and client responsiveness.  
4.2.2.2 Budget Accountability  
The World Bank’s institutional reform appraisal document on Bolivia indicated that, despite 
a legal framework for reform, “the goals of allocative optimisation and efficient resource use 
are not being achieved.”401 The report indicates that the budget was still based on inertial line 
item adjustments instead of strategic policy considerations. It was not linked to medium-term 
strategic priorities, and its ‘strategic’ nature was undermined by long delays of approval, ad 
hoc adjustments during approval and the influence of overriding cash limits and 
unpredictable spending caps during execution.402 A donor representative commented on the 
budget process: 
The budget tends to be inflated. In other words, it has larger spending limits 
than can actually be executed. As a result, the practical implementation of the 
budget is not decided by congress. In the end, it results from pressures that 
particular sectors exert on government.403  
However, line agencies continued to lack effective responsibility over their own budget 
planning, formulation, and implementation activities because the Ministry of Finance 
continued to control such activities at too detailed a level. In many ways, the Bolivian public 
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management system displays many features of a highly clientelistic system where little trust 
existed between different governmental agencies to serve the needs of the public. 
Unfortunately congress also made little progress in improving its role in making strategic 
allocation decisions.404 Many observers lamented that congress could not effectively 
guarantee accountability of the budget, since the budget discussed in congress did not reflect 
actual spending patterns: 
This country needs a lot more transparency on fiscal budget issues, in several 
ways. In one way, the budget discussed in congress is not the same like the 
economic budget that is implemented. […] In many countries the budgetary 
logic is that it goes to congress, which is the legitimate representative of the 
people and of democracy, and congress discussed the country’s priorities on 
public expenditure and the guidelines of fiscal policy – with the budget 
matching, or better matching the fiscal programme. The discussion has to be 
much broader.405  
This statement was echoed by another donor representative, who also complained that 
government needed to find additional sources of funding to cover the gaps between the 
inflated political budget and the actual spending limits:  
Congress discusses a political budget but the government spends an 
economic budget. They spend what they have or whatever else they can get a 
hold of. They go and collect.406  
The weaknesses of the budget process was related to a more general problem: the 
relative weakness of congress as opposed to the executive. Bolivia’s political system has been 
characterised as a ‘parliamentarised presidentialism’.407 Even though the president is elected 
by the Bolivian congress, he is able to pass decrees that overrule its legislative authority. It has 
become common practice in Bolivia that the president uses his coalition in congress to pass 
laws proposed by the executive. This practice is publicly referred to as ‘government roller’ .408 
In addition, parliamentarians often discuss the budget with only their constituency in mind 
and without a view of approving a workable budget for the country as a whole. A donor 
representative explained:  
It takes time, it’s not easy in any country of the world. Statistically it’s 
complicated because at the moment when it enters congress it’s much 
smaller, so it’s more realistic. But then each person in congress wants 
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government expenditure in his or her constituency to be higher. Then it’s 
more difficult because the resulting budget is less realistic but politically 
easier.409  
In sum, both executive and legislative displayed characteristics of a still largely clientelistic 
system, where the common public good was often a secondary concern. It is difficult to 
assess in how far spending patterns diverged from the budget discussed in parliament but 
interviewees’ lack of trust in the process indicate substantial divergences. In the past, 
congress has largely failed to act as an instance that can hold government accountable for 
public expenditure.  
4 . 3  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  F o u r  
In both Ghana and Bolivia, the state is deeply embedded in society. The interaction between 
state actors and social forces has a heavy impact on national politics and on the prospects for 
institutional reform in both countries. In particular, the constitution of the public realm 
defines the way in which the state can impose its authority over its citizens. In both Ghana 
and Bolivia, the public realm presents a substantial challenge to state imposition, albeit in 
very different ways. In addition, different forms of clientelism and patron-client relationships 
shape national politics in both Ghana and Bolivia, although the kinds of clientelism are 
different in each case. State power – understood as the capacity of the state to legitimate its 
domination – in both countries is confronted by several obstacles. Yet, the authority of the 
Ghanaian state seemed to be relatively uncontested, while Bolivian politics were paralysed by 
increasing civil unrest that challenged state authority to the point of making Bolivia 
ungovernable in 2005.  
It can be argued that two publics exist in Ghana, one that relates to the state and one 
in which public affairs are dealt with in separation from the state, by means of hometown or 
neighbourhood associations, religious organisations and the like. Because of this divergence 
between the two publics, citizens are often relatively apathetic towards affairs of the state and 
politically engage in the primordial public instead. However, this apathy towards the state 
does not directly challenge state domination in the way that social protest does in Bolivia. 
The dynamic of the two public also explains particular forms of clientelism that define the 
neo-patrimonial state in Ghana. Incumbents of public offices feel first and foremost obliged 
to service their patronage networks. Because of a collective memory of colonial history and 
because of actual experiences with the inefficiency of the state, they cannot relate the abstract 
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principle of public service to the benefits of particular communities they would like to 
support. However, civil opposition to the military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s have 
managed to constitute a more engaged society that has challenged the domination of the 
militarily ruled state. Since the PNDC’s transition to democratic governance, the authority of 
the state in Ghana has been relatively uncontested, particularly since the democratic 
transition of government from the NDC to the NPP in 2000. It seems the governments’ 
endeavours to civilianise national politics have resulted in increased legitimacy of state 
authority.  
In Bolivia, the picture looks very different. Apathy is not a characteristic of the 
Bolivian public realm. Throughout the past century, state domination has continuously been 
challenged by social movements’ contestation of power, having resulted in the National 
Revolution in 1952, the military-campesino pact during the 1970s and a paralysed government 
in 2005. Different governments have dealt with this contestation by means of state 
corporatism, by which dominant social movements have become co-opted into government. 
As a result, national as well as local politics display features of a particular form of clientelism, 
prebendalism, in which state posts are exchanged for political loyalties. More recently, the 
Law of Popular Participation was an attempt to break social movements influence in national 
politics. Although effective, these reforms have revealed that the tensions between the state 
and campesino and indigenous movements contain important regional elements that have 
come to the fore in 2004. Increasing divisions between the different regions in Bolivia 
around the issue of natural gas production burdened state-society relations to the verge of 
paralysis in 2005.  
Against these contexts of state-society relationships, institutional reform projects 
appeared to be more difficult to sustain than they would seem to have been at first glance. In 
Ghana, the continuing pattern of discontinuing moral imperatives between the private and 
the public sphere made reforming the public management and improving budget 
accountability a difficult undertaking. Similarly, deep-rooted forms of clientelism in both 
countries made sweeping public management reform difficult to implement and even more 
difficult to sustain. Even though such reforms have increasingly become conditionalities for 
international donor funding, both Ghanaian and Bolivian governments have half-heartedly 
implemented agreed reform agendas, while subsequent incoming governments have partly 
reversed initial successes. Similarly, budget accountability left much to be desired in both 
Ghana and Bolivia. In both countries, deviations between estimated budgets and actual 
expenditures appeared to be large. The parliaments in both countries, as the elected body to 
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represent the citizens., did not manage to live up to their ideal-typical function of providing a 
check and balance on government expenditure.  
In both countries, the ritualised façade of results-oriented public management reform 
and measures to improve budget accountability was kept up, while traditional norms and 
values continued to define how to get things done on an everyday basis. Donor efforts to 
support these reform processes have further widened this disjuncture between formal and 
informal managements. Some scholars argue that donor cooperation can improve public 
expenditure management wherever a certain degree of budget and public finance 
management discipline is already in place. However, past reform attempts show that it is 
unlikely that accountability to donors eventually results in improved accountabilities of the 
public administrators to parliament and to non-governmental stakeholders as long as the 
pressure from these stakeholders remains low.410 In Ghana and in Bolivia, concerted reform 
efforts of international donors have yet to manage to make governments more accountable 
to their citizens. It is against this background that direct budget support takes place in Ghana 
and partially also in Bolivia. 
 
                                                 
410  John Roberts (2003): "Managing Public Expenditure for Development Results: A Role for Results-Oriented Public 
Expenditure Management", in: Development Policy Review, 22 (6): 623-651. 
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C H A P T E R  5   –  P O L I C Y  D I A L O G U E  A N D  
D I R E C T  B U D G E T  S U P P O R T  
In chapter four, I have argued that the socio-political context in Ghana and Bolivia matters 
for the effectiveness and sustainability of development cooperation programmes that aim to 
tackle political reform. In this chapter, I specifically look at direct budget support 
mechanisms in development cooperation as a tool for policy dialogue around public sector 
management reform. Ghana is a particularly good case to evaluate such dialogue because it is 
one of the countries where donors have recently established a multi-donor budgetary support 
(MDBS) mechanism. Building on the poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) experience of both 
Ghana and Bolivia, I discuss the Ghanaian MDBS experience, while using the case of Bolivia 
for comparative purposes.  
The idea of budget support springs from the current interest in development 
cooperation to foster government ownership. In a way, this is a step back to development 
cooperation of the early days, when aid commitments were originally designed to fill the 
resource gaps in the recipient countries’ macro-economy. As I discussed in chapter three, 
‘projectised’ aid and structural adjustment conditionality during the last three decades of the 
twentieth century had shifted the focus away from the recipient government’s own budget 
process. However, during this period many aid recipient countries experienced unsustainable 
fiscal and current account deficits, partly due to high levels of debt stock. The 1990s 
witnessed a globally decreasing trend in official development assistance (ODA) to developing 
countries,411 which triggered debates about how to make less aid more effective.412 As a 
result, two strategies gained prominence in development assistance: developing new or 
                                                 
411  Aleš Bulír and Timothy Lane (2002): "Aid and Fiscal Management", IMF Working Papers 02/112, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund; Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (1998): "Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why", NBER 
Working Paper, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
412  The aid effectiveness debate was sparked by Constantine Michalopoulos and V. Shukatme (1989): "The Impact of 
Development Assistance: A Review of the Quantitative Evidence", in: Anne Krueger, et al. (eds.), Aid and Development. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Howard White (1992): "The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A 
Critical Survey", in: Journal of Development Studies, 28 (2): 163–240; Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997): "Aid, Policies 
and Growth", Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1777, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
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innovative sources of finance for development,413 and finding new ways to make existing 
financial assistance more effective.414 
Budget support aims at making aid more effective by granting greater reform 
ownership to the recipient government in order to make reforms sustainable in the long run. 
The idea is that all donors who subscribe to the multi-donor budget support mechanism pay 
into one single fund. Direct budget support can either take the form of general budget 
support or sector budget support.415 ‘General budget support’ refers to financial assistance 
that goes into the overall budget with any conditionalities related to overall budget priorities 
but without earmarked funds for a particular sector. ‘Sector budget support’ refers to 
financial assistance that goes directly into the budget of one sector, with conditionalities 
relating to the particular sector. In principle, the recipient government then has the 
prerogative to determine which priority areas it wants to spend the funds on, within the 
realms of its own budgetary process. The argument in favour of budget support is that 
uncoordinated aid to recipient governments means an extra burden on the already scarce 
capacities of the cooperating government ministries.416 Often, these agencies have to respond 
to different donor priorities, accounting structures and monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms. Budget support aims at making the inflow of aid more predictable and 
continuous. Previously, recipient governments often did not know how much aid to expect 
and could not formulate their budget plans accordingly. Apparently, the MDBS in Ghana 
addresses this problem. As one senior government official put it:  
The transaction costs, in terms of each [donor] mission arriving to do their 
own thing, is minimised by all of them coming now together in agreed 
mission periods. There is better predictability of the resources when you 
know in advance what they are pledging.417 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I investigate the case of 
Ghana. In the second section, I explore the direct budget support initiatives in Bolivia for 
comparative purposes. While a multi-donor budget support mechanism was set up in Ghana 
in 2003, Bolivia only received different types of joint support to particular sectors and multi-
                                                 
413  This view is particularly dominant in the discussion around increasing aid to reach the Millennium Development Goals, 
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416  See Mick  Foster and Adrian Fozzard (2000): "Aid and Public Expenditure: A Guide", ODI Working Paper No. 141, 
London: Overseas Development Institute. 
417  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004.  
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donor basket funding mechanisms. Within each section, I first analyse the government’s 
means and mechanisms to evaluate development planning, with particular reference to 
assessing performance of the poverty reduction strategies in both countries. I do so because 
the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) is the cornerstone on which policy dialogue is 
centred in both Ghana and Bolivia. In a second step, I elaborate on the idea and 
implementation of direct budget support. To conclude, I evaluate whether direct budget 
support initiatives encounter a mismatch between formal arrangements and everyday politics 
that is similar to the ritualised façade of public management reform and budget accountability 
measures described in chapter four.   
5 . 1  D e v e l o p m e n t  P l a n n i n g  a n d  B u d g e t  
S u p p o r t  i n  G h a n a  
In order to link the analysis of direct budget support with an evaluation as to whether 
ritualised formal arrangements diverge from everyday politics, an investigation into national 
development planning and prioritisation is necessary. The Government of Ghana’s medium-
term development plan, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), was the bedrock on 
which multi-donor budget support is built. This is interesting since the strategy was already a 
collaboration between international donors and recipient governments. So already at this 
stage, formalised arrangements did not always reflect national politicians’ strategic priorities, 
as I have shown in chapter three. Nonetheless, performance assessment of the GPRS 
indicators and the subsequent revision of the GPRS after its initial three years presented 
chances to anchor the government’s priorities more directly within the strategy. While the 
main purpose of the initial GPRS was certainly to state the government’s good intentions on 
poverty reduction and provide a document on which Ghana’s donors could base debt relief, 
assessment and revision provided opportunities for different political stakeholders to more 
closely align the GPRS with their political priorities – as long as they did not endanger 
continued donor support.  
5 . 1 . 1  E v a l u a t i n g  D e v e l o p m e n t  P l a n n i n g   
According to the World Bank’s PRSP sourcebook, recipient governments need to monitor 
and evaluate the performance of their poverty reduction indicators on a regular basis.418 In 
that sense, monitoring and evaluation of the GPRS was also a donor-driven demand, rather 
                                                 
418 World Bank (2001): Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook. 2 vols., Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 
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the result of a national demand for accountability on the GPRS. Similarly, the sourcebook 
called for a revision of the poverty strategies after more or less three years. In other words, 
neither the performance assessment nor the revision of the GPRS were measures to respond 
to locally-driven demands or pressure groups. They were primarily carried out to fulfil donor 
requirements. It comes as no surprise that donor and government expectations of the GPRS’ 
performance assessment diverged in ways similar to the initial drafting exercise, as I have 
shown in chapter three. While the donors expected performance assessment to be thorough 
and content-driven, performance assessment was a formality that was largely disconnected 
from the everyday workings of the ministries.   
5.1.1.1 Performance Assessment of the GPRS 
The first GPRS outlined programmes and projects to reduce poverty and foster growth for 
the timeframe 2003 to 2005. Each of these years, the National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC) published an Annual Progress Report, based on the government’s 
Monitoring and Evaluation Plan,419 to evaluate the performance of the GPRS.420 This was a 
difficult undertaking, especially because time and resource constraints were not explicit in the 
strategy, as several donor representatives commented: 
One problem that I see with the GPRS is that it did not look at constraints, 
limited time or limited resources for example.421 
The GPRS lacked a thorough consideration of these constraints, despite its second volume, 
which addressed the costing and financing of the GPRS’s programmes and projects.422 It 
seems that the costing and financing did not primarily aim to distribute resources according 
to priorities. Rather, it was used to put figures next to aims and objectives in order to allow 
the government to lobby international donors for funding. From the government’s 
perspective this kind of approach made sense, even though donors had a different 
understanding of public expenditure planning. It is telling that there was never any effort to 
reconcile the GPRS’s costing and financing with the national budget presented to parliament.  
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These different approaches had a considerable impact on monitoring and evaluation 
efforts. If the GPRS is viewed as a declaration of intent, it only needs to serve as a guiding 
framework, with little need for monitoring and evaluation. This seemed to be the viewpoint 
of many government agents. When asked whether the Government of Ghana was on track 
with the GPRS, one government representative responded:  
I think that there is an awareness that there is a guiding framework. And we 
are… when I say that we are on track we are on track on staying within 
defined parameters. And not just shooting off doing ten different things 
when our resources are only voted for five things.423 
This statement reflects many government officials’ understanding and use of the GPRS. To 
them, the GPRS defined the parameters within which governmental action could take place. 
Yet for the donors, the GPRS was meant to go further. In their understanding, it outlined 
concrete actions to be taken that could be tracked and monitored. Whenever the 
implementation of the GPRS fell behind target, donors tended to see the biggest problem in 
the linkage between cabinet and the operations of the ministries, departments and agencies: 
There is a lot of problems which is flagged in their review of the PRSP, 
which is that they have difficulty monitoring and getting the PRS to sink 
down in the government ministries’ activities that are responsible.424 
This problem essentially related to difficulties within Ghana’s civil service management:  
Each one of the chief directors and the ministers is supposed to sign onto a 
work plan, signed officially with a certain centre agency that says that they 
would be doing this and they will be delivering this. So, if they are not 
delivering on the monitoring, this is just a civil service management problem. 
This is hard to do even in the best managed places.425 
For the donors, monitoring and evaluation was essential because they usually based 
their policy dialogue with the Ghanaian government on the GPRS.426 In that context, 
different types of funds were closely attached to its implementation. Consequentially, 
frustrations regarding the GPRS built up. Yet most donors did not see an alternative: 
The GPRS is very difficult in some ways to use as a basis for policy dialogue 
because it was really uneven. Sometimes it was very activity-based, 
sometimes it was output-based, so in terms of using that… we needed to use 
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government’s own strategy but how that will evolve I think needs to be 
seen.427 
If cooperation built on the implementation of every aspect of the GPRS, policy 
dialogue would evidently have stalled quickly. As a means to continue cooperation despite 
particular draw-backs, donors usually focused on the document as a whole.  
You just weigh [the objectives]. You weigh whether they have done a critical 
mass of them. That’s all.428 
In addition, they agreed with the Government of Ghana on particular disbursement triggers: 
What donors try to do now is to pick certain indicators from the GPRS and 
use that as triggers of conditionality for more money or for policy dialogue. 
So that’s the way we are working with the government.429 
Furthermore, most bilateral donors relied on the evaluations of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to review their own cooperation with Ghana. They used the 
IMF and the World Bank’s Joint Staff Assessment,430 which assesses the overall performance of 
the GPRS, as an indicator for Ghana’s performance. In addition, the Fund attached its 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) and the World Bank linked its Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) to the GPRS’ performance. In order for these funds to be 
renewed, the IMF and the World Bank expect a review of the GPRS by the Ghanaian 
government.431 By means of these mechanisms, multi- and bilateral donors continued to exert 
pressure on the Ghanaian government to continue with the GPRS as it primary development 
plan, even though the government’s lack of interest in the implementation of its indicators 
was apparent. However, at this point the donors’ main interest was to uphold the credibility 
of the PRSP process as such, since most of their cooperation and funding arrangements were 
based on it. At this stage, the mismatch between everyday politics and wishful thinking about 
how institutions should be was already apparent to most stakeholders, but there seemed to 
be no alternative to formalise donor-recipient relationships on alternative grounds.  
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5.1.1.2 GPRS Review 
In line with international development strategy, the Ghanaian government committed itself 
to produce an updated GPRS for the period from 2006 to 2008. Again, the NDPC facilitated 
the process.  
They are aiming to start the revision… the current GPRS covers 2003 to 
2005, and the next one will be 2006 to 2008. And it takes a year to redesign 
one, so they are starting now.432 
In comparison with Ghana’s other long-term development framework, the Vision 2020, the 
GPRS timeframe of three years each was relatively short. Nonetheless, PRSPs have received 
criticism for having too large or inflexible timeframes that did not allow for revisions and 
adaptations by new incoming governments.433 When asked whether two to three years was a 
good time length for a PRSP, one government representative responded:  
If it is seen as a continuous improvement, I would say that three years is fine. 
[…] Particular governments, they have specific areas that they want to look 
at. That’s what I call the big wins within three or four years of office. So 
within eight years, in terms of continuous improvement, I think we need to 
have a much broader framework which should not change depending on 
whose government is in power.434  
This is a more technocratic point of view, favouring a technical, long-term development plan 
to guide policy-making independently from particular campaigning platforms. Another 
government representative responded slightly differently, with a view on new political 
initiatives that the Government of Ghana had signed onto.  
It is opportune that we are revising it next year, so we can bring on board 
these expected initiatives to become part of that. [Two to three years] is a 
good length of time.435  
In 2000, Ghana committed itself to achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) and signed onto the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2001.436 These commitments contained additional 
long-term development priorities, parallel to the GPRS. One donor representative 
commented on the donor discussion at the time: 
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The donors kept saying “No, no, let’s leave it as it is. They have worked so 
hard to get the GPRS to where it is. You know we would be mudding the 
waters,” and that kind of thing. And the Ghanaians to their extreme credit 
realised that they had to do that themselves. So this initiative, to combine 
NEPAD and the MDG under the GPRS, that was the government’s own 
initiative. So, they definitely see their wisdom in getting organised.437 
This speaks of a certain appropriation of the GPRS, at least at the top leadership level. When 
asked whether combining the three initiatives would require a substantial reorientation of the 
GPRS, one government representative explained:  
The MDGs are nothing but all taking reducing poverty by half by the year 
2015. And therefore, it’s not any different from a poverty reduction strategy. 
The only thing is that it talks about goals. Goals are wishes. Therefore you 
have to operationalise those goals by developing actual actions, actual 
strategies. The GPRS was a poverty reduction strategy with actions that can 
help you achieve those goals. So it is not a question of incorporating them 
but a question of developing actions that can lead to the goal.438 
So, as such, the MDG and the NEPAD initiative did not represent a major shift from the 
GPRS. Nonetheless, a reorientation towards productivity issues was likely and advocated by 
several proponents in government:  
The social sector focus needs to be complemented by a focus on growth and 
prosperity. We need to focus more on the productive sector to be able to 
sustain costs of the social sector. Investment and industrialisation need to be 
addressed by the new upcoming GPRS.439 
Overall, people in government were confident that the GPRS review benefit from the lessons 
learnt of the first GPRS: 
It will even become a stronger document at that time because we now have 
benefited from the last three years to learn from […], especially as we are 
shifting from a stabilisation to a growth agenda.440 
This generally positive attitude towards the poverty reduction strategy in Ghana was 
very different from the situation in Bolivia, where the PRSP was largely rejected as a ‘dead 
document’ by government officials as well as civil society representatives. 441 Differently from 
Bolivian case, the Ghanaian PRSP review process had received little criticism from Ghanaian 
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civil society actors. Indeed, in 2004 there was little public interest or acknowledgment that the 
review process was taking place. As a result, government officials were relatively free to mend 
the document in ways that would more closely reflect their actual political strategies. What is 
more, content-related requirements seemed less crucial for the donors’ approval of the 
revision than they were for the initial drafting. By then, the GPRS had already become the 
centre piece of policy dialogue with Ghana, so the donors’ main interest was to uphold the 
credibility of the PRSP process, nationally and internationally. As a result, the formalisation 
of poverty reduction measures did not play the key role that it had had in the initial draft of 
the GPRS, particularly in the revision of the GPRS. Ghana’s donors were more willing to 
consider other development priorities of the government, as long as the formal procedures of 
GPRS revision were being upheld.  
Indeed, the NDPC had opted to call its GPRS secretariat ‘National Capacity Building 
Programme for Wealth Creation and Social Development’. ‘Wealth creation’ is a term that 
appeared often in the government’s discourse, even though it was definitely not part of the 
donor terminology. The annual progress report of the GPRS noted that “the government’s 
policy of providing relief and safety nets to the poor and vulnerable through increased 
allocation to Social Services has crowded out resources to the economic services sector 
which supports wealth creation.”442 By means of such slight adaptations, the Ghanaian 
poverty reduction strategy was being reoriented towards ‘wealth creation’ where productivity 
issues gained significance against the donor-demanded pro-poor policies. Because the 
donors’ priority was to uphold the credibility of the PRSP process as such, Ghanaian 
government official managed to adjust the focus of the revised GPRS to more closely present 
their own development priorities.  
5 . 1 . 2  M u l t i - D o n o r  B u d g e t  S u p p o r t  i n  G h a n a  
The revised GPRS notwithstanding, the multi-donor budget support was built on the initial 
GPRS in 2003. According to the donors’ country analyses, Ghana’s GPRS represented the 
governments’ priorities in development planning. In an ideal world, such priorities  would 
determine public spending. However, as I have argued in chapter four, the budget processes 
in both countries were often non-transparent and not necessarily determined by the 
governments’ formal agenda. Nonetheless, not least because both bi- and multilateral donors 
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were increasingly attempting to harmonise aid at the country level in order to foster 
government ownership, budget support was becoming a more and more popular 
development cooperation tool.443 Doubts about governments’ ownership of the PRSP were 
cast away by a euphoria about the possibilities of increasing ownership through budget 
support.  
Given the state of affairs of the Ghanaian public financial management and the 
divergence between expectations and reality of the GPRS, it might surprise that Ghana’s 
major donors decided to embark on multi-donor budgetary support. Yet one could argue 
that, if international donors only supported governments with an efficient and functioning 
public administration, there would not be any cooperation with developing countries at all.444 
Initially, donors have to accept that they cooperate with flawed and imperfect systems. Most 
development partners have recognised this fact. That was why the MDBS contained a matrix 
of triggers, a list of reform elements that the government had to implement in order for 
funds to be released:  
We wanted to release the money not on the promise of delivery but release 
the money after the things that a country has said it is going to do have 
happened.445  
This was a softened version of conditional negotiations, where the government can spend aid 
money at its discretion after showing that it has made its institutions more effective for 
service delivery. Consequentially, much emphasis was placed on reforming public 
administration and the civil service. Nevertheless, engaging in MDBS required a leap of faith 
from the donors. The terrain was unknown and the outcomes were largely out of their hands, 
while in-country representatives would eventually have to defend the results to their home 
constituencies. On the other hand, MDBS was a convenient way to spend large amounts of 
money relatively quickly, without having to design or track numerous small projects with 
different partners.  
5.1.2.1 The Development Partners  
The donors that signed the MDBS programme framework memorandum in 2003 were the 
African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, the 
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Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank.446 Although almost all 
major donors in Ghana subscribed to the idea of MDBS, not all participated in the same 
fashion. The above contributed financially while others were merely ‘observers’.  
With the MDBS, you have to be cautious not to create this progressive 
donor exclusive club… you know, we are writing cheques and we all putting 
into the budget and are tracking our funds… you want to have a dialogue 
basically. That’s your main objective.447 
This dialogue that the MDBS aimed to foster took place between government and donors as 
much as between different donor agencies. France, Japan, and the United States were 
observers since 2003. They participated in the discussion on the general agenda and on 
spending priorities but did not contribute financially.448  
In 2004, France voiced interest in jointing the MDBS. The Agence Française de 
Développement in Ghana had been looking into options under what conditions it would be 
possible for France to join. A bilateral donor’s conditions for co-funding largely depend on 
the rules and regulations of its headquarters. Indeed, the German Ministry of Development 
Cooperation had to revise its funding regulations in order to enable multi-donor funding 
mechanisms at the country level.449 A donor representative from the contributing MDBS 
members commented on newcomers: 
You have to think hard on how to accommodate them and their own rules. 
And of course, they have to show some willingness as well to break their 
own rules and to adapt their own rules.450 
Similarly, when the Government of Ghana negotiated with the American Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) about how funds could be spent, MDBS partners speculated 
as to whether it made sense to incorporate its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) into the 
MDBS: 
I mean on the one hand you are scared because there is a lot of money 
coming, so whoever pays is going to set the terms. But in terms of influence 
and making a case, it is very good to have them on board.451 
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bilateral donors. The change followed the Declaration of Rome on donor harmonisation in 2002.  
450  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
451  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
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However, the MCA remained an independent initiative. This example shows that inter-
organisational relationships are a vital component in explaining the dynamics of the MDBS. 
Donor representatives at the country level were part of a larger development community and 
acted within a very specific set of rules and regulations defined by their headquarters or 
ministry. This could make cooperation difficult:  
We made progress in these areas but I think all the development partners felt 
that it was a much more painful process than it needed to be. And part of 
that I think relates to institutional constraints that are not always 
transparent.452 
The career of donor representatives often depends on how well their achievements 
are perceived in headquarters. This creates an outward orientation towards principles and 
values and the commonly referred to ‘pressure to spend’.453 Because actual results are very 
hard to measure and difficult to relate to a particular donor programme, achievements of 
individual professionals are often measured by the amount of money that they spend. 
Because of this, the setting of common goals was often a challenge, even between like-
minded donors: 
So while all of the donors at this point in time are espousing harmonisation, 
etc., not all of the development partners, the representatives are rewarded for 
that. And specifically in the case of the Bank: I think the people in the Bank 
are rewarded for getting large amounts of money into the system very, very 
quickly. And you can’t do that if you are consulting.454 
Not many incentives existed for donor representatives to spend a lot of time deliberating and 
conceptualising a programme.  
Intra-organisational differences were another factor that influenced MDBS 
negotiations. In any given donor agency, country representatives and headquarter personnel 
often had different stances on particular issues: 
Here, we cook a lot of things together. Once the mission is there, we always 
have surprises because people from the headquarters are sometimes not as 
attached to the dynamics as we are here, which makes it interesting. 455 
For example in 2004, one bilateral donor wanted to link its disbursement through the MDBS 
with the resolution of an immigration issue – a home affairs condition that was clearly 
                                                 
452  Interview with a donor representative, No. 51, Accra, 5 August 2004. 
453  On the ‘pressure to spend’, see Elliot Berg (2000): "Why Aren't Aid Organizations Better Learners?" paper discussed at 
the EGDI seminar 'What Do Aid Agencies and their Co-operating Partners Learn from their Experiences?', 24 August, 
Stockholm: Expert Group on Development Issues. 
454  Interview with a donor representative, No. 51, Accra, 5 August 2004. 
455  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
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outside the jointly established framework. After extended discussions with the Ghanaian 
government and between the donors, the demand was dropped. Another donor 
representative commented: 
That is a very clear example on how the MDBS should work: to put some 
peer pressure on donors that go beyond the nature of the agreement.456 
Nonetheless, the MDBS deliberation process had to ultimately be justified to the donors’ 
constituencies – parliament and the taxpayers at home, or executive boards in the case of 
multilateral organisations. This caused concern: 
We are not able yet to demonstrate to our constituencies the benefits of 
budget support. […] We are in a extremely vulnerable position. We all 
believe that it is the right way to go but unless we can demonstrate the 
benefits to [our] taxpayer…457 
In that sense, intra-organisational accountability mechanisms played an important 
role and continued to influence the discussion. This presented problems to the Ghanaian 
government, for example because different development partners continued to employ 
different fiscal years. In 2005, this still meant a substantial amount of extra work and 
coordination for the Ghanaian Ministry of Finance: 
For the MDBS bilateral partners, we run a calendar year whereas the World 
Bank, they run a fiscal year, which goes from June through July. […] So now 
we will have one harmonised matrix that for the World Bank is effective this 
July through next year June and will overlap with the bilateral partners, which 
will start January, in their case through to the end of the calendar year 
2005.458 
Indeed, because of their internal accounting structure, both the United States and Japan were 
unlikely to financially contribute to the MDBS in Ghana. In 2004, their accounting 
mechanisms still did not allow for their agencies to participate in any kind of multi-donor 
funding. Both countries’ development agencies were required to track the outcomes of their 
funds separately. These accounting mechanisms resulted from the way in which the agency 
or ministry operated within their home country’s government, to which the agency’s country 
representatives were subordinate. In a way, the World Bank faced similar restrictions, with 
spending being tied to the PRSC. A Ghanaian government representative commented:  
                                                 
456  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. It was also mentioned that the incident would set 
an example for bilateral donors’ own ministries, so that they would not think of using financial assistance as a means to 
pressure recipient governments in other negotiation processes.  
457  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
458  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
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I think it is kind of unavoidable that huge donors, such as America and also 
the World Bank, they do use their own mechanisms. You can’t change the 
bureaucracies in terms of minds to fit them into the MDBS framework. We 
see that with the World Bank, the World Bank not being able to have a 
performance tranche. We also see that with the MCC by their insistence on 
being able to track the flow of money.459 
For the case of the World Bank, the Government of Ghana and the development partners 
accepted a special arrangement within the MDBS to enable them to participate.  
5.1.2.2 Operational Structure  
In principle, the MDBS framework responded to the priorities established in the GPRS. The 
participating development partners agreed to channel their funds into the public budget, 
from where the government of Ghana could use it at their own discretion. In a way, this is 
similar to the savings gap substitution of financial assistance during the 1950s. However, 
recent budgetary support was usually tied to public management reform objectives in order 
to avoid promoting corruption This was also the case in Ghana. The MDBS framework 
established five initial key reform areas – public finance, the budget process, decentralisation, 
public sector reform and governance.460 These public administration areas were aimed at 
improving the Ghanaian public institutions to improve service delivery, in line with current 
thinking within the development community about the importance of institutions. The 
government was not bound to directly use the MDBS funds to support these five areas but, 
each year, it had to prove that the respective triggers were met in order to receive further 
funding.  
Unlike sectoral assistance, budget support put the Ministry of Finance as the key 
agency, not only to liaise with the donors but also to monitor the implementation of the 
triggers. In that respect, MDBS meant a shift away from relatively independent line ministries 
that had previously established working relationships with individual donors. One 
government representative commented on this change:  
First, some ministries felt that coming this way meant that they were going to 
loose out of their personal relationships with the donors in their 
sectoral/bilateral arrangements. […] But we have gotten them to appreciate 
                                                 
459  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
460  Government of Ghana and Development Partners (2003): "Framework Memorandum: Multi-Donor Budgetary Support 
Programme in Support of the Implementation of Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Between the Government of Ghana 
and Development Partners", Accra. 5. 
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that unless they deliver, the national budget as a whole suffers and it will not 
be able to respond to their bigger issues […].461  
At the same time, the Ministry of Finance needed to ensure that ministries, departments and 
agencies as the implementing agencies identify with the MDBS: 
So, it is in [the ministries’] interest to ensure that whatever is agreed to here 
because […] they implement them. And when we are developing them, we 
sit with them now to craft the development of what they are saying they 
want to do. And we meet with them then periodically to see how well they 
are on track.462 
It is interesting to note that the MDBS Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance was specifically 
set up to coordinate the MDBS. At the same time, it also handled processes like the National 
Economic Dialogue or the Consultative Group discussions with the donors. Despite its key 
role in coordinating the ministries, departments and agencies, its organisational structure 
reflected an orientation towards the donors and the issues that they were interested in.463 
The government and the development partners agreed to focus on public 
management reform during the first phase of the MDBS, even though this was not a priority 
area of the GPRS.464 It was deemed necessary that these issues needed to be tackled first for 
subsequent reforms to be effective. Again, these issues were a donor requirement for 
accountability rather than the government’s interest. It did not seem that the government was 
particularly willing to address these issues, even though the GPRS referred to “unacceptably 
poor conditions” in the public service and concluded that “significant improvements to the 
latter represent a component without which the government reform programmes and the 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy are unlikely to succeed.”465 Despite this recognition, some 
donor representatives were wondering whether there was enough political will to back 
reform measures: 
To be successful, the public sector reform agenda would require the political 
will of very senior government officials. I wonder whether that will is 
there.466 
                                                 
461  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
462  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
463  It has to be noted, though, that the secretariat works through the staffing system and that the Ministry never meant to 
create another office. The Secretariat is meant to strengthen the operational system already in place in the Ministry, in 
support of the Minister’s office. Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
464 The disbursement triggers of the MDBS are roughly structured in line with the GPRS priorities to insure support for the 
government’s development priorities. However, the MDBS disbursement trigger matrix is not directly attached to the 
priorities of the GPRS. 
465  Government of Ghana (2003): "Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity", 
Volume 1: Analysis and Policy Statement, Accra: National Development Planning Commission. 119. 
466  Interview with a government representative, No. 31, Accra, 16 July 2004. 
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To coordinate their engagement around the MDBS, the donors established working 
groups on different issue areas. There were thematic groups on public finance, public sector 
reform, decentralisation, good governance, and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, 
sector-specific groups existed on health, education, energy, agriculture, and environment. 
These working groups between the donors were informal.467 Prior to the MDBS, 
development cooperation between donors and government as well as among donors was 
coordinated in working groups that the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) had established. These CDF working groups continued to function 
independently from the MDBS. When asked why the CDF groups and the MDBS thematic 
groups were different, one donor representative responded:  
It would be nice if they were one and the same things. But we needed to get 
these teams working so we just went on with it. [Why weren’t they 
streamlined?] I don’t know. Laziness on the side of the donors and sitting 
back on the side of the government. And also perhaps because other things 
have overtaken. […] It’s grown more organically than formally. 468 
Government representatives sat on some of the MDBS thematic groups, though 
participation varied. Unlike with the CDF working groups, government representatives were 
not co-chairing. The MDBS working groups were basically a donor coordination mechanism 
to avoid duplication.  
In addition to the MDBS, donors continued to have sector-specific programmes and 
projects, despite all harmonisation and ownership-strengthening efforts. The fact that funds 
through the MDBS went directly into the central budget, did “not preclude bilaterals to have 
separate sector-specific relationships outside of the MDBS.”469 This had several reasons. For 
one, it often takes several years before programmes and projects run out. Yet most 
importantly, MDBS continued to be in its experimental phase. A donor representative 
explained: 
For some time, we could not provide budget support to Ghana because of 
being off track with IMF for some time. If that happens too often that will 
interrupt your budget support. So, budget support for us in Ghana is not the 
main avenue of support. It goes up to probably about 12 percent of our 
spending.470 
When asked whether donors should streamline their bilateral programmes with the MDBS, 
one government representative responded:  
                                                 
467  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
468  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
469  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
470  Interview with a donor representative, No. 136, Accra, 26 August 2004. 
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It would reinforce the message. It is just that at the sector level, some of 
them have specific things where they feel that their country has. […] But 
they also fall within the broad spirit of what the GPRS has been aiming to 
accomplish. It might not be specifically the things in here but it is value 
added to the broad picture of what the GPRS is trying to accomplish.471 
At the early stages of the MDBS, negotiations between the donors centred on 
choosing a focus. The bilateral donors wanted to use it as a tool to emphasise governance 
issues. Yet the World Bank could not be involved in governance issues because of its 
economic mandate. In addition, the World Bank already had a relatively large PRSC in place 
– their standard instrument to support a PRSP.472 The PRSC bound the World Bank to a 
human development and growth agenda. Ultimately, the MDBS framework became slightly 
different for the World Bank than for the bilateral donors. The World Bank settled with a 
three pillared approach aligned with the results framework of their PRSC, while bilateral 
donors focused on governance.473 One donor representative explained how this affects 
payment tranches and the disbursement trigger matrix:  
The World Bank doesn’t have a performance tranche. That’s the biggest 
difference. We use the same matrix, from 2005 onwards. There are still slight 
differences in 2004 as compared to the PRSC. But for next year, we agreed 
on a common matrix. So we will always have this session with ourselves and 
the World Bank is sitting in as well, discussing the performance tranche. 474 
In other words, the operational structure of the MDBS reflected continuing divergences in 
different donors’  institutional structure as well as their priorities. While the MDBS made it 
easier for donor agencies to harmonise their policy dialogue with the Ghanaian government, 
donors continued to employ different accountability, planning and disbursement mechanisms 
as soon as harmonisation requirements conflicted with their organisational requirements. 
Formal exceptions like the World Bank’s three pillared approach or the United States, Japan 
and France’s observatory status show that – even with respect to the donors – harmonisation 
is a ‘wishful thinking institution’ that does not serve to mould politics into desirable patterns, 
as soon as interests diverge.   
                                                 
471  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
472  Originally, the World Bank had envisioned US $ 75 million but the country office ultimately increased the amount to US $ 
125 million, in order to invest in the MDBS approach. Interview with a donor representative, No. 83, Accra, 31 August 
2004. 
473  Interview with a donor representative, No. 83, Accra, 31 August 2004. 
474  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
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5.1.2.3 Disbursement Triggers 
The policy matrix that was agreed on between the Government of Ghana and the MDBS 
donors spelled out specific policy initiatives that trigger the disbursement of funds. All 
donors agreed to pay a fixed, so-called base tranche at the beginning of each year which was 
designed to ensure predictability of cash flow to the Ghanaian government All but the World 
Bank additionally agreed to pay a performance tranche depending on whether the 
government addresses the annual policy triggers. These triggers were jointly agreed between 
government and the donors. Government representatives stressed that their adoption was 
voluntary: “It is not that the partners impose triggers on us. We decide.”475 Both sides 
stressed that the government of Ghana stood behind each of the triggers, even though the 
link with the GPRS indicators during the initial phase of the MDBS was only declaratory:  
This year it’s eight triggers that the government has to meet. And those 
triggers were fully agreed with government and many come from the GPRS. 
The inspiration is the GPRS. We have to evolve to a day, one day soon, 
where we can just take the targets from the GPRS.476  
The triggers were defined as unambiguously as possible, granting the government as much 
leverage as possible: 
Basically, we have a meeting with government, government defines 
everything so that they achieve the triggers. We try to set the triggers in such 
a way so that there isn’t much ambiguity in it. There shouldn’t be any 
disagreement. 477 
It is for the disbursement of the performance tranche that the trigger matrix becomes 
relevant. For this purpose, the triggers were split into two groups: 
They are kind of floating triggers, so whenever government has achieved all 
these triggers, they receive the whole amount. And actually, we split the 
performance tranche into two, associated with four triggers each. So once 
government met four triggers, against public financial management, they 
already get an advancement.478 
When the matrix was established in 2003, different donors led a heated discussion 
about what types of triggers to use for the MDBS.479 Some advocated the use of performance 
                                                 
475  Interview with a government representative, No. 84, Accra, 26 August 2004. 
476  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
477  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
478  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
479  The performance versus output based conditionality debate is summed up well in Christopher Adam, Gérard Chambas, et 
al. (2004): "Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective", in: World Development, 32 (6): 1059-1070. 
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triggers, which had been the custom during the previous few years, while others wanted to 
introduce outcome triggers to the matrix.480  
If the EU wants two or three performance-based indicators and we think is 
doable, we’ll do it. It really doesn’t matter that much to us, whether the 
indicators are process-oriented or performance-based. We’ll do what makes 
sense. To include some performance-based triggers was the only way that 
Brussels would accept such a programme. To us, it is the management of the 
programme that matters.481 
In the end, both sides agreed to a majority of performance-based triggers with a few 
outcome-oriented elements. The debate sheds an interesting light on government ownership 
questions. Surely, the MDBS triggers had been mutually agreed on between the government 
and its development partners. Yet the discussion of what kind of triggers to employ was 
carried out between different development partners. It is quite likely that the government did 
not take a proactive role in deciding on the type of triggers because their primary objective 
was to secure the funding, not to discuss the form. 
Each year, the triggers were evaluated during joint MDBS missions in which the 
World Bank as well as the IMF participate as observers. One donor representative recalled 
that, during the first round in 2003, 
one trigger […] was not met. We had some discussions on the question: Is it 
operating or not? Then we had some sort of assessment but it was not very 
structured, not in the way the World Bank does it. We don’t want to get to 
that level, maybe we can never get to that level. We are still just amateurs, 
sitting together.482 
During the first two years of the MDBS, the trigger matrix and the World Bank’s 
PRSC triggers were not completely streamlined. These years were the initial adaptation phase 
during which donors tried to harmonise their programmes. For the World Bank who does 
not have a performance tranche  
there is evaluation but it is basically in the prior actions. What they have in 
the matrix are prior actions for the World Bank disbursements. In the ideal 
situation, I guess we will be able to evaluate whether they have met the 
triggers for the performance tranche in June already.483 
                                                 
480  A performance trigger would be that the government has presented an environmental protection bill to parliament, for 
example. An outcome trigger is measured by the actual outcome, like an expansion of forest cover from x to y hectares. 
Advocates of performance triggers argue that the essential thing is to ensure that the government is trying. Critics of this 
approach say that just because the government says it is doing something does not mean it will put its weight into it. 
481  Interview with a government representative, No. 84, Accra, 26 August 2004. 
482  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
483  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004.  
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Generally, the MDBS was regarded as a positive step towards greater government 
ownership by both government and the donors. When asked whether the MDBS was a good 
mechanism to give the government more independence, one government representative 
responded:  
Definitely! There is more control of the dialogue if you have a collective set 
of people around the table rather than having each development partner 
doing their own thing. Secondly, the transaction costs, in terms of each 
mission arriving to do their own thing, is minimised by all of them coming 
now together in agreed mission periods. There is better predictability of the 
resources when you know in advance what they are pledging.484 
Particularly with defining priorities, government representatives felt that Ghana will benefit 
from the MDBS:  
Before the MDBS the donors were dealing directly with the sectors. The 
priority decisions were not made by government but made by the donors. 
But now, government will make their choices, in terms of priorities, which 
may not be the same as the priorities of the donors in the past.485 
On the donor side, appreciation was similar. One donor representative commented:  
Government is now better able to take an overview over government’s 
portfolio and the reform process. I think the Ministry of Finance has been 
empowered. Surely, there are a few people in the line ministries that are 
confused by the whole process. […] I think ministries that have been quite 
heavily aid-dependent, both from higher level to departmental bureaus, 
probably share more scepticism. 486 
In sum, both donors and government valued the quality of political dialogue and the 
increased government ownership that the MDBS had established. Nonetheless, donors were 
wary about how to justify the use of such substantial sums of money to their constituencies. 
They feared to loose control over particular reform programmes, even when the reform was 
a component of the MDBS matrix.  
5.1.2.4 An Outsider: The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
In terms of government ownership, a comparison between the MDBS initiative and the 
American MCA offers some interesting insights. The MCA initiative was established by the 
                                                 
484  Interview with a government representative, No. 93, Accra, 29 July 2004. 
485  Interview with a government representative, No. 106, Accra, 27 August 2004. 
486  Interview with a donor representative, No. 96, Accra, 3 August 2004. 
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US government as a “new compact for global development”.487 Interestingly, it is 
administered by the newly created Millennium Challenge Corporation, outside of the US 
government’s branch responsible for development cooperation, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).488 It is still early to evaluate the impact of the MCA at 
the country level but a few comments can be made on the negotiation process between the 
Ghanaian government and the MCC. Since the government based the MCC in Washington, 
the MCC solely relied on missions to negotiate and communicate its approach with the 
Ghanaian government, instead of coordinating representation of the MCA via the country 
offices of USAID. One donor representative explained that “they have made it very clear 
that they don’t want to be represented [by USAID].”489 As a consequence, in 2004 the donors 
were left uncertain as to whether the MCA was going to be streamlined with the MDBS or 
whether the MCC would participate in other donor harmonisation efforts. 
After having been chosen as a MCA recipient in 2004, the Government of Ghana 
had to present a proposal on how to use its funds.490 The Ministry of Finance thus 
established an MCA desk in the External Finance Mobilisation Division as well as a working 
group that included members of other ministries and relevant civil society representatives. 
Even though the criteria for eligibility were fairly comprehensive, almost no restrictions 
existed as to the purpose of spending, not even a focus on poverty was necessary.491 Thus, 
the MCA was a perfect fund through which the government could finance underfunded 
items on its agenda. In 2004, the Ministry of Finance’s working group on the MCA had 
identified infrastructure development and productivity issues as key areas to be addressed, 
two items that did not rank highly in the harmonised donor agenda, despite being mentioned 
by the GPRS.  
As problematic as the MCA might be in terms of donor coordination and 
harmonisation, it is an interesting lens through which a concealed government agenda 
becomes transparent. Infrastructure had usually been addressed in projects rather than 
programmes and was not an explicit priority of the newly harmonised efforts. For many 
                                                 
487  George Bush called for the ‘new compact’ at the Monterrey Conference on Finance for International Development in 
2002.  
488 The MCC administered nearly US$ 1 billion in initial funding for 16 eligible countries in 2004 and US$ 1.5 billion in 2005. 
However, disbursement in 2004 and 2005 has been negligible. In 2005, the MCC signed a US$ 3 million pre-compact 
grant with Ghana. In comparison, USAID’s total programme funds for Ghana in 2005 were US$ 47 million.  U.S. Agency 
for International Development (2004): "Financial Year 2005 Budget Justification to the Congress", Washington, DC: 
USAID. 
489  Interview with a donor representative, No. 128, Accra, 14 July 2004.  
490  Assistance from the MCC only goes “to those countries that rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic 
freedom.” Countries that fulfil these criteria are selected on an annual basis. MCA homepage, www.mca.gov, 10 January 
2005. 
491  Cynically, one could argue that the MCA is largely unrestricted due to a lack of development cooperation expertise within 
the MCC – many MCC employees come from the private sector and did not previously work as development 
professionals.  
  150
donors aid to infrastructure was increasingly difficult to justify because recipient governments 
shied away from subsequent maintenance while new builds quickly deteriorated. Much of the 
project-based aid of the 1970s had been spent on infrastructural developments, with mixed 
success rates and often uncertain outcomes.492 In addition, infrastructure has always been 
cost-intensive. It was still an item that features on development cooperation agreements but 
substantially less so than two or three decades ago. Productivity issues were also 
unfashionable to present to the donor community. This relates to the debate about pro-poor 
policy. The argument put forward was that subsidising productivity might enhance growth 
but did not automatically reach the poor.493 As one donor put it: 
In Ghana, too many resources go to infrastructure or into supporting the 
relatively inefficient state-owned enterprises. Definitely too many resources 
go into subsidising fuel…494 
As a result, productivity issues had been neglected by the donors to the benefit of a pro-poor 
emphasis on human resource development and social services.495 The first GPRS was a 
reflection of this. For example, the costing and financing component of the GPRS estimated 
the cost of programmes geared towards ‘enhancing human resource development and the 
efficient and equitable provision of basic social services’ at around 58 percent, while only 27 
percent were allocated for ‘enhancing production and gainful employment’.496 Yet, the MCA 
proposal demonstrated that infrastructure and productivity were still very relevant for the 
government’s reform agenda. It comes as no surprise that the Ghanaian government, which 
was refocusing the revised GPRS towards productivity issues, was thus eager to present a 
funding proposal to the MCA that focused on infrastructure and productivity elements. 
While the MDBS donors in Ghana were lamenting the lack of coordination and 
harmonisation between the MDBS and the MCA, the Ghanaian government was happy to 
use this opportunity in order to present previously neglected priorities for financial support.   
                                                 
492  Elliot Berg (1993): Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa. New York: United Nations 
Development Programme: Regional Bureau for Africa. 
493  The World Bank argues that, instead, emphasis should be put on promoting economic opportunities for poor people 
(better access to markets, expanded assets), facilitating empowerment (removing barriers that exclude women, ethnic and 
racial groups, and the socially disadvantaged), and enhancing security (by providing mechanisms to reduce the sources of 
vulnerability that poor people face). World Bank (2001): World Development Report 2000/2001 - Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, 
Empowerment, and Security. New York: Oxford University Press.  
494  Interview with a donor representative, No. 28, Accra, 16 July 2004.  
495  This is not an absolute argument. There is no either-or decision to make between production and social services. 
However, when it comes to prioritising, human resource development and social services feature higher than production 
issues in current donor thought.  
496  Government of Ghana (2003): "Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity", 
Volume 1: Analysis and Policy Statement, Accra: National Development Planning Commission. 14. 
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5 . 2  D e v e l o p m e n t  P l a n n i n g  a n d  B u d g e t  
S u p p o r t  i n  B o l i v i a  
In Bolivia, the picture looks quite different from Ghana. Indeed, in 2005 the majority of 
general budget support initiatives had been established in Africa.497 This is curious since 
middle income country governments are commonly believed to be more efficient and 
accountable than heavily indebted poor country governments. When asked why budget 
support was so popular in poor countries, one donor representative in Ghana suspected that 
it was because of the pressure to spend: 
It is pretty difficult to get your money through all the normal procedures that 
we already have. If, in addition you have a host bureaucracy that is also not 
too efficient then really you cannot get your money moving. And we cannot 
tell that to politicians and politicians cannot tell that to tax payers, so I think 
that there is this kind of political imperative to see that we are spending 
money.498 
This would imply that budget support actually went to governments that were less able to 
channel money than others. However, since multi-donor budget support initiatives are a 
relatively recent phenomenon, systematic research as to how multi-donor budget support 
recipients are selected is lacking. Nonetheless, statements like the above probably address a 
key aspect of donor-recipient relationships: willingness to disburse funds on the side of the 
donors is often confronted with a large and inefficient bureaucracy that is unable to disperse 
funds quickly. Multi-donor budget support is an easy way for donors to disburse funds 
quickly without having to deal with the allocation to key target groups. In Bolivia in turn, the 
polity is complex enough to allow for alternative funding arrangements – like basket support 
to the national ombudsman or the Mechanism of Social Control of the national dialogue.  
5 . 2 . 1  E v a l u a t i n g  D e v e l o p m e n t  P l a n n i n g   
Just like with the Ghanaian PRSP, international donors attached subsequent funding to the 
implementation and revision of the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (EBRP). In Bolivia 
however, the review of the EBRP and the control of its implementation was also enshrined 
                                                 
497 A recent DFID study lists twenty countries where budget support has been granted, of which eleven were in Africa: 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Ghana, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, and Zambia. The other 
countries examined by the study were Afghanistan, East Timor, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Macedonia, Serbia, Montserrat 
and Bolivia. Bolivia is listed because the study used Statistics on International Development data for programme aid that 
also included some sector support and balance of payment support that were not strictly budget support. Department for 
International Development (2004): "Poverty Reduction Budget Support: A DFID Policy Paper", May, London: DFID. 6. 
498  Interview with a donor representative, No. 136, Accra, 26 August 2004. 
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in the Law of the National Dialogue that emerged from the National Dialogue 2000.499 The 
Law was passed through congress as a result of pressures from civil society organisations – 
following the closing of the dialogue. The objective of this act was to bind government to its 
conclusions and to formalise the main agreements of the dialogue:  
 to designate the municipal governments as the main mechanism to distribute and 
administer the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative’s resources and to 
channel more resources to the poorest municipalities,  
 to create a National Mechanism of Social Control to open up space for civil society 
in the follow-up of the PRSP, and 
 to institutionalise the National Dialogue on a three-year basis as a mechanism to 
discuss and review the progress of the Bolivian poverty reduction strategy in a 
participatory way.500  
For many Bolivians, the law was the actual achievement of the National Dialogue 
2000, not the EBRP. Several people interviewed felt that there was ownership of the Law of 
the National Dialogue, with its transfer of HIPC resources, but not of the PRSP:  
There is ownership of the Law of the Dialogue, of the distribution of 
resources to the municipalities. […] Yet there is no ownership of 
formulation of the PRSP, nor in the monitoring of the PRSP. HIPC is one 
thing and the PRSP is another.501  
The Mechanism of Social Control that was established by the law produced independent 
monitoring reports of the EBRP and contributed towards its review process.502 This 
arrangement added a civil society component to the Bolivian PRSP  review process that was 
lacking in Ghana. As a result, the performance assessment and the revision of the EBRP 
were much more widely observed and critiqued than in Ghana.  
                                                 
499  The outcome of the National Dialogue is summarised in Secretaría Técnica del Diálogo (2001): "Lucha contra la pobreza: 
Entre la deliberación y el tinku", Memoria del Diálogo 2000, La Paz: Proyecto Diálogo Nacional. 
500  Compare República de Bolivia (2001): “Ley del Diálogo Nacional 2000”, Ley 2235 de 31 julio, Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, 
La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Comunicación Social. 
501  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004. 
502  CEDLA, CEPAS Caritas and Mecanismo Nacional de Control Social (2003): "A un Año de Implementación de la 
Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de Pobreza", Memoria del Seminario, La Paz: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo 
Laboral y Agrario; Mecanismo Nacional de Control Social, Comité de Defensa de los Derechos del Consumidor en 
Bolivia, et al. (2003): "Estudio de casos: Seguimiento a la Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza (EBRP), a la 
iniciativa HIPC y su impacto en el sector salud", La Paz: AIS - CODECO - IBFAN Bolivia. The government’s 
monitoring report has been produced by the Ministry of Hiome Affairs and the Ministry of Sustainable Development, see 
Consejo Interinstitucional de Seguimiento y Evaluación de la Estrategia Boliviana de Redución de Pobreza - Gobierno de 
Bolivia (2002): "Primer Reporte de Seguimiento de la Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza", La Paz: 
Ministerio de Hacienda, Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación. 
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5.2.1.1 Performance Assessment of the EBRP 
 Just like in Ghana, the PRSP provided the basis for continued funding to Bolivia. The IMF 
and the World Bank assessed its performance by means of a yes-no evaluation:  
There is a locally done PRSP, together with national comments that contain 
feedback for the discussion of the PRSP. Once the Fund and the Bank 
approve the PRPS, we jointly do what is called a joint staff assessment, 
which more or less evaluates the PRSP and says “this seems good, this has 
substance, here we can make progress.”503 
Like in most recipient countries, this recommendation serves as a guide for most bilateral 
organisations, which usually orient their funding accordingly. Several Bolivian government 
representatives remained sceptical about this simplified performance assessment: 
I have the impression that it is a very ‘Washington’ vision, to have “a place 
where we can put our money”. 504 
Just like in Ghana, the PRSC and the PRGF are incentives for the Bolivian government not 
to abandon the EBRP process since funds would be lacking otherwise. However, the IMF 
agreed to do a stand-by agreement prior to the EBRP review, recognising that the political 
crises had further delayed the review process in 2003.505 
The donors’ performance assessment was generally hindered by the fact that they 
placed more emphasis on the mere elaboration than on the actual implementability of the 
EBRP. The Bolivian government, civil society organisations and academics criticised this fact: 
The international cooperation obviously plays an important role. […] I 
believe that their interest was to see the document concluded, the EBRP as 
such but not the implementation process.506 
An important result of the donors’ engagement in the EBRP formulation was that many of 
the donors’ own priorities entered the EBRP, even when these had not been emphasised by 
the government or the dialogue process. Neither the government, nor the National Dialogue 
nor the donors saw the necessity to deliberate on what priorities should come first if 
resources were scarce. Instead, all stakeholders added their agenda to the EBRP ‘wish list’:  
                                                 
503  Interview with a donor representative, No. 122, La Paz, 8 April 2004. 
504  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
505  See International Monetary Fund (2003): "Bolivia: Request for Stand-By Arrangement - Staff Report; Staff Statement; 
Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Bolivia", IMF Country 
Report No. 03/179, June, Washington, DC: IMF. 
506  Interview with a government representative, No. 79, La Paz, 29 March 2004. 
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If one wants to have many priorities, he ends up having few priorities, in the 
sense that he is not prioritising well.507 
This lack of priorities made it hard to implement the strategy, particularly against the 
background of scarce resources, an emerging economic decline and increasing social unrest. 
Several studies concluded that the original EBRP will be difficult to implement without 
significant adaptations.508 In that sense, the Bolivian PRSP performance assessment 
experience was very similar to the one in Ghana. What was different was constant critique 
that the EBRP process received from the participants of the national dialogue and from the 
Mechanism of Social Control. While civil servants dealing with the evaluation of the GPRS in 
Ghana were generally happy with the process, Bolivian civil servants viewed the EBRP 
process much more critically, not least because of all the criticism they had received by civil 
society organisation for the limitations of the process.   
5.2.1.2 Review of the EBRP 
Civil societies’ demand for revision of the EBRP fitted in neatly with the international 
requirements of the PRSP process, which called for a revision of the original PRSP after 
three years. Yet, social unrest in February and October 2003 meant that the third national 
dialogue did not start in 2003 as foreseen. In October 2003, the Bolivian government took a 
preliminary revised EBRP to the Consultative Group meeting in Paris.  
Last year, a PRSP was presented to the Consultative Group in Paris but it 
was said that the PRSP didn’t have any consultative links with the people, 
like at the beginning of the PRSP processes. And now we are in the 
development process of this new dialogue, let’s hope this time to implement 
the past experience, attempt to input the dialogue into the formulation of the 
PRSP.509 
Shortly thereafter, the third dialogue was initiated in September 2003. However, many voices 
in government continued to question whether a PRPS was the right approach towards 
development planning for Bolivia: 
We are discussing not to do a EBRP anymore but to simply do what the 
constitution requires, a socio-economic plan, the PGD, which is done by the 
                                                 
507  Interview with a donor representative, No. 122, La Paz, 8 April 2004. 
508  Aside from the EBRP studies mentioned before, Spranger and Wolff highlight an important link between the Bolivian 
PRSP process and increasing political instability. Hans-Joachim  Spranger and Jonas Wolff (2003): "Poverty Reduction 
through Democratisation? PRSP: Challenges of a New Development Assistance Strategy", PRIF Reports No. 66, 
Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. 
509  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004. 
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planning ministry. And the planning ministry exists from the bottom up 
through the municipalities and top-down through the strategy proposals.510 
Despite these doubts, the government eventually backed the PRSP process and continued to 
organise the National Dialogue 2003/04.  
As an innovation, a National Directorate was formed between civil society 
organisations and government in order to secure a more inclusive and participatory 
preparation of the process at the national level. Furthermore, the National Dialogue 2003/04 
greatly enlarged the scope of participation – instead of about 15 000 participants like in 2000, 
about 60 000 people participated in the roundtables. Contentwise, a shift emerged away from 
the pro-poor focus that had defined the first EBRP: 
If one looks at the previous poverty reduction strategy [...] whatever one 
does is pro-poor. So 90 percent of the Bolivian public budget are within this 
pro-poor focus.511  
The poverty label did not appeal to ‘the poor’ as much as international donors had assumed. 
One government representative explained: 
If you listen to the small-scale producers or the indigenous original farmers 
organisations from the North of Potosí, they will tell you: “We are not poor, 
we are producers!”512 
Instead of poverty reduction, the preliminary discussions within the directorate, a pre-
dialogue and the subsequent roundtables stressed an emphasis on productivity issues.513  
The civil society organisations today don’t like the EBRP “because the 
EBRP is from Washington. It’s from Tuto Quiroga. We don’t want it. It 
doesn’t interest us. We want to do something called productive strategies.” 
This is the new proposal by civil society. 514 
This shift in discourse is curiously similar to the one that occurred in Ghana, despite 
the different circumstances. Both countries matured from the initial PRPS document that 
was formulated under the HIPC initiative, with the primary aim of securing as much debt 
relief as possible. Even though subsequent funding was still dependent on the continuity of 
the PRSP process, both the Bolivian and the Ghanaian government had become more 
                                                 
510  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
511  Interview with a donor representative, No. 122, La Paz, 8 April 2004. 
512  Interview with a government representative, No. 27, La Paz, 12 March 2004. The North of Potosí is one of the poorest 
regions in Bolivia.  
513  For the results, see Secretaría Técnica del Diálogo Nacional Bolivia Productiva (2004): "Compromiso Nacional por una 
Bolivia Productiva", La Paz. 
514  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
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confident in defining their agenda independently from external expectations. In Bolivia, this 
change of emphasis was moreover a response to a broad-based call for a productivity focus.  
5 . 2 . 2  B u d g e t  S u p p o r t  I n  B o l i v i a  
In Bolivia, general budget support had been discussed since 2004.515 As discussed in chapter 
three, the Vice-Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing had established a 
round table between the donors and government to discuss matters of harmonisation. The 
participants of this round table established a task team to design a national action plan on 
harmonisation and alignment.516 Yet until 2005 donors have not started budget support, 
primarily because of the political instability in Bolivia. Nonetheless, different forms of basket 
funding initiatives continued to exist, where several donors pooled their resources to fund 
one particular sector or initiative.  
5.2.2.1 Contemplating Multi-Donor Budget Support 
Similarly to Ghana, the discussion around starting a multi-donor budget support initiative in 
Bolivia centred around establishing a conditionality framework that could address public 
sector reform:  
There are many budget support initiatives. […] I believe what has to be done 
here is to give budgetary support but as part of a process to improve the 
transparency of public administration, and to start with the EBRP having 
some priorities that are reflected in the future budget. That’s the idea.517 
Clearly, this idea was favoured by donors rather than government who worried about 
delivering to the donors’ expectations: 
In reality, it is a process where some donors are united around an idea. I 
believe that it’s a good idea but the government is under a lot of pressure 
because they are like the accountant. […] What initiative are they going to 
take for the implementation, distribution, controlling and auditing of the 
budget so that it improves? […] Also, we cannot give budget support if it’s 
not part of a wider framework.518 
The existing budget support flows were not coordinated under a comprehensive, wider 
framework. Until 2005, the Bolivian government had a multi-annual framework in place to 
                                                 
515  International Monetary Fund (2005): "Bolivia: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and 
Technical Memorandum of Understanding", March 24, Washington, DC: IMF. 
516 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005): "Survey on Harmonisation and Alignment", Paris: 
OECD. 
517 Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
518 Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
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coordinate budget support, which was primarily used as a short-term fiscal gap-filling 
measure.519 This meant that monies where not provided on a continuous basis, nor were they 
earmarked: 
What needs to be done is that donor projects become more flexible. The 
need to harmonise, the donors need to realign their cooperation. If you 
asked them, they’d tell you “yes, we are all aligned” […] but aligned on what? 
25 percent, almost 30 percent of all budgetary projects are earmarked for 
administration, institutional strengthening.520 
The reason for this lack of coordination was certainly the political instability that 
characterised Bolivian politics since 2003.  
In 2004, several donors established a memorandum of understanding agreeing to a 
common framework for multi-annual budget support. In 2005, this mechanism was yet to be 
established. A framework similar to the MDBS in Ghana would require a relatively good 
predictability of public administration. Since frequent political changes in Bolivia usually 
entailed a turn-over in bureaucratic personnel, such predictability was unlikely, at least until 
after a new election. Another reason for scepticism among donors was that donors perceived 
politicians as too patronage-oriented for effective disbursements of funds. They were worried 
that politicians might spend the money to service their patronage networks: 
What the politicians are interested in is that they are getting a bridge financed 
in the area where they live. […] There is too much discretion and a great lack 
of control and auditing. 521 
In essence, there was a lack of trust between donors and government. The donors did not 
perceive the budget process as transparent enough to entrust all their funds to it. Even 
though the government was arguing for a transparent budget process, several donor 
representatives remained sceptical: 
Yes, I believe it is a problem that there is not transparency in the budget in 
the sense that… I don’t believe that the politicians understand the budget. 522  
Peculiarly, this was also the case in Ghana. What was different was that in Ghana spending 
alternatives were rare, whereas the political landscape of Bolivia offered a multitude of 
recipients. Donors who preferred to support civil society instead of government could 
                                                 
519  For example, when political crisis severely worsened the economic crisis in October 2003, several donors provided 
emergency budgetary support to help reduce the deficit. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(2005): "Survey on Harmonisation and Alignment", Paris: OECD. 
520  Interview with a government representative, No. 112, La Paz, 30 April 2004. 
521 Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
522 Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
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choose among a variety of traditional social movements and newly emerging non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This choice did not exist in Ghana. Even within the 
state, there were autonomous agencies like the Office of the Ombudsman or the Mechanism 
of Social Control to support. Basket funding initiatives in Bolivia focused on these 
organisation and programmes.  
5.2.2.2 Joint Funding Initiatives  
In 2003/04, the three major joint funding initiatives in Bolivia were for decentralisation, the 
Office of the Ombudsman and most recently the National Dialogue 2003/04. 523 All of these 
initiatives had been established fairly recently, so donors were reluctant to judge their 
performance:  
It’s still unclear. There is not much to say. In the Institutional Reform 
Program, there was one for the Office of the Ombudsman, one for 
decentralisation policies. I think that this is the most interesting of it all.524 
While the basket fund for decentralisation was established through the World Bank 
initiated Institutional Reform Programme, the basket for the Office of the Ombudsman was 
an independent initiative by several bilateral donors in 1996. This newly established office has 
an interesting status within the Bolivian state:  
The Office of the Ombudsman is not outside of the budget like the 
Mechanism of Social Control. Both are structurally independent, of the 
government, of the legislative and judicative, but the Ombudsman is 
nevertheless part of the budget.525  
The Mechanism of Social Control, which was established by the Law of the National 
Dialogue in 2000, received funding through the basket for the National Dialogue 2003/04, 
along with the Technical Secretariat of the National Dialogue and the other organisations 
that participate in the Directorate. Yet, its status was less favourable than that of the 
Ombudsman, particularly because of the lack of budgetary funding.  
When asked whether basket funding was working, one responded said that the 
donors had much to learn in terms of granting ownership. With respect to a recent initiative 
by one ministry, he commented:  
                                                 
523  Interview with a government representative, No. 27. La Paz, 12 March 2004. Donors were also discussed a basket fund in 
support of the Coordination Unit for the Constituent Assembly, when the government established it in 2004. 
524  Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
525  Interview with a donor representative, No. 17, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
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They are saying, “we want basket funding and we have already defined the 
priorities for the donors.” That’s much more interesting. This is what we 
would like to trigger. […] What we need now is to confront ourselves step 
by step. It’s not because the donors are bad. It’s because they too have 
national bases and they have to respond to them.526 
Just as much as they have to respond to national bases, donors have to respond to internal 
requirements and mechanisms. This might get in the way of consultation or cooperation. 
Many of the problems of joint funding agreements related to difficulties between different 
actors on the donor side. A donor representative cited one example: 
There is a large basket for decentralisation […] And the World Bank, in the 
style of lord of the manor, has partially disregarded the bilateral donors. They 
decided that the benchmarks have been reached without even consulting the 
others. The World Bank always talks about Comprehensive Development 
Framework as long as it so pleases and in the decisive moments decides on 
its own. Many are upset by this.527 
It comes as no surprise that joint funding mechanisms – be they budgetary support 
or specific basket funds – are often initiated by bilateral rather than multilateral donors. 
Bilateral donors usually have less resources and more influence to gain from increased 
harmonisation, while the added benefit for large multilateral donors is marginal.  
5 . 3  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  F i v e  
Multi-donor budget support mechanisms are currently the predominant tool in development 
cooperation to achieve greater government ownership. They are heralded for granting greater 
autonomy to the recipient government and for increasing its discretion to spend the public 
budget. Here, ‘government’ ownership is understood in the narrow sense, where 
appropriation by society at large is not a necessary condition. To this end, budget support 
mechanisms certainly achieve this goal. What is questionable is whether they can be used as a 
mechanism to influence governments’ development planning to reflect donors’ priority areas, 
like public sector reform. The MDBS in Ghana was closely tied to a public sector reform 
agenda that was hoped to increase the transparency and accountability of the Ghanaian 
government expenditure. It remains to be seen whether it can actually achieve this goal.  
The examples of the Ghanaian and the Bolivian PRSP process show very clearly that 
both GPRS and EBRP were primarily formulated with a view of pleasing the donors in order 
                                                 
526  Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
527  Interview with a donor representative, No. 34, La Paz, 4 February 2004. 
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to be eligible for debt relief under HIPC II. This is true even in the Bolivian case where an 
extensive national dialogue was organised prior to the EBRP formulation, which could have 
defined the agenda for Bolivia’s poverty reduction strategy. Despite these efforts, the EBRP 
team was very careful to primarily respond to the donors wishes and demands, not to the 
recommendations of the dialogue. The origin of financial flows weighted more than the input 
provided by participatory processes or even than the government’s own development. It is 
questionable whether the original poverty reduction strategies accurately reflect the 
governments’ development priorities. Yet, both country cases display an interesting shift 
away from social sector spending towards productivity issues during the PRSP review 
process. This happened without a similar shift of focus within donor thinking. In Bolivia, this 
paradigm even stemmed from the national dialogue deliberations with civil society. The shift 
indicates a lack of government ownership of the original strategy, where social sector issues 
were prioritised in order to receive debt relief, without necessarily being a government 
priority as such. While the review of the PRSP was still important for continued funding, it 
attracted considerably less funds than the original PRSP. This opened up the space for the 
governments to enshrine their own agenda.  
In addition, contrasting the MDBS with the MCA shows the façade of formally 
declared strategies, reforms and procedures of the original PRSP for the case of Ghana. 
Although most donors are aware of gaps between declared and actual priorities, they seemed 
to not realise the consequences of such a situation. If formal arrangements are partly a 
façade, change cannot be easily achieved by reforming them, which was what the MDBS 
disbursement triggers attempted to do. That is why donor-supported reform attempts of the 
public administration and the civil service are doomed to failure, so long as they do not take 
actual patterns of everyday politics into account. The whole renewed focus on political 
institutions to foster economic development is likely to fail if only formal institutions are 
considered in practice. Yet, it is likely that a focus on informal political processes would 
reveal that they are too strongly rooted in society to be easily influenced or changed by 
external donors. Their complexity is probably the reason why donors shy away from 
analysing the issues at hand at a more profound level. 
On a different note, the MDBS in Ghana has certainly contributed to increased 
donor harmonisation, as have budget funding mechanisms in Bolivia. The intention to 
harmonise donor intervention at the country level was particularly beneficial when it came to 
administrative structures and financial management. However, up until 2005, attempts of 
donor harmonisation had only simplified the agenda, not the procedures. It was certainly 
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much easier to agree on a harmonised agenda between Western development partners, who 
have relatively similar values and base their development cooperation on a common 
foundation of academic writing. On the other hand, accounting structures have not been 
harmonised. Until 2005, only small improvements had been made in terms of reporting, 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The joint reporting on the MDBS triggers is a good 
starting point. Yet, it is telling that the MDBS development partners continue to operate 
according to different fiscal years, depending on the financial system of their home country. 
If donors were to take harmonisation seriously, they would orient their accounting 
procedures according to the regulations of the recipient government. Similarly, the fact that 
multi-donor budget support recipients are not selected on the basis of their efficient 
bureaucracy but rather according to donors’ pressure to spend reveals that increasing  
harmonisation and ownership are only secondary concerns of multi-donor budget support 
initiatives.   
It should not be forgotten why harmonisation ostensibly appeared on the 
development agenda: to free scarce human resources within the recipient government from 
administering donor programmes. To do that, donors need to tackle harmonisation of 
procedures as their primary goal. Yet, this is something very difficult to achieve for agencies 
that represent sovereign states and independent international organisations, where 
competition exists between different development partners about degrees of influence. In 
reaction to these obstacles, donor agencies preferred to turn towards harmonisation of 
agendas, which was much easier to do among like-minded Western donors. Yet, a 
harmonised agenda does not contribute to greater recipient ownership, on the contrary. 
Harmonising agendas reduces the plurality of opinions and leaves the recipient with no 
choice to pick the most suitable development partner. The result is an externally defined 
agenda and, consequentially, reduced government ownership. It is ironic that development 
partners who reform political institutions to make them more democratic have yet to realise 
that any system benefits from a plurality of opinions about how to solve the problems at 
hand. In a scenario where donors’ agendas compete with each other – like opinions do in any 
plural system – Ghana has the advantage of playing to the highest bidder willing to support 
reform programmes that are genuinely owned by the government. 
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C H A P T E R  6   –  S T A T E - S O C I E T Y  
R E L A T I O N S H I P S  I N  A  R E P R E S E N T A T I V E  
D E M O C R A C Y  
Part two of this thesis has shown that government ownership of multi-donor funded 
programmes depends on the degree to which donors address the interplay between political 
realities and wishful thinking of how institutions should be. In part three, I want to discuss in 
how far formalised agendas and informal political processes of state-society interaction affect 
the fourth dimension of ownership – the degree to which government made efforts towards 
consensus-building among various societal constituencies. To do so, this chapter establishes 
an overview of state-society relationships in Bolivia and Ghana. I pick up the political 
sociology perspective developed in chapter two to discuss how the political realm in both 
countries is a result of the way in which society interacts at the state level.  
Bolivia is often cited for its exemplary and innovative forms of civil society 
participation in national policy-making.528 In 1994, the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada passed the Law of Popular Participation, heralded by international practitioners and 
academics alike. Together with the Law of Administrative Decentralisation passed in 1995, 
the law established a decentralised system of policy-making at the municipal level. Many 
scholars of civil society participation mechanisms have attempted to evaluate these 
reforms.529 In addition, the succeeding government – with Bolivia’s ex-dictator General Hugo 
Banzer as president – established the first National Dialogue in 1997 to consult with civil 
society representatives on national policy-making. Initially, this might have simply been an 
attempt to legitimise Banzer’s government as genuinely democratic. Yet, it became one of the 
most well known examples of civil society consultation at the national level, further 
strengthening Bolivia’s image as a participatory democracy. This first national dialogue was 
later used as a model to devise civil society participation mechanisms required for the poverty 
reduction strategy paper (PRSP). In 2000, Law of the National Dialogue institutionalised 
                                                 
528  For an overview of the literature on local participation, see Günther Schönleitner (2004): Deliberative Health Councils and 
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of Development Studies, Brighton: University of Sussex.  
  164
national dialogues as national policy consultation processes on a regular basis.530 Nonetheless, 
social protest was on the rise in Bolivia, with different social groups claiming that they were 
excluded from political decision-making. To understand the extent to which exclusion took 
place in Bolivia, it is necessary to discuss how civil society and civil society participation were 
perceived and valued by different parts of society and government. It is also worth looking at 
different channels of inclusion and participation, formal as well as informal ones. 
In Ghana, the picture looks quite different. The only forms of direct participation 
were consultative processes to pass the PRSP requirements. Unlike Bolivia, Ghana did not 
have much experience with participatory processes, but it also did not have a history of social 
protest. Social divisions along economic and class cleavages were less marked in Ghana than 
in Bolivia. In chapter four of this thesis, I discussed Ghana’s neo-patrimonial state as an 
important factor in Ghanaian politics. The patronage networks that underpin political 
leverage of Ghana’s top leadership are multi-facetted and reach deep into different parts of 
society. They cut across ethnic or social divisions and create less of a sense of social exclusion 
then do ‘prebendal’ clientelistic networks in Bolivia, which rely more on direct favours than 
collective identities. Hence, state-society relationships in Ghana appear to be different than in 
Bolivia, even though both countries are representative democracies and both entertain similar 
types of cooperation programmes that include civil society participation elements. 
Comparing the two cases provides an interesting context in which to evaluate donors’ 
attempts to promote civil society participation in national policy-making.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I investigate the ‘role 
model’ case of Bolivia. In the second section, I explore state-society relationships in Ghana 
for comparative purposes. Within each section, I first discuss how perceptions on the role of 
civil society differ between the government and civil society organisations. In a second step, I 
discuss informal channels of societal participation in the national policy-making processes. I 
analyse what informal channels exist for different societal groups to influence policy-making, 
paying particular attention to collective action, participation in community affairs, and 
different forms of social protest. In a third step, I present formal consultative processes that 
have been established in Bolivia and Ghana in order to directly consult with civil society on 
national policy-making. I conclude that there are distinct differences in the way the concept 
of civil society is understood. These diverging perceptions on what constitutes civil society 
and civil society participation can have decisive effects on policy-making at the national level, 
to the point of destabilising representative democratic institutions. Donors’ attempts to foster 
                                                 
530  For a discussion of the national dialogues, see Vladimir Ameller Terrazas (2002): Diálogo para la descentralización: 
Provocaciones, avances y desengaños. La Paz: Plural. 
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civil society participation in national policy-making that employs an normative civil society 
concept instead of building on existing forms of state-society interaction further contributes 
to this destabilisation.  
6 . 1  S t a t e - S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  B o l i v i a  
In the Bolivian context, the definition of what organisations constitute civil society is of 
particular importance. Bolivia’s history has long been characterised by the conflicting powers 
of the militarily ruled state and the union-led social movements. Indeed, traditional concepts 
of a state as having successfully monopolised power are not very apt to explain the Bolivian 
state.531 Rather, Bolivian sociologists speak of poder dual – dual rule or dual power. The 
Bolivian sociologist Zavaleta Mercado has coined this term to describe the co-existence of 
political and social organisation.532 He particularly refers to the union-led social movements 
that continue to challenge state domination in Bolivia, as I have shown in chapter four. An 
interviewee confirmed the applicability of the concept:  
This idea [of dual rule] seems very important to me to define state and 
society in Bolivia because it is not like we are consolidating towards 
something. We are very consolidated in something that is dual rule. It’s very 
strong, it’s a very large bequest.533 
The term denotes the fact that the state in Bolivia is weak and its domination is continuously 
challenged by social movements – before and after democratisation. In such a situation, are 
the social movements not part of Bolivian civil society? Perception as to who constitutes 
society or civil society differ very much between different actors in Bolivia. Even beyond 
academic perspectives, government and societal organisations have diverging definitions of 
civil society and of participation. These understandings can even be conflicting and are partly 
at odds with each other.  
6 . 1 . 1  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  i n  B o l i v i a  
To evaluate government’s perception of civil society, I rely on public statements and policy 
papers. Yet, although popular participation was a prominent feature of government’s 
approach towards inclusion, it is not very clear what Bolivian governments have understood 
                                                 
531  The theory of state domination and the monopoly of power goes back to Max Weber, see Max Weber (1922): Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung III, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).  
532  René Zavaleta Mercado (1974): El Poder Dual. Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro. 
533  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004.  
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by civil society. State-society relations have definitely had a long tradition in Bolivia, but one 
could argue that government began to use the term ‘civil society’ only when it became a 
priority on the international donor agenda.534 Even though business associations have been 
existing in Bolivia since the beginning of this century, labour movements and church 
organisations are more commonly referred to when discussing Bolivia’s societal organi-
sations. Bolivian state-society relationships have a vibrant history, marked by deep social 
inequality. Because of these divisions, governments have usually formed alliances with strong 
social movements, such as the mining labour movement after the National Revolution in 
1952. Nonetheless, the division between the ruling elite and the rest of the population has 
been sharp and noticeable until today. Neglecting Bolivia’s history makes it impossible to 
understand the particular relationship between state and society. 
6.1.1.1 Government’s Perceptions  
The unions and social movements of the nineteenth century evolved from an antagonistic 
opposition against the militarily ruled state. Because of their struggle against dictatorship 
governments have tended to equate their conception of society with all groups in opposition 
to the government.535 Union movements stood out among Bolivia’s social movements, led by 
the traditionally influential miners. Both systems of power continued to exist side by side in 
Bolivia: state power dominated by the European-descended upper class on the one hand, and 
union and ayllu community power organised by the largely indigenous rural population on the 
other. In many rural areas, everyday life is still governed by traditional forms of 
administration that is independently of the Bolivian state, as one interviewee remarked:  
[Especially before popular participation] the government was somehow not 
existing in people’s heads. You could come to relatively large villages, 1000 
inhabitants, where only three men spoke Spanish. They have their own 
indigenous Quechua or Aymará traditions of administration.536  
The concept of dual power has been reformulated by others as the division between the país 
legal and país real.537 In other words, the political system enshrined in the constitution does not 
adequately reflect the power relations that determine policy-making on an everyday basis.  
                                                 
534  Even Bolivia’s flagship reform in 1994 was called popular participation, not civil society participation, and the societal 
organisations addressed by the law are referred to as territorial grassroots organisations. Compare República de Bolivia 
(1994): “Ley de Participación Popular”, Ley 1551 de 20 abril, Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, La Paz: Dirección Nacional de 
Comunicación Social.   
535  Christian Aid (2002): "Participating in Dialogue? The Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de Pobreza", Christian Aid Policy 
Briefing, January, La Paz. 
536 Interview with a donor representative, No. 34, La Paz, 4 February 2004. 
537  George Gray Molina (2001): "Exclusion, Participation and Democratic State-Building", in: Crabtree and Laurence 
Whitehead (eds.), Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience. Oxford: Palgrave: 63-82: 63. 
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I told the president that this is not a state […]. We’ll have to see… he’ll have 
to see to it that we reach 2006 without killing each other […]. He should 
realise that the only thing he can do is to avoid a catastrophe and that this 
implosion be a controlled implosion […]. This is not a racially mixed 
country. There are two things here, two heavy things and I don’t know what 
they are because I was always of the opinion that there are two civilisations 
here: the indigenous civilisation and the Western civilisation.538  
In 1952, the National Revolution in Bolivia resulted in a so-called co-gobierno, where 
the governing party Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) agreed to involve worker 
unions into government policy-making. This history of corporatism has left its mark on 
Bolivia’s collective memory. With respect to the current discussion around participation, one 
interviewee commented: 
It is important that this analysis emphasise the risks, which are that this 
might turn into corporatism. We all know the history that has led to these 
strong corporatist movements. […] In other words, they are navigating on 
the edge and it is really easy that this gets out of control. Really, the 
discussion should be what kind of country we should have, that is to say to 
see whether these participatory mechanisms are the one we should or 
shouldn’t use. […] All these concepts that they use of state capture, etc, etc, 
they can equally be applied to civil society and the political parties.539 
Because of this, participation in Bolivia did not necessarily lend itself to the academic 
understanding of a broad-based consultation process. Rather it recalled collective memories 
of co-gobierno and corporatist policy-making. One tends to forget that it was in this context, 
that Bolivia’s democracy was re-established in 1982. However, the economic adjustment of 
the last few decades significantly altered the constellation of social movements and 
destabilised traditional strongholds.540 For a long time, even the democratic governments 
continued to perceive social movements as oppositional and antagonistic, because of their 
history, but also because of their tendency to oppose working inside of formal government 
structures. Social movements are still capable of mobilising large numbers of people into 
forceful street protests. This was evident in October 2003, when social protests in the streets 
forced the incumbent president to resign. 
Despite all the tensions, there were several political efforts since 1982 to improve the 
relationship between state and society in Bolivia. Immediately after democratisation, first 
attempts were the parliamentary reform and the electoral reform in 1989. They reorganised 
                                                 
538  Interview with a government representative, No. 58, La Paz, 6 April 2004.  
539  Interview with a government representative, No. 27, La Paz, 12 March 2004.  
540  John McNeish (1999): "Betwixt and Between: Globalisation and the Politics of Participation in Highland Bolivia", 
presented at the conference "Tradition and Reform in Bolivia", June, Institute for Latin American Studies, University of 
London. 
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the Corte National Electoral and the parliamentary voting system was restructured. The 
governments sought to distance themselves from the former dictatorships with these 
measures and improve democratic representation. In 1993, the Bolivian government’s judicial 
reform programme began setting up new procedures for appointing judges. As part of the 
same agenda, the government created several new state organisations such as a National 
Judiciary Council, a Constitutional Tribunal and a Ministry of Justice. An independent Office 
of the Public Defender was created in 1998. Complementary key judicial reforms included a 
revision of the Bolivian code of criminal procedures, which was still largely inquisitorial.541 
These measures sought to improve the human rights situation in Bolivia and establish trust in 
the state and its justice system. Another important cabinet reorganisation included the 
creation of a Ministry for Indigenous Affairs in order to better respond to the large 
indigenous population. With regard to direct civil society participation, the Sánchez de 
Lozada government introduced popular participation in 1994 and administrative 
decentralisation in 1995. For the first time, these measures gave civil society the opportunity 
to participate in policy-making at the municipal level. The National Dialogue 1997 was the 
first genuinely government-initiated attempt to include civil society into policy-making at the 
national level – although this initiative might have been prompted by the necessity to increase 
the legitimacy of the incumbent government with the ex-dictator Banzer as president.  
After Bolivia’s experience with the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative 
and with the PRSP, the concept of civil society participation became central to government 
rhetoric in Bolivia, as the three dialogue processes of 1997, 2000 and 2003/04 clearly show. 
Yet, this was accompanied by increasing civil society fatigue and doubts about its 
representativeness:  
I believe that civil society is spoiled. They have really shaped the discourse 
and they believe they have the right to comment on everything. That’s how it 
is. We ourselves have done this. Civil society thinks they have the right to 
influence. They have to be in all dialogue round tables. Whether or not they 
have a vision is another issue.542  
There is a general belief in the value of dialogue with civil society but the means are 
increasingly questioned. When asked about the usefulness of including civil society 
representatives in the directorate of the National Dialogue, one interviewee responded: 
                                                 
541  In an inquisitorial system, the judge both conducts the investigation and then rules in all cases brought before the court. 
In addition, in Bolivia, all phases of trial were recorded only in documents whose flow and distribution was controlled by 
the court secretaries. 
542  Interview with a government representative, No. 41, La Paz, 4 February 2004.  
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I believe that it has its positive and its negative sides, to have it established. If 
we are talking to the valid speakers, it is possible. If they are really 
representing a particular group, it can be positive. But just because they claim 
they are… It’s also implicitly a kind of ignorance of formal representation in 
this body, isn’t it?543  
From this point of view, representative and participatory means of policy-making can 
contradict each other. 
6.1.1.2 Civil Society Perceptions  
Before societal restructuring by the Spanish conquest, large parts of Bolivia’s indigenous 
society were organised in ayllus. An ayllu is a community of families that share recourses 
according to need.544 With the Spanish came a new European urban upper class who largely 
monopolised political power as well as land rights within Bolivia. In 1952 and in 1953, the 
National Revolution and the Agrarian Reform partly distributed vast stretches of land to the 
indigenous campesinos. These new landowners organised themselves in unions to organise 
economic and social life within their rural communities. In some communities, they were 
organised alongside traditional ayllus and operated parallel to them.545 Some argue that the 
ayllus and the workers unions provide the basis for a ‘democracy of consensus’ at the rural 
level in Bolivia, where issues are discussed until a consensus is reached to which their leaders 
are obliged to adhere. These traditional forms of social organisation continued to exist and 
effectively present a forceful counterbalance to government influence in Bolivia. They were 
complemented by the mining and workers’ unions, which were composed of similar 
groupings.  
However, social movements were strongly divided, both within and between groups. 
This division inhibited their joining forces and interests to constructively engage in dialogue, 
preventing them from realising their full potential power. Nevertheless, some authors argue 
that some progress has been made in joining forces, for example through the formation of 
the Comité de Enlace in 1999.546 Yet, the relationship between government and societal groups 
was as diverse as the groups themselves. Rooted in Bolivia’s history of societal opposition to 
                                                 
543  Interview with a government representative, No. 113, La Paz, 30 April 2004. 
544  A. M. Ejdesgaard-Jeppesen (2002): "Reading the Bolivian Landscape of Exclusion and Inclusion: The Law of Popular 
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government policies, non-governmental organisations generally mistrusted government 
action as well as government representatives. The degree of this distrust varied from 
organisation to organisation and extended to an opposition to organisations that were 
perceived as close to government. The Catholic Church was traditionally perceived by other 
members of society as closely aligned with government. For that reason, the Church-led 
Jubilee 2000 dialogue faced similar problems as the government-initiated dialogue process in 
overcoming the suspicion of particular organisations towards the process. In general, civil 
society groups continued to be sceptical of government’s willingness to permit civil society 
participation in local and national policy formulation. 
It has become customary to speak of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as 
almost synonymous to civil society organisations. In Bolivia, recently founded organisations 
with a developmental mission are commonly referred to as NGOs. Yet, in Laurence 
Whitehead’s words, “NGOs tend to lack the surrounding ethos, the sense of authenticity, the 
spirit of autonomy celebrated by theorists of civil society.”547  
NGOs get resources. They come, do a project in a rural community, and 
when the project is done, they go and look for another project. But the 
mechanisms of accountability, of interaction, of representativeness, they 
haven’t been employed.548  
As the ‘voice of the poor’ becomes an increasingly valuable asset – certainly in terms of 
funding – further division within civil society has emerged between NGOs and social 
movements. NGOs tend to be run by highly educated, non-indigenous middle class staff or 
by foreigners. Social movements tend to be more broad based interest groups around a 
certain issue – such as mining, coca, indigenous issues – that generally represent and are run 
by indigenous people. Even though they largely work in rural areas, social movements attack 
NGOs for imposing external values and judgements on discussions of rural causes of 
poverty and inequality. It is estimated that about 80 percent of all NGOs registered in Bolivia 
are based in the three biggest cities La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. In contrast, social 
movements claim to be the only genuine representatives of the people and society, arguing 
that NGOs lack such a societal base.  
[Social movements] totally reject NGOs and the Church. Within these 
organisations, there is a strong rejection of this interference.549  
                                                 
547  Laurence Whitehead (2002): Democratization: Theory and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 68. 
548  Interview with a government representative, No. 79, La Paz, 29 March 2004.  
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In short, NGO, social movements, trade unions and political parties alike have severe fights 
among themselves as to who most legitimately represents Bolivian society, in opposition and 
critique of the government. Donor perceptions that view civil society as organised interest 
groups that purposefully engage with government policy in order to further developmental 
goals do not capture the reality of the struggle for power and influence in Bolivian society.  
6 . 1 . 2  C h a n n e l s  o f  P a r t i c i p a t i o n   
Democratic theory often presumes that democratisation can build on a high degree of 
homogeneity – in terms of space and in terms of ethnic and social divisions – of the state and 
of the country’s society.550 However, in Bolivia the state is not able to guarantee the rule of 
law, effective policy-making and nation-state unity.551 Gray argues that, due to Bolivia’s 
cultural and territorial diversity, the Bolivian state can be visualised as enforcing its legal and 
bureaucratic presence in ‘pockets’ that often privilege the urban and the well-off over the 
rural and the poor.552 This means that the formal channels of representative democracy tend 
to privilege the urban middle and upper classes, while marginalising large parts of the rural 
population. Although everyone was technically able to vote since democratisation in 1982, 
the right to be elected at the national level continued to be exercised by only a few, who had 
the means and the networks to run campaigns. In 2005, this changed for the first time with 
the election of the populist cocalero leader Evo Morales to the presidency. His election  with a 
majority vote followed the collapse of Carlos Mesa’s and Sánchez de Lozada’s governments 
that were unable to appease heated political protest by large parts of the population. Indeed, 
until 2005 formal channels of participation had provided little means of improving dialogue 
between the Bolivian governments and large parts of society.  
6.1.2.1 Formal Channels  
Although Bolivia has had constitutional governments for over 250 years, it has only 
experienced brief periods of democratic governance prior to its democratic transition in 
1985.553 Under the constitution of 1967 executive power resides in a president, elected by 
popular vote, who serves a five year term and is not eligible for immediate re-election. 
                                                 
550  Guillermo O'Donnell (1993): "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View 
with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries", in: World Development, 21 (8): 1355-1370. 
551  The picture is similar in other Latin American countries. Compare R. Andrew Nickson (1995): Local Government in Latin 
America. London: Lienne Rienner. 
552  George Gray Molina (2001): "Exclusion, Participation and Democratic State-Building", in: Crabtree and Laurence 
Whitehead (eds.), Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience. Oxford: Palgrave: 63-82. 
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Congress consists of two chambers: the Congress and the Senate, made up of three elected 
from each of nine departamentos. Members of both houses are elected for four years. The 
President has the power to appoint members of the cabinet, diplomatic representatives, 
archbishops and bishops from a panel proposed by the Senate. In 2004, the President still 
had the power to appoint prefectos in each of the nine departments who then hold supreme 
administrative, political and military authority in their respective regions.554 In contrast, the 
mayor of each municipality, the alcalde, was elected by popular vote. With the Law of Popular 
Participation passed in 1994, the alcaldía was complemented by a comité de vigilancia – 
anoversight committee composed of grassroots organisations that provides a checks and 
balance function to the workings of the municipal government.  
6.1.2.2 Informal Channels 
An analysis of Bolivian politics thus requires a closer look at informal channels of political 
participation, especially because they have had such a decisive impact on political change 
after 2000. In the following subsections, I discuss these informal channels of political 
participation according to the channels that private actors use to influence policy-making. 
These channels differ with respect to the degree to which they are integrated into the political 
system. Lobbyists work quite often in close direct contact with government officials and 
sometimes even maintain institutionalised positions through political consultation. Protest 
movements, in turn, have little direct contact and try to influence political issues by means of 
public opinion or through a general threat of falling voter support. Both of these forms, 
which have been called insider and outsider lobbying, evolve in response to the political 
institutions that they try to address.555 In addition, primordial social institutions exist in 
Bolivia and have become more integrated into the political system through Popular 
Participation, even though they existed outside and before its creation.  
6.1.2.2.1 Insider Lobbying: Interest Groups 
Academic writing on interest group relationships with the state in Bolivia has usually 
highlighted two areas: the union movement and the peasant and agrarian campesino 
associations. As I have argued in chapter four, both managed to form strategic alliances with 
governmental institutions and influence policy-making through pactos and so-called co-gobierno 
after the National Revolution in 1952. The alliances between the MNR and the Central Obrera 
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Boliviana (COB) as well as between Banzer’s military dictatorship and the campesino 
movements were the most prominent examples of insider lobbying in Bolivia. However, one 
important area of interest group associations remains under-researched: the influence of 
private entrepreneurial associations on the Bolivian state. There are close links and overlaps 
between the Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia – the Confederación de 
Epresarios Privados de Bolivia – and the MNR governments of Sánchez de Lozada. The 
confederation was founded in 1962 and has since then had a broader base of members than 
the traditional landowner or mine owner associations. While the latter have always 
maintained close links with the political elite on an inter-personal basis, the confederation has 
always expressed its desire for institutional mediation between the state and the 
confederation. It can be argued that the neo-liberal turn of governmental politics in the 1980s 
and 1990s was largely due to these linkages – together with external pressures from 
international development agencies.556  
In sum, different governments have forged alliances with different parts of society. 
While the corporatist governments of the 1960s and 1970s relayed more on organised 
groupings, economic interest groups’ association with liberal democratic governments was 
largely based on inter-personal ties of the ruling elite. By means of these alliances, interest 
groups were able to influence policy-making according to their interests and preferences, 
while different governments managed to co-opt political opposition in order to secure 
political stability or to gain access to economic resources.  
6.1.2.2.2 In the Middle: Institutions of Primordial Collective Action 
In the Bolivian highlands, the traditional Aymará communities are organised in so-called 
ayllus. Ayllus are not defined by territory, but by belonging. Because of this, it has been hard 
to integrate the ayllus into the Bolivian state, because the communities cannot be easily 
equated or subsumed under a territorially bound municipality:  
How to you make the Pocuata community feel that it is part of the Pocuata 
municipality? Today, a person from the Pocuata community doesn’t think 
that the mayor is representative […]. And how do you make this reality – 
which is very democratic, in a different logic of democracy – how do you 
unite these two realities, beyond parallel existence?557  
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This continues to be a challenge from above as well as from below. Traditional communities 
organised themselves into several national bodies aimed at representing the interests of the 
communities to government. The Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del Collasuyu (National 
Council of Indigenous Leaders) is such an example. The government made attempts to 
integrate such organisations into national policy-making, by creating a directorate to organise 
the National Dialogue 2003/04. By doing so, the government was trying to reconcile 
traditional forms of political organisation with its current mechanisms of consultation and 
policy-making. Yet, social protest between 2003 and 2005 has increasingly mobilised ethnic 
identities to further political objectives by protesting in the streets. On the other hand, the 
Bolivian constituent assembly  is supposed to integrate the ayllus into the political system. As 
one interviewee put it:  
[Bolivia] isn’t a mixed country. There are two things here. I have always 
argued that two civilisations exist here: an indigenous civilisation and a 
Western civilisation. … That is how Bolivia works and the new constitution 
will need to reflect this.558  
Indigenous forms of collective action in Bolivia were thus caught in the middle between 
insider and outsider lobbying until 2005, where the election platform of Evo Morales gave 
them a more prominent place in the political system of Bolivia.  
6.1.2.2.3 Outsider Lobbying: Social Protest 
Social protests dominated the political landscape in Bolivia, in effect since February 2003. In 
October 2003, they led the then president Sánchez de Lozada to resign and in June 2005, his 
vice-president and successor Carlos Mesa also resigned as a result of civil unrest. Mesa said 
that the country had become ungovernable. Early elections were called for December 2005. 
One of the issues that sparked protest was a call for nationalisation of Bolivia’s natural gas 
reserves and a demand for a constituent assembly. At the heart of the protest lay 
fundamentally different opinions on Bolivia’s economic and political organisation – between 
the economic elite, who are largely from the Santa Cruz region, and the indigenous 
populations of the Western highlands. When Carlos Mesa responded to many of the 
demands of the protesters in La Paz, he had to realise that the district of Santa Cruz was 
unwilling to back his concessions. In essence, social protest in Bolivia was not issue or policy 
based. Rather it was a fundamental struggle around what kind of political system should 
govern the country. This culminated in the election of the protest leader Evo Morales to the 
presidency. Interestingly, the result of this outsider movement was thus the integration of 
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previously marginalised societal groupings into the political system. Before Morales’ election, 
the protesters had little direct contact with government officials. Beyond influencing political 
issues by means of public opinion, the Bolivian protests managed to overhaul the political 
system by providing a platform for previously marginalised groups to be included.  
6 . 1 . 3  D i r e c t  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  N a t i o n a l  P o l i c y - M a k i n g  
Since the Law of Popular Participation was passed in 1994, Bolivia has remained a prominent 
example for institutionalised participatory interaction between the state and civil society 
organisations. More recently, the National Dialogue processes – which were formalised in the 
Law of the National Dialogue – have been heralded by the international development 
community as a model for participatory processes in other countries.559 In 2004, the Bolivian 
government conducted its third national dialogue process. Similarly, civil society itself 
organised several national dialogues, of which the Jubilee 2000 Forum is considered the most 
important. The first National Dialogue, which took place in 1997, was a participatory process 
at the national level, prior to the participation conditionality of the PRSP.  
The following national dialogue, the National Dialogue 2000, was created in 
fulfilment of the participatory element of the PRSP. However, the National Dialogue 1997 
had already created doubts about how sincere the government had actually been in listening 
to societal needs:  
The first dialogue […] was Banzer with 50 friends.560  
As a consequence, civil society organisations were sceptical when the government called for 
the National Dialogue 2000.561 To facilitate the National Dialogue 2000, the government 
created an independent secretariat, as it had done in 1997. The Catholic Church – a key 
player in the civil society movement for debt relief – also declared its interest in filling this 
role, but could not come to an agreement with government. Consequently, the Church 
created the Jubilee 2000 dialogue in parallel to the government-initiated process.562 It 
intended to provide a counterweight to the government-initiated National Dialogue 2000. 
The Jubilee 2000 Forum finished just before the National Dialogue 2000 started. Around 
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March that year, the Church finally agreed to integrate part of its dialogue into the National 
Dialogue 2000 by sending representatives to the departmental and national tables.  
Once the National Dialogue 2000 was concluded, the elaboration of the PRSP began 
– led by an independent external consultant together with a team from the government 
think-tank Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (UDAPE). Critics claim that the 
input from the National Dialogue 2000 was not influential in elaborating the PRSP. They 
argue that the Law of the National Dialogue is the only genuinely Bolivian outcome of the 
National Dialogue 2000, whereas the PRSP was much rather a donor-driven exercise.563 A 
donor representative explained this disconnect between the National Dialogue and the EBRP 
with the donors’ substantial involvement:  
Every donor wanted to include something: the British gender issues, 
ourselves indigenous issues, and so on. We all managed to get something 
specific included but it wasn’t a national consultation process. It was 
included because the donors wanted it. It was something imposed from 
outside.564  
Yet, the international requirements of the PRSP process, which called for a revision 
of the original PRSP after a few years, fitted in neatly with civil societies’ demand for revision 
enshrined in the Law of the National Dialogue. In September 2003, the third dialogue was 
initiated. As an innovation, a National Directorate was formed between civil society 
organisations and government, in order to secure a more inclusive and participatory process 
at the national level. The National Dialogue 2003/04 greatly enlarged the scope of 
participation – instead of about 15 000 participants like in 2000, about 60 000 people 
participated in the roundtables. As such, the national dialogues have become an 
institutionalised element of direct participation in national policy-making. According to the 
Law of the National Dialogue, its conclusions are binding and government is supposed to 
take its recommendations on board when designing national policies. However, the reality 
differs from this idealised picture. Civil society has few means of sanctioning the government 
if it chooses to ignore a dialogue’s recommendations. A currently popular saying in Bolivian 
society goes, “I participate, you participate, he participates, we participate, they decide.” 
Despite relatively frequent consultations, governments often ended up not implementing the 
resulting policy recommendation and civil society had few means to enforce coherence with 
the outcome of consultative processes.  
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6 . 2  S t a t e - S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  G h a n a  
Unlike Bolivia, Ghana has not had a history marked by social movements’ antagonism to the 
state. Professional associations and voluntary organisations have existed since British colonial 
times. They played a role in shaping state-society relationships, albeit in different ways than in 
Bolivia. What is comparable is that ruling governments in Ghana also tried to forge strategic 
alliances with voluntary associations to strengthen and legitimise their rule. Nonetheless, 
other forms of social organisation continue to play an important role, and patronage 
networks based on social identity are more influential in Ghana then they are in Bolivia. 
These patronage networks rely less on the exchange of favours and gifts than they do in 
Bolivia. Instead they are upheld by different social identities and create dependencies based 
on professional, regional, religious, or ethnic ties.  
6 . 2 . 1  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  i n  G h a n a  
Political constellations are much less volatile in Ghana than they are in Bolivia where 
coalitions and governments change almost every term. In Ghana, changes of government or 
a reshuffling of party fractions in parliament are much rarer. For the first time since Ghana’s 
transition to democracy, there was a government change-over in 2000, with the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) taking over from the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Against 
this background, how does government perceive civil society? What understandings do 
voluntary organisations have of their role in the political process? The answers to these 
questions shed light on the forms in which state-society relationships take place in Ghana. 
6.2.1.1 Government’s Perceptions 
The governments of Ghana have not conceived of civil society organisations as relevant 
stakeholders in national policy-making, although they acknowledge that society is the main 
beneficiary. Public access to official information is still severely restricted. Public officials 
continued to be suspicious of civil society organisations and were reluctant to engage in 
dialogue with them.565  
I have a personal ideology which is different from what people think but I 
respect it. Who is civil society? Civil society to me are parliamentarians. 
Beyond that, think tanks are people who have an academic interest in an 
area, they get some funding. They make a lot of noise and they get heard. 
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But I don’t think that they have any mandate to demand government to do 
what they think should be done.566 
The government has implemented only few mitigation measures and deliberated very little 
with civil society representatives, apart from donor-driven initiatives. Examples of those were 
the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative, which engaged donors, 
government and civil society representatives, or the National Economic Dialogue with civil 
society through which the government fulfilled the participation conditionality of the PRSP. 
However, even in these initiatives, questions of representativeness persist: 
Well, the government faces the same dilemmas as we do. What is 
consultation? And what is the difference between consultation and 
participation? And who does civil society represent?567  
In tripartite initiatives between the donors, the government and civil society, negotiations 
tended to break up in pairs, where the donors negotiated with the government or with civil 
society independently from one another.568  
Out of all government ministries, departments and agencies, the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC) has been at the forefront of initiating 
consultative processes with civil society stakeholders. This was probably due to the fact that 
the NDPC coordinated and evaluated long-term planning efforts – such as the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) or the Millennium Development Goals – which were 
usually conducted in cooperation with international aid agencies that pressed for participatory 
measures. The Ministry of Finance also consulted with civil society and private sector 
representatives on different issues – again, usually initiatives that were donor-driven. The 
proposal for the Millennium Challenge Account was such an example.569 Because of the 
external sources of finance for governance-related issues that privilege participatory 
approaches, civil society and private sector representatives increasingly enjoyed formal 
membership in consultative committees and forums. Yet, while this had undoubtedly led to 
more inclusive spaces for decision-making, political power brokerage still took place outside 
of these forums. Civil society organisations were consulted rather than being included into 
the policy-making process:  
What you see now is what you saw with this GPRS. It is just talk and 
ceremonies where the drafts are presented and civil society is invited to 
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comment on it and so on, but no involvement at all of civil society in the 
making of the draft.570 
Most civil servants continued to view participation as donor-driven and considered 
its benefits to be limited. When asked whether there was a lot of pressure from donors to 
have civil society participate, one government representative responded:  
Yes, there is but we manage it carefully. To the extent that they want it, I let 
them do it. But I am not going to spend my time.571 
Killick concludes that well established participatory frameworks “sit uncomfortably along a 
seemingly entrenched top-down culture which in the past has, at best, accommodated only 
such ‘consultation’ as can be managed, and preferably be manipulated and dominated.”572 In 
reaction to donor requirements, the Ghanaian government today appeared to seek 
participatory input and consultations with civil society, while civil society organisations’ actual 
decision-making continued to take place behind closed doors. Within the political system of 
Ghana, the executive – in particular the president – still played a dominant role that 
continued to limit the realm of deliberative institutions and processes.  
6.2.1.2 Civil Society Perceptions 
Even though colonial rule under the British was autocratic, it did not prevent the 
establishment of a variety of voluntary organisations.573 Unlike previously existing forms of 
organisation in the social sphere, these organisations made use of the resources of the civil 
public realm in order to promote the welfare of the civil public and their members. Until 
today, they pursued a variety of professional, economic, social, religious, and political 
interests and goals vis-à-vis the colonial, and later post-colonial state. Examples are the Ghana 
Bar Association, the Ghana Medical Association, the Ghana National Association of 
Teachers, the Chamber of Commerce and Mines, Ghana Manufacturers’ Association, the 
Trade Unions, the United Ghana Farmers’ Council, as well as the Christian Council of 
Churches, National Catholic Secretariat, Pentecostal Council of Churches and the Ghana 
Muslim Council. Additionally, there were sports clubs, self-help associations and recreational 
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clubs.574 These organisations were part of the civil public sphere and could generally be 
connected with the concept of civil society identified in developed societies. They also 
perceived themselves as such. These voluntary organisations chose to use the civic public 
space to engage in dialogue with the government or between themselves on the particular 
issues that mattered to them. 
Over the past few years, the number of civil society organisations in Ghana increased 
dramatically. They take various forms, from grassroots organisations, intermediate level 
associations, specialised research organisations, to networks, coalitions and platforms – such 
as the Civil Society Coordinating Council, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, and 
the Education Campaign Coalition, to name a few. Aside from the traditional voluntary 
organisations, these groupings were increasingly influencing public debates and policy-
making, by liaising with parliament and its committees.575 These organisations tended to be 
issue-led, cutting across different social identities. Generally, they were aware that 
government did not take the engagement with them as serious as external donors would like 
to see. With respect to the National Economic Dialogue, one civil society representative 
commented:  
In a sense, the consultations were being done because the government had 
to do that, not because they wanted to take on board civil society as a whole. 
Yet, personally I still think the process is good, as a dialogue.576  
Civil society organisations welcomed the opportunities of participation in national policy-
making, although they acknowledged that their knowledge on policy issues was often scant. 
Civil society organisations criticised government for not taking their advice seriously enough 
and called for more acceptable frameworks of consultation.577 
Several scholars have rightly pointed out that a “grotesquely unequal distribution of 
economic power” existed in most African societies.578 This was also the case in Ghana. It had 
an adverse effect on the growth of many grassroots organisations originating from lower 
income levels and clearly favoured an increase in the number of civil society organisations of 
the wealthy urban middle class. The newly created civil society organisations generally faced 
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severe resource constraints and were usually entirely dependent on external sources of 
funding. In that sense, it was the international environment that made possible the breadth of 
coverage of these organisations, rather than internal demands or collective action of their 
members. Usually, members perceived these new civil society organisations as an alternative 
source of income or career path. They did not have the same collective action origin that 
some of the traditional voluntary organisations were founded for nor the activist character 
that a comparable organisation would have had in a developed country.  
6 . 2 . 2  C h a n n e l s  o f  P a r t i c i p a t i o n   
Ghana similarly is a heterogeneous country like Bolivia, but social divisions are less sharp. 
The state might not be able to enforce its legal and bureaucratic presence in the way that it 
does in established democracies. Nonetheless, the Ghanaian nation-state unity is not so 
much challenged by opposing fractions of society. Allegiances to particular social identities – 
be they regional, professional, religious or ethnic – exist but are often cross-cutting. Voting 
patterns are relatively constant in Ghana and political constellations are much less volatile 
than they are in Bolivia. Party allegiances often play a more important role than issue-based 
electoral competition. This is due to the neo-patrimonial structure of the state. Allegiances 
depend on social identities and patronage networks. Ghanaian citizens depend on other 
channels to influence policy-making and voice their opinion. Formalised channels of 
democratic participation like electoral politics only play a minor role.  
6.2.2.1 Formal Channels  
Representative democracy faces different challenges in Ghana. Ghana’s transition to 
democracy took place in 1992 with the introduction of a multi-party system. Yet, electoral 
competition is not as important to Ghanaians as might be assumed. A recent survey of public 
opinion in Africa concluded that the Ghanaians surveyed conceive of democracy primarily as 
free speech and direct participation rather than in terms of electoral choice and representative 
government. In line with this view, voter turnout in African post-transition elections has 
generally been lower in new democracies in Africa than in Eastern Europe, and especially 
than in Latin America.579 There are several reasons for this. In order to be eligible to vote, 
Ghanaians have to register with the electoral commission. This can be an obstacle, where 
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registration centres are far away or information on registration is not disseminated in time.580 
Voting behaviour in a country like Ghana is a difficult subject to study since official figures 
are very unreliable. For example, the electoral register for the 1996 election in Ghana was 
obviously inflated with phantom voters, to the point that proportion of those voting is higher 
among eligible than among registered voters.581  
6.2.2.2 Informal Channels 
However, as I have argued in chapter four, it is not the formal democratic institutions that 
usually count in neo-patrimonial regimes. If the essence of neo-patrimonialism is the private 
appropriation of the state’s powers, the distribution of state-generated benefits to political 
followers becomes a primary concern. Informal channels of participation then are a vital 
means of forging allegiances with power holders or of opposing a ruler’s politics outside of 
the constitutionally-mandated institutions of the political system.  
6.2.2.2.1 Insider Lobbying: Interest Groups 
In Ghana, one of the greatest problems that all civil associations faced was the hegemonic 
claims and ambitions of various governments, most importantly the civilian single-party 
dictatorship of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the military dictatorships that 
followed. Most of the voluntary associations were harassed, intimidated and ridiculed on 
public platforms and in the state-owned media. Notably the professional and the orthodox 
Christian churches fiercely resisted the attacks.582 The first attempt to co-opt civil society 
organisations was by the CPP government under Nkrumah that succeeded at incorporating 
the trade unions, farmers’ associations, co-operatives, women’s and youth organisations in 
the CPP as ‘integral wings’. The Acheampong military government attempted something 
similar with the creation of a ‘Union Government’ that would take the form of a ‘no-party’ 
national government comprising representatives of the armed forces, police and civilians. 
The Union Government incorporated several civic organisations, but most of the 
professional associations and others rejected the idea. The Provisional National Defence 
Council’s (PNCD) attempts to control civil organisations were the most extensive. For 
example, it passed the Religious Bodies Law in 1989, which gave the government the right to 
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prohibit particular religious organisations if it thought that they could lead to civil 
disobedience, public nuisance or be contrary to public order. Nonetheless, new voluntary 
organisations emerged during that time, including professional organisations, trade 
associations, and business cooperatives. Ghana is characterised by a “tug-of-war between 
patrimonial and inclusive models of politics”, where a strong tradition of top-down politics 
continues to dominate the political system.583  
6.2.2.2.2 In the Middle: Institutions of Primordial Collective Action 
The traditional chieftaincies of the Akan play a similar role in Ghana than the ayllus do in 
Bolivia. They claim to represent traditional political organisation that existed before the 
colonial and post-colonial Ghanaian state. The chieftaincies fulfil several socio-political 
functions and are traditionally responsible for allocating resources within the community. 
Increasingly, the chiefs are organising on the national level to influence policy-making. The 
house of chiefs is the most important national body. Besides collective lobbying and interest 
group work, the chiefs have continued to influence national politics through allegiances with 
different politicians on the national level. Politicians know about the opinion-shaping power 
of the chiefs and generally campaign under the patronage of particular influential chiefs.  
However, traditional institutions and leaders in Ghana vary enormously across the 
different cultures and localities of the country, which made it difficult for governments to 
formulate general policies or approaches to better integrate traditional authorities into the 
political system. In addition, chieftaincy remained a contested and highly political institutions, 
because of its associations with different authorities and its politisation by successive 
governments and parties, as I have argued in chapter four. The chieftaincies’ right to local 
authority was most uncontested with respect to land administration.584 Beyond administrative 
authority however, some Asante chiefs even managed to influence national policy debates. 
Yet, close alliances between chiefs and national parties were quickly regarded as ethnic ties. 
This puts a limit on the extent to which politicians could allow themselves to be closely 
linked to major traditional leaders as well as to the extent to which traditional institutions 
could be integrated into the formalised channels of political participation.  
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6.2.2.2.3 Outsider Lobbying: Social Protest 
Social protest is much less pronounced in Ghana. Until 2005, it did not have such a 
devastating effect on political stability as it does in Bolivia. One factor to explain this is that 
social divisions are less deep and that allegiances are often cross-cutting. An interesting 
exception were the protests around the end of petrol subsidies in 2000. Under pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government had agreed to drop petrol subsidies, 
which in turn led to an increase in petrol prices. Within a very short time, the taxi and tro-tro 
drivers in Accra organised street protests and were demonstrating in front of the presidential 
palace. The protests ended when the government reinitiated the petrol subsidies to keep 
prices constant.  
6 . 2 . 3  D i r e c t  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  N a t i o n a l  P o l i c y - M a k i n g  
Unlike Bolivia, Ghana has not been at the forefront of decentralisation and civil society 
participation initiatives. Since 1983, the Government of Ghana had largely employed a top-
down economic policy-making process, giving priority to economic growth rather than 
participatory pro-poor policy-making.585 The government engaged with people who were 
marginalized by this policy agenda with a mixture of containment and police repression of 
public dissent. Engagement initiatives tended to be top down and mitigation measures were 
largely donor-driven.586 
Under pressure, they have committed to provide better information to civil 
society, with respect to the Annual Progress Report, etc. It’s all not very 
easy-going and, especially with critical NGOs, the attitude could be more 
welcoming. I also don’t always know who gets invited to an event. I can 
imagine that often the good friends get invited and the evil foes are not 
informed. […] Discussion and criticism is still taken as a personal offence, 
even when it comes from Ghanaians.587 
Nonetheless, the government has been implementing a decentralisation and local 
government reform programme since 1988. The aim was to establish efficient decentralised 
government structures as a means to providing opportunities for participatory development. 
In addition, constitutional reform in 1992 initiated a process of administrative 
decentralisation which aimed at administrative and technical de-concentration of key service 
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delivery organisations. This initiative established the District Assemblies at the municipal 
level and the District Assembly Common Fund. The constitution commits the government 
to allocate at least five percent of total revenues of Ghana to District Assemblies for 
development, by means of the Common Fund.588 However, the government’s National 
Decentralisation Action Plan notes that “support to deepen and institutionalise the 
decentralisation efforts of Government have been incoherent.”589 Even though the resource 
transfer to the District Assembly is constitutionally entrenched, government has in the past 
been criticised for not making these transfers in a timely and reliable fashion. 
Yet, beyond administrative de-concentration, participatory processes at the national 
level were relatively uncommon and a very recent phenomenon. Ghana’s Interim PRSP was 
developed in an entirely non-participatory manner, despite international advocacy for a 
participatory process.590 In 1997, the first National Economic Forum took place as the 
government’s first attempt to consult civil society on national economic policy-making issues. 
This was the first formal opportunity for the public, including opposition parties, 
independent research institutions and civil society organisations to provide input into 
national policy-making.591 A further step towards participatory politics was a World Bank 
exercise with government and civil society organisations to evaluate the impacts of structural 
adjustment policy reforms through the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
in 1998.  
In early 2000, the preparation of the GPRS started with a national forum of 
stakeholders. They comprised representatives of government, the private sector, non-
governmental organisations and donor representatives. In July 2000, a wider cross-section of 
stakeholders was consulted when the GPRS was formally launched. From August 2000 
onwards, five core teams were established to work in the areas of the macro economy, 
production and gainful employment, human resource development and basic services, 
vulnerability and exclusion, and governance. Each of these seven-person teams were chaired 
by a ministry official and had a donor-sponsored Ghanaian consultant to assist then in their 
analytical work.592 In addition to this, the GPRS process also involved community-level 
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consultations in the form of focus group discussions within 36 districts. They were followed 
by wrap-up sessions with the District Assembly and by regional consultation workshops.593 
Finally, the draft GPRS was presented to civil society by means of a National Economic 
Dialogue, held in May 2001. The National Economic Dialogues was the offspring of the 
early National Economic Forums that were organised since 1997. It had become 
institutionalised to discuss matters of economic reform with civil society that took place 
every year.594  
[The Minister of Finance] decided to use the National Economic Dialogue, 
which has happened for many years, as the platform to discuss: What were 
the issues with the GPRS? Were the GPRS goals appropriate, reasonable, 
realistic, achievable? Are the GPRS activities being implemented correctly? 
He decided to use the National Economic Dialogue this year to reach out 
and have discussions with stakeholders.595  
Yet, differently from the Bolivian arrangement, the Ghanaian dialogues were not 
institutionalised by law, nor did they establish an obligation for government to take their 
recommendations on board. The National Economic Dialogue was simply a forum for 
consultation with civil society, comparable to Bolivia’s first dialogue in 1997.  
6 . 3  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  S i x  
In Bolivia, a severe problem of state-society relations is that different social groups have 
fundamentally different concepts of the political and the economic sphere. The 
entrepreneurially underpinned political elite has a conception of representative democracy 
and a liberal economic system that has failed to include large parts of the population that 
have been marginalized for centuries. On the other hand, the political and economic reforms 
proposed by the social movements do not present an inclusive alternative either. Although 
they claim to represent a more direct, and therefore just, version of democracy, they do not 
foresee a way through which non-indigenous, non-peasant and non-union citizens can 
participate in policy-making. As a result, there is an antagonism between both sides’ ideals of 
a political and economic system that is not easily reconcilable. Because dialogue between 
these different sides has not taken place for a long time, inclusive politics have not been the 
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subject of debate. The fact that the subject has sprung to the forefront of politics is in itself a 
sign of improvement in this regard. Yet, it significantly destabilises the political system to the 
point of paralysis. External actors that are aiming to promote participatory mechanisms in 
Bolivian policy-making have to be very knowledgeable about the destabilising effects that this 
can have.  
In Ghana, the political situation looks less alarming, political instability is not 
immanent as it is in Bolivia. On the other hand, Ghana has never been the donor’s premier 
example of participatory mechanisms like Bolivia has been since the Law of Popular 
Participation. Participatory mechanisms in Ghana are a relatively recent phenomenon. It is 
noteworthy that initiatives to include civil society in national policy-making in Ghana are 
consultative rather than participatory. The Ghanaian National Economic Dialogue does not 
claim to have civil society organisations participate in national policy-making like the Bolivian 
National Dialogue suggests. It is clearly a consultative tool that came after the elaboration of 
the Ghanaian Poverty Reduction Strategy, whereas the National Dialogue 2000 was a 
deliberative process designed to provide inputs into the elaboration of the Bolivian Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. This communicates a very different message to participating 
organisations. While their influence might have been limited from the beginning, so were 
their expectations.  
This chapter has shown that the political realm in Bolivia and Ghana is profoundly 
defined by a multitude of formal and informal institutions that result from and impact on the 
way in which different sections of society participate in politics. In both cases, formal 
institutions of the state do not necessarily reflect the informal political processes that 
underpin political interaction with and within society. Social movements, pressure groups and 
traditional authorities in both Bolivia and Ghana have established long-standing links with 
different parts of the state that continue to influence policy-making. Whether or not these 
links are conducive to democratic policy-making is not necessarily related to the degree to 
which they participate. Participation can take the shape of patronage and clientelism, where 
privileged parts of society co-opt the state to further their own ends. Policy-makers who aim 
at making politics more democratic by means of participatory processes need to be aware of 
these pitfalls. This is even more true for external aid donors who might not be as familiar 
with the national context as national politicians. Policies that aim at strengthening democratic 
accountability by means of participatory processes must keep issues of representativeness in 
mind. Participatory processes can only improve democratic accountability if the participating 
members of society can legitimately claim to represent a particular section of society. In the 
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next chapter, I investigate how these considerations come in to play in international aid 
donors attempts to foster civil society participation at the national level in Bolivia and Ghana.   
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C H A P T E R  7   –  F O S T E R I N G  C I V I L  S O C I E T Y  
P A R T I C I P A T I O N  I N  N A T I O N A L  P O L I C Y -
M A K I N G  
I used part two of this thesis to discuss donor initiatives to foster government ownership. 
Part three investigates donors’ attempts to foster national ownership by means of fostering 
participatory processes at the national level. In chapter five, I argued that donors try to foster 
government ownership by employing multi-donor budget support mechanisms as a means to 
strengthen government decision-making authority while attempting to maintain control over 
performance assessment. I have done this against the background of governance reforms in 
the socio-political context of the recipient country, an argument I developed in chapter four. 
Similarly, I have divided part three into chapter six, where I investigate state-society 
relationships in both Bolivia and Ghana, and this chapter, where I evaluate donor initiatives 
to foster national ownership by means of civil society support. Bolivia is a particularly good 
case to evaluate donor support to civil society participation in national policy-making because 
it is one of the few countries that had a nation-wide dialogue process prior to the formulation 
of the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP). This chapter thus discusses the Bolivian 
experience with participatory dialogue, while using the case of Ghana for comparative 
purposes.  
As I have shown in chapter three, sustainable poverty reduction has become the core 
task of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since September 1999. 
The Voices of the Poor study developed and stressed the proposition that civil society 
participation in national policy formulation helps to achieve better pro-poor policies for 
development.596 The key point of this argument is that civil society should be involved in 
drawing up and monitoring economic policies to ensure a pro-poor focus. In short, the ideal 
is that recipient governments decide upon economic policies, following broad participation 
from society at large to ensure their pro-poor character. This concept of ownership is larger 
than ‘government ownership’ discussed in chapter five. In terms of definitions of ownership, 
                                                 
596  Deepa Narayan, Raj Patel, et al. (eds.) (2000): Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices of the Poor, Vol. 1, New York: Oxford 
University Press., Robert Chambers, Deepa Narayan, et al. (eds.) (2000): Crying Out for Change. Voices of the Poor, Vol. 2, 
New York: Oxford University Press., and Deepa Narayan and Patti Petesch (eds.) (2000): From Many Lands. Voices of the 
Poor, Vol. 3, New York: Oxford University Press. 
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broad-based participation is a component of ‘national ownership’, while government 
ownership merely refers to appropriation by the government.597 
In its sourcebook for PRSP formulation, the World Bank has avoided to specify 
“broad-based civil society participation”.598 It simply requires the individual recipient 
government to come up with a definition for its own country context within the framework 
of the PRSP. This seems to be in line with the donors paradigm to emphasise ‘national’ 
ownership.599 The formal position adopted by the World Bank is therefore that the PRSP 
includes a description of which civil society organisations have participated. Neither the type 
of civil society organisations that should participate is defined nor the nature of their 
participation. This vagueness of definition indicates that civil society participation is a means 
to an end. Fostering civil society participation helps to legitimate donor intervention in 
national policy-making. It underpins development cooperation with an air of accountability 
and democratic governance. It does so because civil society participation fulfils two functions 
from the donors’ perspective. For one, it aims at making development planning more pro-
poor by giving ‘voice to the people’. This function is a vital paradigm for the World Bank and 
the IMF who have to choose cooperation tools in accordance with their economic mandate. 
In addition, civil society participation is considered to improve democratic governance by 
making government policy more responsive to citizens’ demands. This function nicely 
concurs with many bilateral donors’ attempts to improve democratic governance in recipient 
countries. As a result, the two functions are often used interchangeably without much 
consideration as to whether they are actually compatible.  
Yet, if civil society participation is a means of democratic politics, it touches upon 
very foundational issues of democratic representation. As discussed in chapter two and six, 
the fundamental question that every representative democracy has to respond to is how to 
choose societal representatives. The same applies to participatory mechanisms: who gets to 
represent different sections of society in a deliberative process? Particularly in national policy-
making, civil society participation mechanisms affect the relationship between the state and 
society. By doing so, they alter the role of government. Randomly including ‘civil society 
representatives’ in national policy-making marginalises other possibly more legitimate 
representatives in the political process. The way in which society is represented in political 
decision-making evidently defines state-society relationships. Donors’ attempts to foster civil 
                                                 
597  The definitions of national and government ownership have been discussed in chapter three.  
598  See the chapter on participation, World Bank (2001): Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook. 2 vols., Washington, DC: The 
World Bank Group: 237-248. 
599  SGTS & Associates (2000): "Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): Report to the 
Department for International Development", Vol. 1: Overview and Recommendations, London: SGTS & Associates. 
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society participation thus inevitably have a political dimension to it. They affect the way in 
which governmental and societal representatives perceive each other and ultimately alter 
patterns of power in a state-society relationship. Often, this effect is little understood or 
insufficiently analysed when donors design new programmes and initiatives.   
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I investigate the case of 
Bolivia. In the second section, I explore mechanisms to foster civil society participation in 
Ghana for comparative purposes. While Bolivia came to be the role model country to foster 
civil society participation in national policy-making, the Ghanaian government has consulted 
little with civil society at the national level.  In each section, I first explore the conditionalities 
of the PRSP with respect to civil society participation in national decision making processes. I 
a second step, I build on the concepts of participation to discuss how participatory 
mechanisms have altered concepts of representative democracy. In a third step, I evaluate the 
effects that external support for participatory processes have on state-society relationships in 
Bolivia and Ghana. I discuss this with a view to the political system on the one hand, and to 
civil society organisations on the other. I conclude that donor efforts to foster civil society 
participation potentially run the risk of delegitimising representative democracy whenever 
they are not based on existing state-society interaction in the recipient country.  
7 . 1  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  B o l i v i a  
As I have argued in chapter three, political reforms towards more participatory public 
administration turned Bolivia into a model recipient during the 1990s. Two processes stand 
out: the Law of Popular Participation and the Law of Administrative Decentralisation in 
1994 and 1995 that established participatory policy-making at the municipal level on the one 
hand, and the first national dialogue in 1997 that sought civil society input on developmental 
planning at the national level. Both processes were heralded for being genuinely government-
owned, although both have very different origins and were realised by different governments.  
7 . 1 . 1  P a r t i c i p a t o r y  A n t e c e d e n t s  
Implemented by the Sánchez de Lozada administration, the ambitious and innovative 
Law of Popular Participation aimed at devolving fiscal and political powers to municipal 
governments and institutionalised citizen participation in municipal decision-making 
procedures. International observers heralded the enlightened institutional design of the law, 
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applauding its ability to facilitate a transition to more democratic politics.600 As one donor put 
it: 
Popular participation has changed Bolivia, substantially. […] Before, the 
municipalities didn’t even have their own money, they didn’t have budgetary 
funds. Some people from the Vice-Ministry travelled across the country and 
distributed money like lords. 601 
However, it can also be argued that it is best described as a process of political construction. 
Instead of marking the transition from informal to formal politics or the consolidation of 
democratic institutions,602 it is characterized by different layers of politics: participatory 
democratic politics upon corporatist politics, upon peasant and indigenous mobilisation.603 
By the 1990s, Bolivia’s politics were characterised by increasing political fragmentation, 
political discontent with neoliberal reform during the 1980s, and electoral dispersion that 
favoured territorial over corporatist politics.604 In this light, it was a timely response by the 
Bolivian government to engage with societal pressures.  
Even though the intention was not to please international donors, international 
appreciation was a welcome side effect. The World Bank as well as bilateral donors were 
quick in responding to the government’s reform initiatives by establishing funding measures 
to support the process. Popular participation received financial support but little technical 
intervention. One of the Bolivians responsible at the time comments: 
I was involved in things where the donors had their best projects but it was 
precisely because we didn’t do what they thought. We didn’t even ask 
them.605 
Popular Participation strengthened the standing of the Bolivian government, both 
internationally and internally.606 At the international level, it was the first step towards the 
image of a participatory Bolivia where the government is responsive to citizens needs and 
open to have everybody participate in political decision-making.  
                                                 
600  See for example Donna Lee Van Cott (2000): The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Allan Rosenbaum (1998): "Strengthening Civil Society and Local Democracy 
through National Initiatives: The Case of Bolivia's 'Popular Participation Law'", in: International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 64 (1): 133-136. 
601  Interview with a donor representative, No. 34, La Paz, 4 February 2004. 
602  Larry Diamond (1999): Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
603  George Gray Molina (2004): The Politics of Popular Participation in Bolivia, 1994-1999. DPhil Thesis, Department of Politics 
and International Relations, Nuffield College, Oxford: University of Oxford. 
604  Xavier Albó (1999): "Ojotas en el poder local: Cuatro años despues", Cuadernos de Investigación No. 53, La Paz: CIPCA 
y PADER. 
605  Interview with a government representative, No. 58, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
606  Some authors argue that the territorial orientation of popular participation has indeed weakened the traditional corporatist 
mobilisation in Bolivia’s rural areas, see John-Andrew McNeish (2001): Pueblo chico, infierno grande: Globalisation and the politics 
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After popular participation, it was the first dialogue of 1997 that continued to 
impress the international donor community. The Banzer administration initiated this first 
dialogue to seek input for the government’s long-term development plan. The Bolivian 
government hugely gained from this exercise, as it appeared to genuinely seek input from its 
citizens.  
The people who observed it said that the government organised this dialogue 
because it didn’t have a genuine development plan […]. Others said that 
apart from what it looks like it’s a good idea to resort to civil society to ask 
what kinds of things need to be done.607 
General Banzer had been one of Bolivia’s authoritarian rulers between 1971 and 1979. His 
election as president in 1997 came as a shock to many Bolivians. His government was thus 
clearly in need of establishing its democratic legitimacy. A dialogue with civil society 
representatives neatly fulfilled that function.  
Unlike Bolivia’s later dialogues, the first one only took place at the national level. 
About 200 representatives of non-governmental organisations were invited to discuss 
development planning.608 Yet the government was not bound to the conclusions of the 
dialogue. It could merely use it as a forum to collect input.609 These two aspects, its limited 
scope and its non-binding character were the main points of criticism: 
The first [dialogue] was a disaster because at the end it was a meeting of the 
big shots to discuss among themselves, to speak of very ethereal things, 
nothing concrete. So this dialogue failed. The results were very general.610 
Yet to the donors, these were secondary concerns. The question for them was not 
whether the Dialogue 1997 had succeeded in making government and society communicate 
or whether desired aims had actually been achieved. The fact that the Bolivian government 
had already sought civil society input alone gave grounds enough for their appreciation. One 
government representative in Bolivia criticised:  
I believe that from one moment onwards, the donors saw civil society 
participation a bit too romantically, this attempt to be participatory.611 
                                                 
607  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
608  Fundación Hanns-Seidel and Fundación Boliviana para la Capacitación Democrática de la Investigación (1998): Diálogo 
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610  Interview with a government representative, No. 134, La Paz, 22 January 2004. 
611  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004.  
  194
Particularly against the background of increasing interest in participatory mechanisms, donors 
quickly labelled Bolivia as a forerunner on that front. Within the Bolivian government, some 
voices became much more critical: 
This a very personal opinion… the problem of HIPC is that the people who 
did it turned towards the grand participation of the people. In all of this, the 
people have to participate… […] that doesn’t always work.612 
Nonetheless, the tradition of popular participation and national dialogue had already set the 
stage for Bolivia’s ‘broad-based consultation’ in order to formulate a Bolivian Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (EBRP). 
7 . 1 . 2  P a r t i c i p a t o r y  C o n d i t i o n a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  E B R P  
While the recipient government could prepare the Interim PRSPs without involving civil 
society, the PRSP itself necessarily needed to be formulated according to a ‘broad-based 
consensus’ between the government and all parts of civil society. As much as the World Bank 
and the IMF avoided a clear definition of what constitutes civil society, they did not prescribe 
what form the consultation should take. The particular type could be chosen by each 
recipient government. This meant that each recipient government was free to consult 
nationally or locally, with corporatist or with territorial representatives, with grassroots 
organisations or with think tanks. More significantly, it was free to decide at what stage of the 
PRSP elaboration it wanted to engage with societal representatives.  
7.1.2.1 Pre- versus Post-Consultation 
Bolivia was one of the very few countries that opted for a consultation process prior to the 
formulation of the draft PRSP. This was a result of Bolivia’s past experiences with 
participation and dialogue. ‘Tuto’ Quiroga, vice-president and later president during the 
PRSP elaboration, was known as a ‘yuppie’ who spoke the donor language and was very apt 
at accommodating their concerns. It was under his auspices that Bolivia opted for a 
nationwide consultation process prior to the elaboration of the PRSP, combining elements of 
both the National Dialogue 1997 and popular participation. Bolivia’s donors were delighted 
about this approach. 
For one, the newly created Technical Secretariat for the National Dialogue had to 
decide who to invite to the dialogue’s round tables. Since the first dialogue had received 
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criticism for not being inclusive enough, the secretariat opted for a series of roundtables at 
the municipal, departmental and national level. The actors at the municipal tables were 
recruited from the institutions that popular participation had created, while the departmental 
and national ones included representatives of the Church and other non-governmental 
organisations. As a result, prevailing animosities between corporatist social movements and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) re-emerged: 
…the original indigenous peasant organisations, the artisans and all these 
social movements… [among them] there is a strong resentment that relates 
first of all to the results of the dialogue where they perceived a capture of the 
process by these [non-governmental and church] organisations. It’s 
debatable whether that is true or not but […] they are making it public.613 
These cleavages within Bolivian society were one of the aspects that the secretariat had to 
grapple with.  
Another point of uncertainty was the purpose of the dialogue. In most people’s 
minds, the dialogue took place to discuss the utilisation of Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) initiative’s debt relief funds. In the eyes of the proponents of the National Dialogue 
2000, this was one of its most important achievements: the dedication of HIPC funds to the 
municipalities that was later enshrined in the Law of the National Dialogue: 
The HIPC funds are mathematically distributed to the municipalities, in 
principle according to the criteria of popular participation in order to assign a 
determined bit of the funds to everyone.614 
Channelling the HIPC funds to the municipalities was a definite achievement in terms of 
addressing poverty issues, while strengthening the existing administrative structure that 
popular participation had created: 
The [HIPC] funds goes to the municipal level and is administered along with 
the popular participation funds. It’s administered by the municipal 
governments and distributed according to poverty criteria. The control 
mechanism at the municipal level is the comité de vigilancia. That is being 
consolidated. 615  
Yet the participants of the National Dialogue 2000 were not sufficiently aware of the 
PRSP formulation. This became a problem when the results had to be translated into an 
actual strategy. Later, many people in government complained that the donors did not give 
enough thought to the difficulties of such a process:  
                                                 
613  Interview with a government representative, No. 27, La Paz, 12 March 2004. 
614  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004.  
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They have never asked themselves: “From the dialogue to the PRSP, what 
has to be done?” […] What needs to be done here is to code the processes 
of the dialogue well, translate what has happened into a policy.616 
Indeed, this task was partly made difficult by prior agreements between the Bolivian 
government and its international donors: 
I would say that HIPC contains two important elements: for one that the 
elaboration of the strategy be participatory […], the other is that Bolivia 
maintain a stable macroeconomic framework. This means that it asks of 
Bolivia to make an effort and to consider its budget restrictions when 
developing the strategy. The problem was that what originated from the sum 
of demands of what civil society came up with was not linked to the medium 
and long term measures that Bolivia had agreed on with the donors. It was 
going to result in something that wasn’t compatible!617 
So, even though the EBRP was propagated as arising from the National Dialogue 2000, it 
had to take the above restrictions into account. A member of the EBRP elaboration team 
recalls: 
The fundamental thing was to take the restrictions that the donors had 
imposed […] into account. It was difficult to make civil society and the 
government understand this.618  
Apart from the formal restrictions imposed by bi- and multilateral agreements, donor 
representatives in La Paz got actively involved in the drafting of the EBRP. The elaboration 
team made sure to circulate draft versions in order to ensure the donors’ approval of the final 
document. A government representative recalled:  
There were many forums but the truth is that there had been many, many 
more meetings between government and the donors than between 
government and civil society.619 
Retrospectively, even the donor representative recognised that this had gotten in the way of 
genuine government ownership of the process:  
We had a heated discussion about what role the donors had played because 
some where greater protagonists than national actors and the process de-
nationalised. The ministers didn’t know anything about a EBRP but we were 
experts.620 
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Indeed, some Bolivians went as far as arguing that the EBRP elaboration was solely the result 
of donor engagement in conjunction with the work of paid consultants:  
If the government had made the political decision to curb this kind of 
intervention, we would have suddenly stopped with the poverty reduction 
strategy that was basically elaborated by four or five experts from the World 
Bank and four or five others from the bilaterals.621 
The team that elaborated the EBRP had to respond to both sides’ demands: respond 
to the recommendations of the national dialogue while incorporating Bolivia’s existing 
obligations to its external creditors: 
[We] had to decide that the dialogue would be one input into the strategy, 
not the only one because Bolivia was already in the middle of other very 
advanced development programmes. It was evolved in thousands of projects 
with the donors. So it wasn’t that we decided not to work with civil society 
anymore but we also included what we were already working with, what 
Bolivia was already doing to reduce poverty. 622 
It was this decision that fundamentally flawed the EBRP in the eyes of the Bolivians that had 
participated in the dialogue. They felt that the expectations were betrayed. 
7.1.2.2 EBRP Revision  
The PRSP handbook recommended that nationally-owned PRSP were to be revised after a 
three year period.623 To ensure this, the World Bank and the IMF established participatory 
revision of the PRSPs as a requirement for further funds, such as the Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit (PRSC) and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). Through these 
mechanisms participation as a conditionality continued after the PRSP. Unidad de Análisis de 
Políticas Sociales y Económicas (UDAPE) presented a Revised EBRP to the Consultative Group 
in October 2003, but the international donor community had tied their approval of this 
version to the National Dialogue 2003/04. In fact, church-related civil society organisations 
within the Mechanism of Social Control opposed the Revised EBRP that UDAPE had 
prepared for the Consultative Group meeting and boycotted the process. Since many 
Bolivian civil society organisations rejected the EBRP and questioned government ownership 
of the document, they were not interested in revising the EBRP. Instead, the organisations 
present in the newly created Directorate of the National Dialogue preferred to discuss issues 
like productivity but rejected a document revised by a government entity. Nonetheless, this 
                                                 
621  Interview with a government representative, No. 79, La Paz, 29 March 2004. 
622  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
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was still a precondition for further funds, even though donor approaches had become much 
more flexible after the events of October 2003 – realising that the government was under 
great pressure to respond to demands of its citizens. One donor commented on the revised 
EBRP that was submitted to the Consultative Group in October 2003:  
It’s a good document because of the clarity of the priorities that manages to 
reconcile the MDG and that is more social with a productive focus. I think it 
is better in that sense. I think it is a better document but it’s a document that 
didn’t go through the dialogue process.624 
Clearly it was a good technocratic document because it had been produced by technocrats. If 
it had gone through a dialogue process like the last one it would not be as technically precise 
anymore.  
In order to ensure the civil society participation that could make the revised EBRP 
passable to the donors, the government was using the National Dialogue 2003/04, which was 
required by the Law of the National Dialogue. However, even the officials that were 
organising the process were very sceptical as to the usefulness of yet another participatory 
process. When asked whether the National Dialogue 2003/04 was a good idea, most 
government representatives responded in ways similar to this one:  
Not at all. I am a person who believes that it’s something we have to get rid 
of, or at least it is not something that will save us from the constituent 
assembly. Honestly. It is happening at a moment in Bolivia with very heavy 
political processes. Very heavy, very important political processes are 
occurring. The political discussion is very heated, the referendum on natural 
gas is coming up, the constituent assembly is coming up, municipal elections 
are coming up, but there is no room for an economic discussion. And the 
main problem of this crisis has to do with inequality, has to do with 
poverty.625 
Although the donors present in Bolivia recognised these pressures on the Bolivian 
government, they were anxious to have the revised EBRP be legitimised by yet another 
participatory process. A government representative complained: 
Yet again the government is oriented towards these foundational issues. And 
the donors are a bit upset, frustrated. They are saying, “they should already 
have a PRSP!” So, I get these letters all day saying “I don’t know why the 
government still doesn’t have the PRSP validated [by civil society] if the only 
thing missing are a few workshops over the course of several months.” And 
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we are resisting and saying, “no, we don’t want to hear this again.” So, again 
it’s a vicious cycle. So that’s what it is. We are captured by this topic.626 
It continued to seem like a security to them that the government’s development policy be 
approved by society at large. Bolivians were frustrated by this stance:  
Now [the donors] are asking for securities because […] they want the 
government to perform the task. They don’t understand that the task was 
already performed by the past consultative government but the dialogue 
process is being extended because of the referendum, the constituent 
assembly, the municipal elections .627 
So, while the government was caught up in juggling all sorts of pressures and ongoing 
political processes, it continued to organise the national dialogue, despite one year delay. 
Interestingly, societal organisations – who were more engaged in the facilitation then before 
by means of the Directorate of the National Dialogue – were emphasising several issues that 
were not exactly what the donors expected: 
They don’t want the logic of poverty, […] they want to put social policies to 
the background. For them, the priority has to be production.628  
This put the government in an uncomfortable position when negotiating with the donors:  
[The original indigenous peasant organisations] are not interested in gender 
issues. So, well, you don’t want to say that the government doesn’t put 
emphasis on these kinds of issues. I think that it is the responsibility of the 
government to put them on the agenda but I have to tell you that the actors 
[of the social movements] strongly dismiss this general discourse.629 
This was indeed a difficult position to be in. For example, when asked what the government 
should do if the donors wanted gender issues on the agenda, even if it was not the 
government’s nor the dialogue’s priority, one donor recommended “they should just be 
pragmatic and adopt a gender approach” anyway.630 Another donor representative was more 
complaisant: 
It would be good to get straight what the EBRP really is, because the 
international cooperation wants to support it. And if the EBRP is not the 
government’s national development plan then possibly we should be 
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supporting something else. It doesn’t really matter what the name is, we just 
need to understand.631  
However, even with such an accommodating attitude, international donors failed to realise 
that the government was not concerned with a development plan at all. They were 
desperately trying to hold on to political stability, as much as was left of it. 
7 . 1 . 3  R e p r e s e n t i n g  S o c i e t y :  P a r t i c i p a t o r y  B o l i v i a  
In the eyes of external donors, Bolivia became a showcase for democratic politics, particularly 
since the government’s introduction of popular participation. It comes thus as no surprise 
that the donors were keen to support the consolidation of emerging democratic structures by 
means of fostering civil society participation in policy-making. Much more than other heavily 
indebted poor countries, Bolivia came to experience the dual objectives of participatory 
mechanisms. Beyond ensuring pro-poor poverty reduction, donors in Bolivia were interested 
to strengthen democratic politics by means of participation.  
In the Bolivian case, two particular representative questions arose that policy makers 
continue to grapple with. For one, popular participation established mechanisms of societal 
representation in questions of municipal management, while the national dialogues sought 
input into national policy-making. The question is: at what level can citizens effectively 
participate in the decision-making process? In addition, participatory processes have to 
establish principles as to how society can best be represented. Bolivia’s history of corporatist 
movements presents a tension with the territorial structure of representation that popular 
participation has established. The two will be discussed in turn. 
7.1.3.1 Local versus National Level  
The Bolivian popular participation continues to be a bold and innovative mechanism of 
citizens’ participation in local policy-making. It certainly had a positive effect on 
strengthening municipal governments and societal input at the local level via the Comités de 
Vigilancia. However, some argue that it has also undermined national channels of societal 
mobilisation of organisations which are not organised territorially. On a different note, recent 
studies on civil society control of state institutions at the municipal level in Bolivia conclude 
that in several cases these instances of control have been co-opted by the system and display 
                                                 
631  Interview with a donor representative, No. 100, La Paz, 2 April 2004. 
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similar problems of clientelism and nepotism.632 This runs counter to common 
understandings of the role of civil society in current development debates. In these 
discussions, civil society is perceived as an integral part of the socio-political context, which 
acts as a check and balance to government policy formulation. In Bolivia, however, one can 
argue that the intention of several civil society organizations was not only to provide input 
for policy change, but often also to change the political system as a whole. This made the 
interaction between government and civil society particularly confrontational. Interaction 
between the state and civil society organisations can be said to be a mix of confrontational 
civil society protest and policy input through existing channels.  
This in and of itself already contained elements that made management 
complex because civil society saw this in an active way, to be able to 
participate. They are seeing this more in a way to demand something back.633  
It is no secret that political parties in Bolivia have generally lost their credibility and 
are considered as corrupt and rent-seeking.634 Opinions differ as to why this has happened. 
Several people argue that a culture of clientelism and prebendalismo exists that forces party 
members in office to attend to political allies first. Given this political culture, one wonders 
why civil society organisations are not expected to behave in similar ways. Political parties 
and civil society organisation are relatively comparable entities. They represent the collective 
interests of a certain fraction of society and are composed of individuals that are expected to 
work towards the realisation of these interests. Donors in Bolivia have made the mistake to 
contribute to the clientelistic relationships in Bolivia: 
Sometimes they were interested in the quality of civil society but that civil 
society included their clients – because every bilateral has its client, every 
bilateral has its poor person. 635  
Once in power it is as likely for members of civil society organisations as it is for members of 
political parties to become corrupted by the opportunities and means of influence they have 
acquired. The parallel is even more striking since the government’s decision in February 2004 
when it allowed civil society organisations to compete alongside political parties in municipal 
elections. Now, if the political culture applies to civil society organisations just as well as to 
                                                 
632  See for example, James Blackburn (2003): "La participación popular en una sociedad de prebendas: Una análisis de la 
planificación municipal participativa en Sucre", in: Programa de las Nationas Unidas para el Desarrollo (ed.), Nuevos actores 
sociales. Vol. II. La Paz: Plural: 9-56; Benjamin Kohl (2003): "Democratizing Decentralization in Bolivia", in: Journal of 
Planning Education and Research, 23 (2): 153-164. 
633  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
634  According to a recent survey, political parties in Bolivia figure as the most distrusted of national institutions. See Luis 
Tapia and Carlos Toranzo (2000): "Retos y dilemas de la representación política", Bolivia Cuadernos de Futuro No. 8, La 
Paz: United Nations Development Programme. 
635  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004. 
  202
political parties, it is no solution to neglect the institutions of representative democracy for 
the sake of creating new participatory institutions. Competition around who gets to represent 
society is getting increasingly fierce in Bolivia: 
We never knew who really represented civil society. They didn’t even agree 
among each other, they were speaking different languages.636 
At the national level, civil society participation is appealing to donors and to many 
recipient government officials because it appears to consolidate democratisation and make 
development more equitable. Yet, to achieve both democratic consolidation and equitable 
development is – although not impossible – incredibly difficult. There are several obstacles 
that have to be tackled. Like in the National Dialogue 2000 and 2004, the government might 
not be interested or capable to react to the demands evolving out of the dialogue. This can 
lead to great suspicions within society about the credibility of government. Disappointed and 
disillusioned civil society organisations will be much less willing to re-engage in dialogue and 
a delegitimised government is much less stable than before. On the other hand, increased 
participation means that particular civil society organisations will gain power and influence, 
some more than others: 
At the departmental level, this whole horrible structure of social control and 
Jubilee mechanisms was created. Do you remember that Jubilee was a lot 
along this line to achieve that debt was forgiven for the poorest countries? 
This whole current of the Catholic Church of these countries to forgive debt 
was a little bit to justify these antecedents that have served as a mediator so 
that it wasn’t forgiven. The Jubilee was an expression of the Catholic Church 
here.637 
This competition between different organizations is getting more and more 
commonplace in Bolivia. In addition, there is often a misleading implicit understanding that 
civil society organisations will not abuse power like corrupt governments do. It is illustrative 
that the organisations represented in the directorate of the National Dialogue 2003/04 tried 
to deny access to further civil society organisations. Beyond their own inclusion, these civil 
society representatives did not make the political process more inclusive.     
Some authors argue that the Bolivian governments used the national dialogues to 
their own interest. The dialogues were not spaces to empower society, instead they were 
instruments that officials tried to use in their favour, with the objective to legitimise their rule 
                                                 
636  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
637  Interview with a government representative, No. 134, La Paz, 22 January 2004. 
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towards the political and social opposition, and later towards the international community.638 
Such a view would explain why the dialogues did not originally foresee any space for concrete 
resolutions that the government had to subjugate itself to. Only through international 
pressure, the government was forced to formulate specific next steps, such as the EBRP.  
Strengthened by such demands, corporative civil society organisations – which 
include the traditionally strong social movements – are the most vocal in demanding 
participation in policy formulation at the national level. Yet, critics attack the few civil society 
organisations that have gained an institutionalised channel of input through processes like the 
national dialogue for their self-centred agenda. And even when influence is not formalised, 
the representativeness of particular organisations and movements is increasingly questioned. 
The appearing division between the High Lands and the Low Lands on matters of civil 
unrest shows that not all Bolivians feel that protests in the streets of La Paz in February and 
October 2003 were in their name.  
7.1.3.2 Corporative versus Territorial Participation  
Popular participation and national dialogues are the most prominent examples of civil society 
participation in Bolivia. Yet, there is an important distinction between the two. Popular 
participation has promoted civil society participation in policy formulation at the local level, 
while the national dialogues required such participation at the national level. On the local, 
municipal level the form of participation was by nature territorial. By means of the Comités de 
vigilancia, territorial grassroots organisations were asked to provide policy input within certain 
territorial boundaries – the municipality. On a national level, the form of participation is not 
naturally a given and continues to be experimented with.  
The National Dialogue 1997, which aimed to facilitate public input to the 
government’s national development plan and to strengthen the legitimacy of the incumbent 
government, invited civil society organisations on a corporative basis. Basically, they were all 
representatives of particular sectors, complemented by participants form the national political 
system. This dialogue did not incorporate a way to represent society territorially, for example 
through the actors that emerged from the Law of Popular Participation.639 In sum, it was 
organised on a functional rather than on a territorial basis. In 2000, the Chruch organised its 
own consultation process called Jubilee 2000: 
                                                 
638  Carlos Toranzo Roca (2002): "La experiencia boliviana de los diálogos nacionales", octubre, Bolivia. 14-21. 
639  Carlos Toranzo Roca (2002): "La experiencia boliviana de los diálogos nacionales", octubre, Bolivia. 
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The Church does its consultations with its church parish structure. Then the 
government took over and realised that if the Church had already done these 
consultations it couldn’t do one for the country. From there, the idea was 
born to do a municipal dialogue.640  
As a result of all the received criticism, the government’s National Dialogue 2000 
differed very much from this design, partly as a response to the received criticism:  
The second dialogue was a transfer of the municipality promoters […]. They 
said that we should do a dialogue but not with the same people as always. 
[…] “Let’s go to the field, let’s talk to other sectors. […] In Bolivia, almost 
60 percent of public investment is decentralised to departmental and 
municipal funds. Everything is implemented downwards, so let’s listen what 
the people down there have to say.”641 
It was implemented through the formal governance structure – through organising 
municipal, departmental and national roundtables.  
Many instances within civil society said that the municipalities were not 
representative but the government had good arguments to say that they 
were. It’s not worth explaining the whole dialogue process but, yes, in 
essence the decision was to consider the means of going through the 
municipalities as efficient and to have to add an element of the law of 
popular participation, which was to divide the resources according to the 
number of inhabitants, while whoever was poorer got more resources. 642 
This made the dialogue more territorially based and reinforced the existing administrative 
system of municipalities, prefectures and national government. This organisational structure 
encountered the criticism of corporative organisations who felt overlooked: 
Last time in 2000, the dialogue had a strong municipal focus and other 
important actor didn’t get into the discussion much – actors like the unions, 
there were only some from their grassroots.643 
Even newly emerged non-governmental organisations were marginalized by the municipal 
design:  
There were problems with the dialogue because civil society didn’t feel that it 
was represented by the municipalities.644  
As a result, the balance between corporative and territorial representation shifted 
again with the National Dialogue 2003/04. The Mechanism for Social Control, which 
                                                 
640  Interview with a government representative, No. 134, La Paz, 22 January 2004. 
641  Interview with a government representative, No. 134, La Paz, 22 January 2004. 
642  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004. 
643  Interview with a donor representative, No. 88, La Paz, 6 April 2004. 
644  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004.  
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resulted from the Law of the National Dialogue and is comprised of particular corporative 
organisations on the national level, had the task to monitor and evaluate the progress of the 
EBRP and of the dialogue process. Yet, because of the criticism it received by left-out civil 
society organisations for its lack of representativeness, the Directorate of the National 
Dialogue 2003/04 was created as an innovation to further ensure the inclusion of corporate 
civil society organisations in the management of the dialogue on the national level. However, 
the organisations represented in the directorate also had an interest to exclude non-present 
organisations from this process. They were interested in using this newly gained sphere of 
influence to further their own sector-specific agenda instead of representing society at large. 
To counterbalance this increase in corporative representation, the Technical Secretariat of the 
National Dialogue 2003/04 aimed at a much larger number of representatives to participate 
in the municipal and departmental roundtables in order to increase the territorial weight of 
societal input. Another problem with the corporate Directorate of the National Dialogue was 
that the organisations in the directorate have tended to confuse deliberation within the 
directorate with deliberation within the dialogue itself. They did not see their role as 
facilitating the best possible input of society into national policy-making. Rather, they wanted 
to use their influence in the directorate to directly determine where government policy should 
be heading.  
The tension between corporative and territorial representation is key to 
understanding the evolution of the dialogue processes: 
The limitation is that there is still no close encounter between the 
corporative and the territorial. It’s very difficult. […] Yet the country is the 
sum of all of these societies, a corporative civil society and a territorial 
society. [...] You can’t just do a scheme that covers neither of the two types 
of civil society.645 
In Bolivia, just as much as in other countries, someone has to be chosen who can participate 
as a representative for the rest of society. Because a ‘trauma of governance’646 exists in Bolivia 
and because of hugely discredited political parties, party representation is no longer 
considered legitimate by the majority of the population. For that reason, many people claim 
that only participatory democracy can function in Bolivia. Nonetheless, since not all eight 
million Bolivians can contribute to every political decision, ways have to be found how a few 
can best represent the interests of many. 
                                                 
645  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004. 
646  René Mayorga (1992): "Democracia y gobernabilidad: América Latina", in: Nueva Sociedad. 
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7 . 1 . 4  E f f e c t s  o n  S t a t e - S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  
While donors have paid considerable thought to the relationship of society and the state as 
such, they have never paid much attention to the tripartite relationship that gets created when 
donors establish cooperation with the state on the one hand and support for civil society 
organisations on the other hand:  
The contributors, the ones who pay taxes [in the donor country] have a great 
love of civil society. But the donors have never managed to further the 
relationship between civil society and the state. Either they cooperate with 
the state or they only fall in love with civil society. They fail to join them.647 
The problem with this lacking inter-linkage is that societal organisations will blame the 
government for the limits and failures of civil society participation, not the donors that might 
have influenced the process. If civil society participation is not a clear success, the 
government has much to loose while the donors’ situation is almost unchanged.  
7.1.4.1 Disappointed Expectations 
After the National Dialogue 2000, societal organisations grew disappointed with the 
government when they realised that their expectations were not met. Disappointed 
expectations can become a major obstacle to political stability.648 A donor representative 
observed:  
In this country, we never talk about what unites us. For example, the country 
today is better off than twenty years ago but nobody talks about that. People 
only talk about failures.649 
In a climate of perceived failure and mistrust, participatory processes started under difficult 
conditions. Above all, the fact that the EBRP was not closely tied to the results of the 
National Dialogue 2000 created much disillusionment among civil society actors. In 
particular, the donor requirements that shaped the proceedings of the EBRP elaboration 
were perceived very unfavourably by societal organisations, while blaming the government 
for this:  
First, we did a poverty diagnosis, [...] simply a descriptive piece of work. We 
didn’t want to develop a proposal. When we presented it, the donors also 
                                                 
647  Interview with a government representative, No. 18, La Paz, 27 February 2004. 
648  Indeed, sociological theorists of revolutions have proposed that social unrest occurs, not when people are worst off, but 
when their expectations about improvement get disappointed. For this relative deprivation theory, see Ted Robert Gurr 
(1970): Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
649  Interview with a donor representative, No. 52, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
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voiced their opinions. […] Later we put a proposal [on what had to be done] 
to serve as questions for the dialogue. [...] So during this process, a document 
slipped through and the media made it public. People said, “The government 
has everything cooked up already! They’re inviting us to participate in a 
dialogue for nothing! They will screw us over, they already know what they 
will do!” Oh! It was a bush fire. It was horrible, horrible.650 
Instead of being remembered as a genuine attempt to collect people’s input into 
policy-making, it left the government with the image of having ignored the people’s voices.  
From there, the story became difficult because civil society organisations 
always remember that the poverty reduction strategies were not developed 
during the dialogue. In 2002, that was the first issue of complaint, that this 
poverty reduction strategy […] is really a fraud, it’s a farce because “we have 
not participated in anything! What is more, we don’t know it and we don’t 
want to get to know it!” In other words, an impressive rejection.651 
Whether or not civil society organisations are right in this perception partly depends on how 
much a government can actually deliver. The PRSP formulation started off with the difficult 
claim that it would reflect the people’s priorities. Even without prior commitments of the 
international community, this would have only been achievable in a country where everyone 
concurs on the same policy action. However, this was a utopian situation in Bolivia: 
The term ‘broad-based’ consensus is highly misleading because it demonises healthy 
disagreement between different societal groups that exist in any deliberative democracy. A 
government representative sums up the difficulties:  
All these participatory processes create expectations that the elected 
government cannot meet. It can discuss with the representatives of civil 
society. But here, the leaders of each sector demand, not ask. 652 
Given that the relationship between the state and social movements has traditionally been 
tense in Bolivia, it was not surprising that policy dialogue is difficult to create.  
7.1.4.2 Little Willingness to Participate 
Bolivia has been a showcase for participatory democracy during the last decade. It has made 
more efforts than most countries to institutionalise popular participation and national 
dialogue between state and society. Yet, many claim that these efforts to institutionalise 
                                                 
650  Interview with a government representative, No. 113, La Paz, 30 April 2004. 
651  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
652  Interview with a donor representative, No. 52, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
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participation in Bolivia have been far too limited, were often politically motivated, and did 
not always achieve the desired results.653  
The government of this country needs to communicate to the people that a 
citizen doesn’t only have rights but also duties. For sure, there are 
inequalities in the system but the problem is more serious. There is a lack of 
national consciousness.654 
Comprehensive participation by civil society organisations – apart from the selected 
few which participate in institutionalised national processes – was still lacking. However, this 
lack was also a result of a profound scepticism within civil society organisations towards the 
political system, which made them hesitate to effectively participate within formalised 
governmental structures. Some claim that there was a tendency in Bolivian politics to reject 
everything that has previously been achieved:  
There is an attitude in Bolivian politics to reject everything that has been 
done before. […] If we cannot be systematic in our advancement and learn 
from your mistakes, how can we ever move forward? I am surprised to see 
the same attitude among some civil society groups. “The previous one is 
useless!”, disqualifying a process that had such wide-spread participation. I 
think that at least some things are worth rescuing form the last strategy, 
some points will be relevant…655 
Critics say that Bolivia has neither the bureaucratic structures nor the resources to effectively 
manage such participation.  
On the other hand, many proponents of participatory democracy argue that Bolivia 
needed to deepen and improve participation to adequately incorporate all its diverse social 
groups. For this matter, the latest national dialogue continued to improve the means of 
participation through which societal representatives were engaged. However, these newly  
established institutions also affected previously established democratic relationships between 
the state and the people:  
The actors of the dialogue, the ones that are in the directorate, think that 
they are better than congress. That cannot be. Bolivia is democratic. 
Congress is democratically elected to represent the people.656 
                                                 
653  See the diverse criticism compiled in Christian Aid (2002): "Participating in Dialogue? The Estrategia Boliviana de 
Reducción de Pobreza", Christian Aid Policy Briefing, January, La Paz. 
654  Interview with a donor representative, No. 52, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
655  Interview with a government representative, No. 113, La Paz, 30 April 2004. 
656  Interview with a donor representative, No. 52, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
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In other words, Bolivian government representatives realised that the rules of the game of 
representative democracy were at stake. They were worried that representativeness was not a 
given, while non-legitimated actors might derail national policy-making: 
When you open the doors for civil society, you don’t know who you are 
opening the door for.657 
Once a government has promised to include the opinions of civil society into its 
politics and is not able to do so for various reasons – that might also include power struggles, 
competing fractions of government and a lack of mitigation strategies – society will be 
disappointed and the government will further loose its credibility. Thus, while not achieving 
participatory democracy, representative democracy is weakened through the process.  
7.1.4.3 Redefining the Political System  
Since October 2003, Bolivia’s political system has been under considerable strain because 
street protests continued to be an imminent threat to the incumbent governments. Indeed, 
creating new participatory processes were a way to appease the general mood. However, the 
political administration seemed overburdened: 
It’s too much for Bolivia because there are too many process now that are 
happening at the same time – the dialogue, the constituent assembly, the 
referendum, the demonstrations, etc. 658 
State-society relationships had come under considerable tension since 2003 and, even though 
participatory processes seemed to be an acceptable way to deal with societal demands, public 
administration was increasingly unable to keep up with all of them. As a result, processes that 
appeared incidental to political stability like the national dialogue 2003/04 were neglected for 
the sake of processes that responded to protest demands, like the referendum on natural gas. 
Heightened political protest forced the government to withdraw attention from donor 
demands towards demands from street protests.  
In terms of participation, the participatory processes that evolved in 2003/04 were 
quite distinct from one another:  
Each one has a very distinct modality. The national dialogue has a very 
‘assembly’ modality. The modality for natural gas is the referendum, which is 
                                                 
657  Interview with a government representative, No. 70, La Paz, 26 April 2004.  
658  Interview with a donor representative, No. 52, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
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very distinct. The logic of the referendum is a vote, a question - one person, 
one vote. The constituent assembly is captured between the two.659 
While the national dialogue was a left-over of donor-recipient negotiations of the PRSP, the 
referendum on natural gas and the constituent assembly got created to respond to the 
demands of street protesters. Carlos Mesa promised the two when he took over Sánchez de 
Lozada’s administration after the latter had resigned in October 2003.  
The donors viewed the referendum on natural gas primarily as a mechanism to reach 
an agreement on the use of natural resources.  
The referendum on natural gas is a mechanism to reach an agreement on 
how to use the most important resources of the country. That’s what I think 
is important, that we can reach an agreement for a new law. The basis for a 
referendum has been created and let’s hope a national agreement can be 
reached how natural gas can be used.660 
The government, on the other had to find a way to balance genuinely seeking societal input 
with guaranteeing property rights and continuing a market oriented economy. One 
government representative explained why property rights cannot simply be discarded with 
respect to donor-recipient relationships:  
What the donors are interested in is that hopefully the referendum won’t 
eliminate the legal security that the international company of their countries 
have.661 
At the same time, the government was reluctant to enable a nationalisation of Bolivia’s 
natural gas as one possible result of a referendum because that would curb public revenue. 
This argument was also upheld with reference to donor pressure: 
If I put myself in the shoes of the donors: “You! I continue to pass on 
resources to you but you don’t make any effort to for example strike a deal 
to sell the natural gas or to collect taxes!” So, I think that the donors are 
worried about it but there isn’t much that they can do because in the end it’s 
linked to political processes that are often extremely ideologised.662 
When the referendum finally took place in July 2004, the questions were ambiguous enough 
to uphold the government’s liberty in the reformulation of the Law on Hydrocarbons.663 In 
                                                 
659  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
660  Interview with a donor representative, No. 88. La Paz, 6 April 2004.  
661  Interview with a donor representative, No. 88. La Paz, 6 April 2004.  
662  Interview with a government representative, No. 79, La Paz, 29 March 2004. 
663  The questions were: (1) Do you agree that the Hydrocarbons Law (No 1689) approved by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
should be repealed?, (2) Do you agree that the state should recover ownership of all hydrocarbons at the wellhead?, (3) 
Do you agree that the YPFB (the state oil company) should be re-founded, recovering the state’s ownership of stakes held 
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the end, the referendum served as a modus to seek consensus while predetermining the 
results.664  
The constituent assembly, which is supposed to change Bolivia’s political system, has 
been scheduled for 2006 by the Mesa administration. Differently from the referendum or the 
national dialogue, it was destined to deliberate on a fundamental aspect of Bolivia’s 
democratic system. Again, issues of how to represent society come to the fore:  
The key question is: how can we assure the representation of all? There will 
be demands to represent the country according to sectors, ethnic and other 
groups. This way the process will be representative but maybe these 
representatives don’t have the capacity to discuss very specific constitutional 
changes.665 
In early 2003, the government established a Coordination Unit of the Constituent Assembly 
that was supposed to collect ideas and proposals on representation and content. Different 
proposals for representation were being discussed:  
There are proposals that say that it should be via assembly members and 
other that say there should be elected constituent delegates that form a 
congress [while experts] elaborate the constitution. […] In any case, these 
two tendencies have always coexisted in Bolivia: a very constitutional, 
institutionalist tendency […] that coexists with long-established social 
movements and indigenous rebellions – politics in the streets and politics in 
congress.666 
In 2005, discussion on the constituent assembly were delayed by further political unrest and 
Mesa’s resignation. The subsequent interim government called early elections for December 
2005.  
As redefining the political system of Bolivia has to be a nationally owned process, the 
government felt very strongly about not letting the donors define the content of the 
Constituent Assembly. A government representative explained:  
                                                                                                                                               
in the part-privatised oil companies, so that it can take part in all stages of the hydrocarbon production chain?, ( 4) Do you 
agree with President Carlos Mesa’s policy of using as as a strategic resource to recover sovereign and viable access to the 
sea?, (5) Do you agree that Bolivia should export gas under a national policy framework that ensures supplies for 
Bolivians; encourages the industrialisation of gas on national territory; levies taxes and/or royalties on oil companies up to 
50 percent of the production value of oil and gas; and earmarks resources from the export and industrialisation of gas 
mainly for education, health, roads and jobs?  
664  Many Bolivians later criticised this ‘trap’ of the referendum, see Centro de Documentación e Información - Bolivia (2004): 
"El Referendúm del 18 de julio: Cualquier respuesta favorece a los dueños del gas boliviano: los empresarios extranjeros", 
La Paz: CEDIB. 
665  Interview with a donor representative, No. 52, La Paz, 22 April 2004. 
666  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
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The donors have nothing to do with the constituent assembly. They are lost 
in ordinance. It’s not their subject. They are worried but they don’t know 
what it is.667 
Donors seemed to concur that they should not get involved, apart from financial support to 
facilitate the process:  
It’s the country that decides about its destiny, not the donors. That would be 
like the ‘it’ of national consciousness.668 
During the first year of organising the constituent assembly, cooperation in Bolivia has been 
supporting the constituent assembly process without content-related conditionalities. 
No, we wouldn’t say that the donors present us with reports on this. And to 
start: the constituent assembly is something the donors had sufficient fear of, 
there is a type of exercising citizenship within the assembly. Certainly, under 
no circumstances would we allow that the donors come and impose criteria 
that are not within our interests.669 
Both sides recognised that participatory processes had become foundational issues in Bolivia 
and that the political system of the Bolivian state was at stake.  
Yes, they are interested. I think that they are interested to see the whole 
sequence: constituent assembly, referendum. In a sense, it’s an interest that 
Bolivia, the formal state, survives. That’s a fact..670 
In sum, while participatory processes can deepen democratic responsiveness, the transition 
period can have very destabilising effects on the political system as a whole. In 2005, the 
Bolivian government with all its good-will to be more inclusive has to juggle disappointed 
expectations of societal organisations, engage with organisations that show little willingness 
to participate in the existing system that they reject, and redefine the political system without 
letting the state succumb to chaos.671 
7 . 2  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  G h a n a  
In Ghana, the picture looks much different. Although civil organisation have existed in 
Ghana for quite a while, its politics have not been marked by a history of co-gestión, co-gobierno 
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669  Interview with a government representative, No. 109, La Paz, 12 April 2004. 
670  Interview with a government representative, No. 45, La Paz, 27 January 2004. 
671  Jonas Wolff (2004): "Demokratisierung als Risiko der Demokratie?  Die Krise der Politik in Bolivien und Ecuador und die 
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and poder dual that every Bolivian government had to juggle with. Societal pressure to respond 
to citizens demands were much less present in Ghana. What was similar was the 
government’s need to establish the legitimacy of it’s rule, particularly after the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) had transformed into National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) following multi-party elections in 1992. One way of doing this was through 
administrative decentralisation:  
The decision to decentralise was largely political. The government felt the 
need to show that they are inclusive.672  
Even before, during the late 1980s, opposition to the PNDC rule was ripe. This was not only 
a result of the PNDC’s socially costly structural adjustment programme. Early opposition to 
the regime came from civil associations, which perceived the regime as endangering human 
life, liberty and property.673  
In 1988, […] people were dissatisfied with the system, and therefore the 
government that came in 1982 started to say: “Well, we are giving power to 
the people!” So that issue appeared and they thought about how to best set 
up the district assembly with councillors, where local councillors would be 
able to manage things on their own and they are responsible to their 
electorate.674 
Decentralisation became the government’s primary means to present itself more responsive 
to its citizenry.   
7 . 2 . 1  P a r t i c i p a t o r y  A n t e c e d e n t s  
The government of Ghana embarked upon the implementation of a comprehensive 
decentralisation policy and local government reform programme in 1988, still under PNDC 
rule. This policy was later enshrined in the 1992 constitution and supplemented by the Local 
Government Act of 1993 (Act 462). A donor representative sums up its progress: 
Decentralisation since 1988 - that was when the first local government 
elections were held - moved on well. And then in 1993 the local government 
law was amended. Act 462 came into being. Before it was PNDC Law 37 of 
1988. Things started well but along the line from 1996 till now, it just 
stalled.675 
                                                 
672  Interview with a donor representative, No. 128, Accra, 14 July 2004. 
673  See Dan-Bright S. Dzorgbo (2000): Ghana in Search of Development: The Challenge of Governance, Economic Management and 
Institution Building. The Making of Modern Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
674  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
675  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
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The reforms had established District Assemblies to implement the government’s 
development programmes and Regional Co-ordinating Councils to coordinate and monitor 
these programmes. A District Common Fund has been established through which five 
percent of the public budget are channelled to the district level. However, Ghana was far 
from having devoluted political and administrative powers to the district level.676 A 
commonly voiced argument was that capacity at the district level was still insufficient for 
effective administration:  
One of the key areas of reform is the building of capacity at the district level, 
so we do acknowledge that there is a need for capacity building. Unless we 
do that, we are not going to go very far.677 
Yet this was not the only problem. While the district assemblies were the institutions 
where local level decision-making takes place, the local civil service was still under the 
authority of the central government. Even though the district departments – such as health 
or education, for example – were to be integrated into the district assemblies according to 
Act 462, they still responded to their respective line ministry in the central government in 
2004. A donor representative complained that the government lacked the will to change this:  
Political will from the government to cut off that and let the district 
department be responsible is not coming up clearly. Most of the time, there 
is a resistance from the central government… not government but the 
ministries… to let go – because of money, power, influence. […] The 
ministries still want to hold on to all these budgets and all kinds of things.678 
Several years past the tenth anniversary of Ghana’s decentralisation policy, ministries, 
departments and agencies still managed to hold on to their dominant position in decision-
making processes without substantial protest from societal groups. The point here is not to 
evaluate whether central or decentralised public administration renders the delivery of public 
service more effective. Ghana’s reluctant implementation of decentralisation law simply 
illustrates that, to the government, decentralisation was a means to legitimate its rule rather 
than an end in its own right. In this situation, the basis for civil society participation in the 
formulation of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) was much different than in 
Bolivia.  
                                                 
676  Decentralisation Secretariat - Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2003): "National Decentralisation 
Action Plan (NDAP): Towards a Sector Wide Approach for Decentralisation Implementation in Ghana (2003-2005)", 
September, Accra: Government of Ghana. 
677  Interview with a government representative, No. 110, Accra, 23 August 2004. 
678  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
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7 . 2 . 2  P a r t i c i p a t o r y  C o n d i t i o n a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  G P R S  
In Ghana, the broad-based consultation took place in a very different manner. Although 
there were consultations prior to the elaboration of the GPRP, they did not take place at the 
same scale as in Bolivia. Sample consultations were conducted in thirty-six communities to 
enquire about perceptions of poverty and collect ideas on its reduction. Since this was not a 
nation-wide process like in Bolivia, the impact on public opinion was much more limited. In 
addition, the government organised a so-called National Economic Dialogue, which was 
organized in a similar fashion to the Bolivian National Dialogue 1997, at the national level 
with a relatively small number of civil society representatives. Once a first draft of the GPRS 
had been formulated, several forums and workshops took place where it was presented. 
Participants included the National Association of Local Authorities, NGOs in service 
delivery and religious groups, women’s groups, the workers’ unions, as well as research 
institutions and think tanks.679  
7.2.2.1 Pre- versus Post-Consultation 
While these consultations served as inputs into the GPRS formulation, they did not address 
the allocation of funds made available through HIPC debt relief. In 2000, the only transfer of 
resources from the central to the local level was the District Assemblies Common Fund, 
which transferred five percent of the national budget to the District Assemblies.680 However, 
HIPC resources were not directly channelled through to the local level, like they were in 
Bolivia. Yet, indirectly the HIPC funds strengthened decentralisation: 
The local governments are considered to have spend a certain section. There 
is a project called HIPC Watch observing dispersal. Through the agreements, 
local governments are also expected to monitor the dispersal of HIPC 
monies. I have heard the complaint that the government uses the HIPC 
money as a political tool, especially now as elections come close.681 
In terms of GPRS implementation at the local level, some civil society representatives 
advocated that it should be coordinated at the district level. The argument for this was that 
basic communities could better articulate their concerns to towards district level authorities 
than national ones.682 However, the insufficient degree of implementation of Ghana’s 
decentralisation policy meant that participation at the local level remained low, in terms of 
                                                 
679  Government of Ghana (2003): "An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity - Ghana's Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003 - 
2005: Monitoring and Evaluation Plan", Accra: National Development Planning Commission. 
680  According to Section 252 (1) of the Ghana’s 1992 Constitution.  
681  Interview with a donor representative, No. 128, Accra, 14 July 2004. 
682  Interview with a civil society representative, No. 120, Accra, 28 June 2004. 
  216
both consultation and implementation of the poverty reduction strategy. In 2004, a new local 
government service act was passed to strengthen the delivery of public services at the local 
level, a response to GPRS goals. A donor representative commented:  
If you look at this act, act 462, the 1993 law of decentralisation: if it had been 
implemented to the fullest maximum, a lot would have been achieved. There 
would not have been a need for the local government service bill.683 
What was oddly similar in the Ghanaian and the Bolivian case was that both 
country’s grassroots organisations had difficulties to comprehend the whole concept of a 
poverty reduction strategy. The main problem that many grassroots organisations had with 
the GPRS was that it did not contain any meaning for them. Several interviewees recalled 
that grassroots organisations were confused as to what poverty reduction actually meant.684 In 
both countries, the PRSP was bound to be a far to technical document for small societal 
associations to provide meaningful input to the process.  
7.2.2.2 GPRS Revision 
While street protests and political turmoil reached a height during the revision of the Bolivian 
EBRP, substantially delaying and affecting the process, Ghana’s PRSP revision was taking 
place in a stable political climate. Even though elections were held in December 2004, 
National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) was already preparing the revision of 
the GPRS in near certainty of a continuity of government. They were proven right. As a 
whole, the GPRS revision seemed utterly unaffected by political processes and its 
appropriation was as uncontroversial as the appropriation of the original GPRS.  
Nonetheless in 2004, NDPC was planning to alter several aspects of its participatory 
mechanism to make it more representative of society. For one, they were going to present 
the draft document to parliament as they had done before:  
Different [versions]: Maybe halfway through we’ll present it to parliament. 
But then the final one we’ll give it to them for their approval.685 
In addition, NDPC was thinking of doing more thorough consultation processes in rural 
areas. There was a general fatigue with the term ‘civil society’, whenever it referred to urban, 
middle class organisations that claimed to speak on behalf of the people. A government 
representative explained about the planned consultation in the rural areas:  
                                                 
683  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
684  Interview with a civil society representative, No. 120, Accra, 28 June 2004. 
685  Interview with a government representative, No. 106, Accra, 27 August 2004. 
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It will not only be in government services but market women, hawkers, 
farmers…686 
In sum, while the government’s GPRS ownership was little disputed or questioned, NDPC 
was working to make consultations more representative, yet without raising doubts about the 
executive’s prerogative to take policy decisions independently.  
7 . 2 . 3  R e p r e s e n t i n g  S o c i e t y :  C o n s u l t a t i v e  G h a n a  
First and foremost, Ghana had become a donor darling because of structural adjustment, not 
because of innovative democratic politics like Bolivia. When donors started to support 
participatory mechanisms in Ghanaian policy-making, the focus was thus much more on pro-
poor policy formulation than on the improvement of democratic politics. Rather than have 
society participate in the decision-making process, the Ghanaian PRSP elaboration consulted 
with societal representatives on the decision. Participation and consultation are two very 
different ways of engaging with society. Juxtaposing the consultative processes in Ghana with 
the participatory mechanisms in Bolivia enables a better judgement of societal expectations 
and appreciation of such processes.  
In Ghana, consultation with civil society representatives was a means to get approval 
and to legitimise policy-making.  
Yes, we shared it with [the donors] and I think they were quite ok with that. 
We have also shared that with quite a number of stakeholders, so we are 
quite comfortable.687 
Civil society representatives in Ghana were more aware about the limitations of consultative 
processes, in terms of getting technical policy-making input. A difficulty in discussing with 
grassroots organisations was that they were very articulate about the problems that they 
encounter but they did not talk much about possible solutions.688 
Indeed, while the government regularly consulted with civil society organisations to 
ensure approval of particular policies, government representatives were sufficiently reflected 
on issues of representativeness:  
This civil society thing is a bunch of interest groups which do not necessarily 
represent the whole of society. So, in addition to them we will go to society 
itself, I mean everybody. We will travel the country and talk to them, the 
                                                 
686  Interview with a government representative, No. 106, Accra, 27 August 2004. 
687  Interview with a government representative, No. 69, Accra, 2 September 2004.  
688  Interview with a civil society representative, No. 120, Accra, 28 June 2004. 
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people who are otherwise are not in any formal civil society organisations to 
express their concerns.689  
Nonetheless, donors continued to criticise the depth of consultative processes even in 
Ghana:  
They had consultations. But the issue was… How deep was that 
consultation? 690 
However, Ghanaians as well as most donor representatives preferred to engage 
parliament when it came to issues of accountability rather than organising another 
mechanism to directly engage with society. 
7 . 2 . 4  E f f e c t s  o n  S t a t e - S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p s  
Ghana never experienced the ups and downs of participatory processes in the way that 
Bolivia did. Ghana’s history of state-society interaction was much different and Ghana never 
became a new donor darling for participatory mechanisms. At the same time, it also never 
had to experience a similar instability to the one that followed Bolivia’s participatory 
experiences. Nonetheless, elements of Bolivia’s experience were mirrored in the Ghanaian 
case, albeit to a lesser degree. The Ghanaian government was similarly unable or unwilling to 
incorporate all of societal input into its policy-making decisions. At the same time, managing 
society’s expectations of participatory processes was an equally sensitive subject in Ghana.  
7.2.4.1 Consultation versus Input  
The Ghanaian government never pretended that it would use consultative processes to let 
civil society representatives formulate government policy. Throughout the GPRS process, it 
was clear that consultations and dialogue forums were designed to get ideas and to seek the 
stakeholders’ approval for the process. Consultative processes had a legitimising function for 
governmental initiatives.  
In particular, government made a point out of being as open and transparent as 
possible when money was already earmarked for a particular issue area, as is often the case 
with donor projects. A government representative explained the proceedings of a proposal 
development for a particular donor fund:  
                                                 
689  Interview with a government representative, No. 106, Accra, 27 August 2004.  
690  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
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This is the concept stage when we would still go along to stakeholder 
associations by organising forums. Already, [we have] been on the radio 
stations, [we] have had a lot of interviews and callings. You know we have 
had some press discussions, we also appear in the papers. We are quite open. 
At the end, we might have an opening forum as well.691 
Gaining legitimacy through openness when spending patterns were already well defined was 
relatively straightforward and effective, especially and when the proposal development took 
place in close contact with the donors.  
Interestingly,. donor representatives in Ghana were supportive of the idea of state-
society relationships where civil society organisations merely lobby policy-makers by 
providing information and resources. A donor representative commented: 
I very much would like to see more involvement of civil society […] in the 
budget process itself and much stronger relations with parliament. […] Civil 
society should come up with reports and inform the parliamentary 
committees on what questions we should ask the government. I mean that is 
very optimistic because it is just that the capacity of civil society is not 
there.692  
In a way, this type of interaction could lead towards a more engaged society and responsive 
politicians without destabilising the existing political system.  
7.2.4.2 Engaging Society 
Even though expectations about participation were never as high in Ghana as in Bolivia, 
some civil society representatives warned that large participatory programmes could misdirect 
people’s expectations. One representative cited one example where people in a rural area 
where hoping that the government would come and insure their children’s discipline about 
going to school.693 In Ghana as much as in Bolivia, the government had to carefully 
introduce and broadcast the aims and objectives of each consultative process in order to not 
disappoint built-up expectations.  
Similarly to governmental agencies, civil society organisations often exhibited flaws of 
non-transparency and patronage. A donor representative explained:  
When they go back, they don’t brief the organisation, so they don’t know 
that they were there […]. At least, write a status report! So you ask some 
other members but if you happen to meet the person who was attending the 
                                                 
691  Interview with a government representative, No. 69, Accra, 2 September 2004.  
692  Interview with a donor representative, No. 24, Accra, 18 August 2004. 
693  Interview with a civil society representative, No. 120, Accra, 28 June 2004. 
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meetings he says. “Yes, we were consulted.” But you meet others who say 
“no”. That is the problem.694 
Such confusion could hinder an effective engagement of these organisations in participatory 
and consultative processes. 
7 . 3  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  C h a p t e r  S e v e n  
The participatory conditionality of the PRSPs fulfils a double purpose, which explains why 
the concept is so popular in international development cooperation. Civil society 
participation is believed to 1) make economic policy more equitable and to 2) consolidate 
democratisation. Yet, there is neither empirical proof nor theoretical indications that these 
two goals converge. It is questionable whether the participatory processes of the PRSP 
formulation have improved the pro-poor focus of public policy in Bolivia and in Ghana. 
What is more, it is even questionable whether these processes have achieved more  inclusive 
policy-making processes. Against this lack of evidence, the current hype around civil society 
participation at the international level – in the academic world as well as among practitioners 
– is puzzling. Why is civil society participation in national policy-making such a popular 
concept?  
The answer can be found in the recent shift from structural adjustment to 
governance issues. This was a process which occurred simultaneously to the worldwide ‘third 
wave of democratisation’ and the end of the Cold War. International and bilateral support for 
processes of democratisation ranked high on the political agenda of many established 
democracies, while the improvement of structural adjustment policies required an 
incorporation of institutional issues. International and bilateral actors felt that they had to act 
quickly to support democratisation before the reversal of the ‘third wave’ hit in.695 The 
international finance institutions, who have an economic mandate and can thus not directly 
support processes of democratisation, focused on civil society participation instead. It was a 
convenient way to support democratic consolidation, while sticking to the economic 
mandate: fostering pro-poor economic policies. The bilateral agencies, who do not have the 
same restriction, openly argued in favour of civil society participation to the end of 
democratic deepening.  
                                                 
694  Interview with a donor representative, No. 123, Accra, 8 July 2004. 
695  In his famous book, Huntington argues that each wave of democratisation is followed by a wave of reversals back to 
authoritarian regimes. See Samuel P. Huntington (1991): The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
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It is a wide-spread belief that dialogue with civil society is “a promising mechanism 
for promoting broad social participation and fostering the sense of citizen ownership in the 
definition and operation of public policies and institutions.”696 Without dialogue, “democracy 
loses its meaning.”697 If that was true, why are there hardly any dialogue processes on national 
policy-making in long-established democracies? Where dialogue processes exist in traditional 
democracies – for example, between trade unions and business associations – they usually 
touch upon very specific issues or are territorially limited. Yet, which government of an 
established democracy is holding a national dialogue on such a broad-based issue as macro-
economic policies, as was required in the PRSP process. International donors who require 
consultation with civil society on particular issues – despite the fact that the Bolivian 
government is democratically elected to represent the interest of its citizens - ignore the 
sovereignty of the recipient government on national policy-making. International donors are 
employing Bolivia, with the consent of the Bolivian government, as a unique experiment in 
which new forms of participatory democracy are put to the test.  
One wonders whether civil society participation in national policy-making is really the 
best way to make government policy more responsive to societal demands. In Bolivia, has 
past government policy not been responsive to societal demands because the government did 
not know what society demanded? Or just because they did not feel the need to respond, 
despite an awareness of the issues? If the answer is the latter, then participatory processes will 
not achieve greater responsiveness because participation is not underpinned by effective 
means to influence policy-makers. With a view on power and politics, societal groups will 
need to develop means to pressure the government into following up on its promises. 
Participatory processes alone cannot guarantee that. Particularly in Bolivia, donors were 
demanding a blueprint of idealised forms of participation that did not respond to the political 
reality on the ground – indeed, it would not even fit in with the political reality in donor 
countries. By putting political and financial pressure on Bolivia, international donors 
contributed to creating forms of participation that were no adequate means to respond to 
heightened societal protest and to consolidate democratic politics in Bolivia.  
One of the biggest challenges of the participatory experiment is how to connect 
progressive methods of democracy like a national dialogue with traditional means such as 
deliberation in parliament. There is an apparent threat of national dialogue processes to 
                                                 
696  World Bank and International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2000): "Experiences with National Dialogue in 
Latin America: Main Lessons from a Roundtable Discussion", Conference Proceedings, November 20-21, San Salvador, El 
Salvador. 1. 
697  World Bank and International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2000): "Experiences with National 
Dialogue in Latin America: Main Lessons from a Roundtable Discussion", Conference Proceedings, November 20-21, 
San Salvador, El Salvador. 4. 
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further delegitimise parliament and the existing political parties and to destabilise 
democratisation. This is particularly true in newly established democracies where the 
legitimacy of congress and the political parties are relatively weak. For the case of Bolivia, 
many argue that a traditional representative democracy will not work for historical reasons 
and because of the ethnic and social fragmentation of society. Such voices claim that 
participatory democracy is the only way forward to democratic consolidation for Bolivia. 
Others argue that the phenomenon of consensus-building through dialogue arises as a result 
of the crisis of representation and of the problems of governance in Bolivia and more 
broadly in Latin America in general.698 This might be true. It can certainly be argued that 
dialogues have a catalysing effect in such a situation. One has to be aware, though, that such 
a democratic strengthening might entail an instability, at least in the short term.699 If dialogue 
is used as a method for different groups within the state and society to deliberate, it must 
produce some tangible results. Without results, the participants will become disillusioned 
with the process. This endangers the legitimacy not only of the process but also of the 
political system as a whole. If a government does not or cannot take deliberated conclusions 
into account, it will loose its credibility. The line to walk between delegitimising or 
strengthening representative democracy through dialogue is very thin.   
                                                 
698  See the discussion elaborated in World Bank and International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2000): 
"Experiences with National Dialogue in Latin America: Main Lessons from a Roundtable Discussion", Conference 
Proceedings, November 20-21, San Salvador, El Salvador. 
699  For a discussion of the potential conflict between stability and democratisation, see Wolff’s analysis of Bolivia’s recent 
unrest as a contribution to democratic deepening, Jonas Wolff (2004): "Demokratisierung als Risiko der Demokratie?  Die 
Krise der Politik in Bolivien und Ecuador und die Rolle der indigenen Bewegungen", HSFK-Report 6, Frankfurt am 
Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung.  
  223
 
 
 
 
PA R T  I V  
 
 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
 
  224
C H A P T E R  8   –  C O N C L U S I O N  
 This study opened with two questions to investigate the ownership paradox. The first 
question considered whose values and beliefs were reflected by externally promoted reforms 
in a development cooperation context. The second question asked in how far informal 
political processes determined policy-making in a situation where formalised agendas and 
informal political processes diverge. I have argued that the two questions are interlinked 
because political reforms often reflect the values and beliefs of donors rather than recipient 
policy-makers, which makes formalised agendas diverge from socially embedded informal 
political processes.  
In order to address these questions, I have investigated Bolivia and Ghana’s 
experience with development cooperation, above all with the elaboration of poverty 
reduction strategy papers and with direct budgetary support. With my conclusion, I do not 
attempt to evaluate the success or failure of the poverty reduction strategy papers, nor of 
budgetary support mechanisms. Instead, summarising the argument, I look at three sets of 
juxtapositions within development cooperation rhetoric: development planning agendas 
versus government priorities and participatory policy-making versus democratic 
representation, and government versus national ownership. Based on these, I evaluate the 
theoretical implications of my findings for existing debates in the field of development 
studies: donors and the state-society relationship in an aid-dependent country, and concepts 
of democracy. These considerations lead me to a more general outlook on the impact of 
development cooperation on democratic development. 
8 . 1  T h e  R h e t o r i c  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n   
Running through my argument has been a constant emphasis on the need to contextualise 
the socio-political setting when agreeing on development cooperation programmes. I have 
argued that political reforms in Bolivia or Ghana resulted from a combination of domestic 
and external pressures and incentives. Even though I advocate a state-in-society approach,700 
I argue with my research that aid donors should be conceptualised as an important additional 
element impacting on this state-society relationship. Politics in Ghana and Bolivia are not 
                                                 
700  Joel Samuel Migdal (2001): State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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only the result of societal interaction but also of the government’s interaction with 
international aid donors.  
Throughout my research three juxtapositions emerged out of the rhetoric of 
development cooperation that I want to summarise here. One is the likely divergence 
between development planning agendas and government priorities. The second is the non-
obvious tension between participatory mechanisms in national policy-making and traditional 
forms of democratic representation. Through these arguments runs the third theme: the 
necessity to distinguish between government and national ownership. 
8 . 1 . 1  D e v e l o p m e n t  P l a n n i n g  A g e n d a s  v e r s u s  
G o v e r n m e n t  P r i o r i t i e s  
In order to address the research question on diverging formalised institutions and informal 
political processes with respect to the state and its organisations, I used part two of this thesis 
to juxtapose official Ghanaian and Bolivian development planning agendas, in particular the 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), with non-formalised government priorities that 
become apparent elsewhere. To do so, I juxtaposed the Ghanaian and Bolivian PRSP 
priorities with the ones that emerged during their revision and with government priorities put 
forward during the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) proposal formulation. In order to 
address the research question on externally promoted reform in this context, I also looked at 
government commitment to the Multi-Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) in Ghana and to 
budget funding mechanisms in Bolivia. In both cases, these multi-donor funding initiatives 
were built on the PRSP, with the assumption that the PRSP represented the government’s 
enshrined development agenda.  
Understanding the PRSPs in such a way is problematic since they were formulated to 
fulfil the requirements of the second Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief 
initiative. The creators of the PRSP initiative were probably aware of this problem: how can a 
recipient government be made to own a strategy that it had to formulate in order to receive 
funds? For this reason, the requirements of the PRSP included a broad-based consensus, 
precisely to ensure the commitment that they knew would be difficult to achieve. As a result, 
the PRSP initiative presented recipient governments with several conditionalities: they had to 
be broad-based and country-owned, yet the content was already defined to be poverty 
alleviation, while dominant development thinking pressured for an emphasis on social 
spending to achieve this goal. The PRSP initiative presented a considerable straitjacket that 
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recipient governments had to make do with. Interestingly, the governments’ commitment to 
their original PRSPs varied between Ghana and Bolivia. In Bolivia – although the 
government officially upheld the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (EBRP) as their 
development agenda – almost every politician and civil servant interviewed disliked and 
outright rejected the EBRP as an irrelevant document.701 In Ghana, politicians and civil 
servants alike were emotionally unattached to the document, yet all stated that it represented 
the government’s development agenda. However, implementation generally fell behind these 
official statements. Few ministries, departments or agencies actually made the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS) targets explicit in their sectoral strategy. Generally, the GPRS was 
used as a policy statement but only very patchily and insufficiently as a tool for monitoring 
and evaluation. 
The revision processes of the PRSP in Ghana and Bolivia in 2004/2005 have proven 
a useful tool to check on the development agendas that both governments put forward 
during the first round of PRSP formulation. Interestingly, both Ghana’s and Bolivia’s revised 
PRSP appeared to be moving away from the original emphasis on social sector spending, 
towards a focus on wealth creation and productivity issues. Even though multilateral donors 
attached further funding to the PRSP revision process, these funds were less substantial and 
seemed to be less of a factor pressuring on the revised PRSP formulation process. In Ghana, 
the American MCA proposal formulation process further stressed this shift. Since the MCA 
proposal guidance notes did not contain a poverty reduction element and were not 
harmonised nor streamlined with other bi- or multilateral donors, recipient governments 
were free to use it for previously neglected priorities that did not fit in well with the GPRS 
and the MDBS framework. In 2004, the core team working on the MCA proposal was 
planning to focus in infrastructure and private sector development – two issue areas that had 
not featured prominently in the MDBS donors’ discourse. In Bolivia, government priorities 
were far more obviously diverging from the original EBRP agenda: towards the productivity 
issues stressed in the revised EBRP and during the National Dialogue 2003/04, but more 
importantly towards minimising the political damage that resulted from continued civil unrest 
since 2003.  
Government’s commitment to the MDBS in Ghana on the other hand was quite 
high. This is not surprising since the framework represented a relatively large amount of 
money that the government could spend as part of the national budget at its own discretion. 
In 2004, the Ghanaian politicians and civil servants interviewed were all very positive about 
                                                 
701  In fact, the only ones neutral on the question were the ones that had been involved in its elaboration.  
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the MDBS. The disbursement triggers specified in the jointly agreed trigger matrix were the 
only aspect limiting the government’s liberties in spending the funds. It seemed that 
government representatives were quite indifferent about these triggers. Deliberation about 
what shape and form the triggers should take primarily took place between different donors. 
Eventually, the government merely signed off the resulting compromise. During my 
interviews, the majority of donor representatives were generally positive about the idea of 
multi-donor budget support, although many were worried about how to justify such expenses 
to their home constituencies. It remains a given that results of such forms of financial 
assistance are very hard to evaluate. In that respect, donor representatives were forced to ‘let 
go’ by opting for budget support. While budget support represented an advancement in 
terms of genuinely committing the government, it deprived involved donors of any effective 
means to control the use of such funds. For the sake of government ownership donors are 
required to make a leap of faith that can only be done if the government is genuinely 
considered as progressive, developmental and trust-worthy. Even then, it is hard to justify to 
multilateral member states and bilateral countries’ taxpayers.  
8 . 1 . 2  P a r t i c i p a t o r y  P o l i c y - M a k i n g  v e r s u s  D e m o c r a t i c  
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
In order to address the research question on diverging formalised agendas and informal 
political processes with respect to state-society relationships, I have used part three of this 
thesis to juxtapose Bolivian and Ghanaian attempts to foster direct participation in the 
elaboration of the PRSPs with previously existing channels of representation and with the 
governments’ capabilities and willingness to take societal input on board. In particular, I 
compared participatory requirements of the PRSPs with traditional means of societal 
representation. In order to address the research question on externally promoted reform in 
this context, I looked at the government’s appropriation of the results of the National 
Dialogues in Bolivia and of the National Economic Dialogue in Ghana. In both cases, these 
dialogues had become established as a response to the participatory requirements of the 
PRSPs, with the assumption that they could create broad-based consensus.  
However, the participatory requirements of the PRSPs were designed to 
accommodate two quite distinct aims: pro-poor policy formulation and government 
responsiveness to societal demands. Even though the two might seem relatively non-
conflicting at first glance, they are not necessarily the same thing. Combining these two 
aspects rested on the assumption that the majority of citizens would like their government to 
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implement poverty-reducing policies. Indeed there would need to be a consensus on what 
kind of policies actually achieve poverty reduction. Especially in Bolivia, such a situation was 
not the case. Profound social cleavages have led to reciprocal distrust between different 
sections of society and between social movements and the government. Bolivia could not be 
further from a consensus on what the country needed to move forward. This was not a new 
phenomenon, Bolivia had been marked by these divisions since colonial times. Large sections 
of the population continue to understand poverty reduction as the redistribution of 
economic and natural resources and as the renegotiation of property rights – very different 
concepts from the donors’ understanding of poverty alleviation. The Bolivian example shows 
that the PRSPs suffer from a combination of methodological and content conditionalities: a 
PRSP has to be based on a national consensus, but at the same time it has to address poverty 
reduction in preconceived ways. These two requirements are easily at odds with each other 
and make national ownership, as it is envisioned by the donors, very unlikely.  
In Bolivia and in Ghana, the governments employed a pre-existing, non-binding 
consultation process to serve as the participatory process meant to ensure the PRSPs’ ‘broad-
based consensus’. In Bolivia, the government transformed the relatively limited National 
Dialogue 1997 into a precedent for the greatly enlarged National Dialogue 2000. In Ghana, 
the government changed the National Economic Forum that had been taking place since 
1997 into the National Economic Dialogue. One major difference between Bolivia and 
Ghana was that the Bolivian government claimed to have elaborated its EBRP based on the 
results of the dialogue, while the Ghanaian government subjected its already completed draft 
GPRS to the dialogue for discussion and approval. By doing so, the Bolivian government 
partially conceded its elaboration authority to participating civil society organisations, which 
naturally made societal expectations rise. The Ghanaian government, on the other hand, had 
made it clear that they are the ones elaborating the GPRS, even though they would appreciate 
societal input. Naturally, disappointments about the limited influence that both dialogues had 
on the final document were much more pronounced and agitated in Bolivia. The situation 
was further aggravated by the fact that donor representatives in Bolivia got very engaged in 
the drafting of the EBRP, with drafts and comments circulating between donors and the 
government. As a result, the final EBRP was much more a response to the requirements of 
the donors and to prior international agreements than to often vague and ambiguous results 
of the National Dialogue 2000.  
Indeed, these problems with the broad-based consensus resulted from several 
misconceptions of societal participation in national policy-making that were inherent in the 
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PRSP. For one, national actors do not necessarily associate policy consultation with the 
democratic notion of participation as donors understand it. In Bolivia, ‘participation’ recalls 
past experiences with corporatist politics. Furthermore, the concept of participation assumes 
that deliberations over what kind of political system would be desirable are already settled. 
Participation then is merely a tool to give input on policy-making but not to alter the political 
system as a whole. The political unrest in Bolivia in 2005 – with the promised Constituent 
Assembly and with aggravated calls for a more socialist state – shows that such a situation is 
often not a given. In Bolivia, disappointed expectations within society only further confirmed 
a prevalent conviction that the political system does not serve the needs of the people. Lastly, 
it is by no means obvious who constitutes civil society. In Ghana, the term as such was 
widely looked down upon as reducing society to a small number of non-representative, urban 
non-governmental organisations. In Bolivia, controversies broke loose as to who can most 
legitimately represent society; yet, the issue is even less settled. The donors’ tendency to 
perceive societal networks according to the basis on which they are formed and not 
according to the channels through which they influence the political system has contributed 
to further widening the gap between formalised consultative processes and actual means of 
policy-influencing. In short, the concept of civil society does not serve to depict societal 
fractions and obscures negotiations on how a government can become more responsive to 
citizens’ demands.   
8 . 1 . 3  G o v e r n m e n t  v e r s u s  N a t i o n a l  O w n e r s h i p  
Even though government as well as national ownership are frequently mentioned in the 
literature, the distinction between the two concepts is usually either blurred or they are simply 
being equated. If they are mentioned together, it is usually to advocate a broad-based societal 
consensus that goes beyond government ownership.702 However, as problematic as the 
notion of ownership is in and for itself, the distinction is necessary in order to specify who is 
supposed to be responsible and committed to a particular programme, if one decides to 
employ the concept.  
Government ownership relates very closely to donor efforts in harmonisation and 
alignment. The idea behind harmonisation was that multi- and bilateral aid donors aligned 
cooperation between themselves and with recipient governments in order to free scarce 
                                                 
702  For example, in Masud Mozammel and Sina Odugbemi (2005): "With the Support of Multitudes: Using Strategic 
Communication to Fight Poverty Through PRSPs", Information and Communication for Development, DFID, and 
Development Communication Division, External Affairs, The World Bank, London: Department for International 
Development. 
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recipient government human resources from administering multiple donor programmes. It 
has been argued that lengthy and diverse decision-making procedures by different donors 
impede the government’s ability to commit to agreed reforms programmes and to effectively 
execute the delivery of aid.703 By harmonising aid flows and development cooperation more 
generally, donors aim to overcome these obstacles and to thus foster government ownership. 
However, donors have muddled up procedural harmonisation with harmonised agendas. 
Instead of aligning and harmonising their accountability, reporting as well as monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms, donors have preferred to focus on harmonising their development 
agendas. Clearly, harmonisation of procedures is something very difficult to achieve for 
donor agencies that represent sovereign states and powerful international organisations. Both 
types of organisations have well-established and complex procedural requirements. Aligning 
these to each individual recipient government’s rudimentary structures presents a significant 
challenge. Nonetheless, it appears to be the most promising means to effectively strengthen 
the aid absorptive capacity of recipient governments. On the other hand, harmonisation of 
agendas has been somewhat easier to accomplish between like-minded Western donors. Yet, 
a harmonised donor agenda does not contribute towards greater government commitment to 
reform. Instead, it reduces the plurality of opinions, depriving the recipient government of 
the choice between the most suitable development cooperation partner. If approaches 
towards cooperation differ, the recipient government can pick the most appropriate donor to 
support a government-originated reform programme. While this reduces donors’ options for 
policy influencing, it would enable development cooperation programmes to be in line with 
government-owned reform agendas. Whether or not this is desirable, is a normative decision 
that every donor agency has to take.  
National ownership, on the other hand, relates very closely to questions of 
democratic accountability, at least from the viewpoint of the donors. They make the 
argument that national ownership – a broad-based consensus on reform agendas within 
society at large – would ensure that the government’s reform plans are responding to the 
needs and demands of its citizens.704 For the donors, national ownership is a way to have 
their intervention in national policy-making be legitimated by the voice of the people. It is a 
means to continuously emphasise that their aim is to help ‘the poor’, or ‘the people’. Yet, it 
rests on the somewhat naïve assumption that policy reforms could ever be underpinned by a 
broad-based consensus. It is hard to think of bold economic reforms in any country in the 
                                                 
703  For a discussion, see Mick  Foster and Adrian Fozzard (2000): "Aid and Public Expenditure: A Guide", ODI Working 
Paper No. 141, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
704  See World Bank Group - Operations Policy and Strategy (2000): "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Internal Guidance 
Notes", January, Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 
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world where that is the case. As I have argued in chapter two, politics are the power plays 
through which different social groups try to realise their own will. Usually, different fractions 
in any society have different approaches and answers to the questions at hand. The political 
process is where deliberation takes place and where a governing majority usually eventually 
imposes its solution on the rest. Especially when reforms are far-reaching and their results 
difficult to estimate, broad-based consensus is highly unlikely. Such reforms will always be 
controversial, in any socio-political setting.  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the concept of ownership, despite its 
normative bias, and to see in how far it can serve as a tool to describe donor recipient 
relationships. I conclude that ownership is of little analytical use. The ownership discussion 
has been helpful to divert attention towards how far a recipient government is committed to 
a reform programme agreed with its donors. Yet, in that context it might make sense to 
speak of commitment to reform, rather than ownership.705 Ownership is a normative, highly 
political term that serves to conceal a controversial political agenda in technical terms. 
Apparently a technical desirability, the ownership debate touches on very profound aspects 
of domestic democratic accountability.706 
8 . 2  R e v i s i t i n g  t h e  T h e o r e t i c a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s  
Two themes stem from these conclusions that have theoretical implications for existing 
debates in the field of development studies: donors and the state-society relationship in aid-
dependent countries, and concepts of democracy. For one, political sociologists who study 
state-society relationships in aid-dependent developing countries would benefit from 
becoming more rigorous about conceptualising the donors as a constant influence in this 
relationship. Several studies acknowledge the influence of donors in country-specific 
studies,707 but these realisations have yet to become integrated in the general theoretical 
debate of the field, beyond concepts of the internationalised state.708 Furthermore, there is an 
                                                 
705  This argument has also been made by Oliver Morrissey and Arjan Verschoor (2004): "Is Ownership a Meaningful 
Concept in Policy Reform? Policy Learning and the Evolution of Pro-Poor Policies in Uganda", paper presented at the 
second International HWWA Conference on Public Choice and Development 'The Political Economy of Aid', 9-11 
December, Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics. 
706  A similar argument can be found in David Mosse (2005): Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. 
London: Pluto Press.  
707  Such as Rosalind Eyben (2003): "Donors as Political Actors", IDS Working Paper 183, April, Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies; Natalie Ann Folster (2001): Systemic Constraints on Aid Policy and Aid Outcomes: The History of Canadian 
Official Development Assistance to Tanzania. PhD Thesis, Development Studies Institute, London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science; James Putzel (1992): A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines. New 
York: Monthly Review Press; Judith Tendler (1984): Captive Donors and Captivating Clients: A Nicaraguan Saga. Washington, 
DC: Inter-Amercian Foundation. 
708  Kate Nash (2000): Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics, and Power. Oxford: Blackwell: 260-264. 
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often normative approach towards democratisation in debates about political development 
that impedes thorough analyses of political transformations and change. Frequently, the state 
is too easily discarded as predatory, with an implicit assumption that the people – especially 
the poor – are morally superior to the power-holders and capable of presiding over effective 
poverty reduction. For the sake of participation and empowerment of the people, issues of 
representation and the limits of democracy are being overlooked. 
8 . 2 . 1  D o n o r s  a n d  t h e  S t a t e - S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  
a n  A i d - D e p e n d e n t  C o u n t r y  
I have argued throughout this thesis that political activity in developing countries is not only 
shaped by the relationship between the state and society. More accurately, it is characterised 
by a triangular relationship between society, the state and the country’s donor community. 
However, this does not mean that in a globalised world, the state has become an invalid 
concept to explain politics. Recognising that a globalisation of politics has taken place,709 I 
nonetheless maintain that analyses of state-society relationships further understandings of 
national politics. Even in cases where the state has been described as weak – in the sense that 
it is not fully able to engage with society – and where some parts of society are disengaged 
with the state, others parts of society still influence the government’s decision-making and 
engage in the public realm of that state in order to partake in national politics.710 However, if 
the government’s resources are considerably dependent on foreign assistance,711 politics 
cannot properly be explained without conceptualising the country’s donor community as a 
third component in that relationship. 
In the case of Ghana, such a triangular relationship is enshrined in the MDBS 
framework, through which donor funds are directly channelled into the public budget. The 
formal structure of the framework, more specifically the MDBS trigger matrix, is an 
expression of the donors’ myths and beliefs in the relevance of public administrative reform. 
At the same time, it represents the formalised, official agenda of the government. This 
agenda does indeed diverge from the day-to-day work activities within the Ghanaian 
ministries, departments and agencies, which often continue to respond to requirements of 
neo-patrimonial patronage networks. Such networks – and the continuing existence of a 
                                                 
709  For this argument, see David Held (1995): Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. 
Cambridge: Polity Press; A. McGrew (1997): The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
710  Unless the state is ‘failed’, that is. For a discussion of state failure, William Zartman (1994): Collapsed States: The Disintegration 
and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
711  Throughout this research, I have defined aid dependence as roughly 10 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.  
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primordial public in which religious, communal, traditional and other non-statal authorities 
dominate – explain why public administrative reform has been relatively unsuccessful during 
the past twenty years. The reforms were frequently in tension with informal, socially 
structured interests. Conceptualising the donors as relevant actors within the state-society 
relationship helps to explain why these reforms came about, even when they were unlikely to 
be successful.  
In the case of Bolivia, the triangular relationship between society the state and donors 
is enshrined in the Law of the National Dialogue. Interestingly, the formal institutionalisation 
by means of a law has been the result of civil society demands that evolved during the second 
National Dialogue in 2000. However, the organisation of the National Dialogue 2000 in 
order to inform the EBRP formulation was a government response to the donors’ myths and 
beliefs in democratic accountability. This gave political space to societal representatives that 
had not usually been at the forefront of state-society interaction. Naturally, they called for an 
institutionalisation of that space. However, even though the government had officially 
committed itself to the results of the dialogues, it has insufficiently taken them into account 
in 2000 as well as in 2004. The government’s political activities then where much rather 
determined by external pressures and commitments to the donors, and by political 
calculations about how economic and political stability could best be maintained. As political 
stability grew to be the most imminent concern since October 2003, the government has 
taken less and less notice of this institutionalised space for dialogue, where deliberation does 
not seem to serve as an appeasement of political agitation. Instead, the government has 
turned towards new public spaces like the envisaged Constituent Assembly, which is hoped 
to be a better means to respond to societal pressures.  
In sum, donors are contributing towards institutional multiplicity at the country level, 
formally and even informally. They represent a pressure group that can exert considerable 
influence on the government’s policy-making because they determine external financial 
assistance and, to a large degree, the recipient governments’ international reputation. Yet, 
they cannot be subsumed under ‘socially structured interests’, because donor representatives 
have an exit option from the national context, unlike domestic actors. In addition, their 
prominent role for legitimising and supporting the existence of particular governments brings 
with it an over-proportionally large impact on institutional formalisation. The danger is that 
such reforms are not underpinned by the multiple informal interests and values that exist 
within a given society. The relative importance of external donors indicates that the state 
become indeed more internationalised, and that governments are eager for international 
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recognition. Yet, beyond debates about the internationalised state, political sociologists would 
benefit to come to terms with a theoretical approach where the social circumstances of 
politics are conceptualised around the state, but not only based on the society that the state 
governs, nor on international agreements impacting on national politics. In an aid-dependent 
developing country, it would be an important step in the right direction to analytically 
acknowledge a triangular relationship between society, the state and the country’s donors. 
8 . 2 . 2  C o n c e p t u a l i s i n g  D e m o c r a c y  
In the introduction and in part three, I have argued from a theoretical standpoint that current 
theories of democratic consolidation and democratic accountability are partly motivated by 
normative pursuits to establish desirable political systems. I have discussed definitions of civil 
society that have been formulated to that end: civil society is generally understood as 
contributing towards the consolidation of democratic rules and principles. Democratic 
theorists like Schmitter understand civil society as consisting of self-organised groups that 
agree to act within pre-established rules, and as not seeking to replace state agents.712 Yet, the 
empirical findings of this research confirm that such a conception inadequately depicts the 
socio-political reality in Bolivia and Ghana. Such notions of civil society turn a blind eye to 
relevant facets of societal organisation in both countries that have a significant impact on 
political transformation and change, and that cannot simply be dismissed as ‘un-civil’.  
In the case of Bolivia, notions of civil society and democratic consolidation are 
inadequate to analyse continuous legacies of corporatist politics. Employing these concepts 
only widens the gap between idealised constructs of desired institutions and actual politics. 
The fact that civil society is assumed to act within pre-established rules of a ‘civil’ or legal 
nature, presupposes that the political order is established. In Bolivia however, social 
movements challenge very recently established democratic rules, and refuse to act within its 
boundaries. Indeed, several movements seek to replace state agents and private producers, 
whose domination they consider illegitimate. The criteria of non-usurpation is therefore 
clearly not a given, Bolivian social movements cannot adequately be described as civil society 
in terms of democratic theorists’ definition. Yet, these movements are protesting against 
deep-routed social injustice and economic inequality that has characterised the socio-political 
system in Bolivia for centuries. Because large parts of the population have de facto been 
excluded from policy-making, street protests has proven to be the most effective means to 
                                                 
712  Philippe Schmitter (1997): "Civil Society: East and West", in: Larry Diamond, et al. (eds.), Consolidating Third Wave 
Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 239-262. 
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have their discontent be heard. Their claims might or might not be legitimate, but their 
engagement with political and state matters is the single most determining factor for political 
change since 2003. Normative theoretical approaches of theoretical consolidation that neglect 
socio-political legacies have not furthered an understanding of how and why such changes 
and societal confrontations occur.  
In the case of Ghana, the civil society concept is difficult to reconcile with the 
existence of two public realms. Many primordial associations – such as ethnic and other 
communal associations that engage in public deliberation but are disconnected from the 
post-colonial state – would not qualify for democratic theorists’ definition of civil society.713 
Similarly to social associations in the Bolivian case, some Ghanaian organisations might seek 
to replace state agents and thus violate the non-usurpation criteria of civil society. For 
example, such a situation would be the case whenever chiefs or other traditional authorities 
take on legal matters that are usually the prerogative of the state. Yet, these self-organised 
groups within society are actively engaged with political affairs and are capable of taking 
collective action in defence or in promotion to their interests. Their engagement is simply not 
directed towards the state. This disengagement between the primordial public and the post-
colonial state is hard to reconcile with theories of democratic consolidation that assume a 
direct feedback process between the state and civil society.  
In both the Bolivian and the Ghanaian case, social movements and associations 
effectively engage politically, even when such engagement is not exactly the kind of input to 
policy formulation that civil society is envisaged by donors to give. Because of normative 
motives, democratic theory has over-emphasised civil society analyses and neglected socio-
political questions of transformation and change that do not fall within the category of 
democratic consolidation. What is more, the discussion of civil society has so far dangerously 
ignored issues of representation. A normative evaluation of how to engage people’s voices in 
the political process might be useful in some ways, but then theorists have to address the 
representation dilemma that every democratic system has to tackle in one way or the other. 
                                                 
713  For a discussion of the difficulties to reconcile the two concepts, see Eghosa E. Osaghae (2003): "Colonialism and Civil 
Society in Africa: The Perspective of Ekeh's Two Publics", Paper presented at the Symposium on Canonical Works and 
Continuing Innovation in African Arts and Humanities, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in 
Africa, 17-19 September, Accra: University of Legon. 
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8 . 3  O n  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n  a n d  
D e m o c r a t i c  D e v e l o p m e n t  
With respect to development studies issues, theories of democratic consolidation and civil 
society participation have so far failed to adequately address the limits of democracy that 
have been lamented by political philosophers for centuries.714 The same is true for aid 
professionals who generally rely on this literature to justify their attempts to strengthen 
democratic institutions. They do so to legitimise development cooperation in countries where 
economic inequality and poverty prevail and where governments are perceived as partly 
responsible for such shortcomings. Having learned their lesson from structural adjustment, 
donors do not want to again be perceived as responsible of economic and social 
marginalisation of some parts of society. In addition, the end of the Cold War has made it 
more difficult for bilateral donors to justify their engagement in developing countries with 
strategic security concerns.715 Instead, democratisation and empowerment have come to the 
fore. Supporting civil society participation has nicely served the double purpose of enabling 
citizens’ participation in national policy-making and in making policies more responsive to 
the demands of the poor.  
However, what is more is that the notion of enabling civil society participation is 
based on the generalised, premature assumption that a breach exists between recipient 
government and their citizens. Implicitly, such cooperation puts forward that recipient 
governments’ actions might not be responsive to citizens’ needs and demands. Even though 
such a situation might be common, it is a statement that would need to be evaluated case by 
case, and giving the recipient government the benefit of the doubt. As an explicit political 
statement, such an assumption would cause an uproar and a breach in bi- or multilateral 
relations. By means of including the demand for national ownership in an initiative such as 
the PRSPs, the claim has become disguised as a technical requirement. Since all heavily 
indebted poor countries that wanted to become eligible for debt relief had to produce a 
PRSP, the initiative implied that none of these candidates had democratic governments that 
were sufficiently legitimate. Such a generalised proposition would be very hard to sustain 
politically. 
The PRSPs have transformed the notions of ownership and participation to mean the 
equivalent of poverty reduction and the alleviation of economic and social inequalities. At the 
same time, they are employed as a panacea and a justification for donor engagement. By 
                                                 
714  I have briefly discussed these in chapter two.  
715  Iraq, Afghanistan and other terrorist hot spots are an exception to the rule.  
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doing so, it subsumes conflict-ridden and controversial political deliberation processes under 
harmonious concepts like consensus and empowerment. The debate about ownership 
ignores fundamental features of politics, in that it is the constrained use of social power. 
Juxtaposing ‘the people’ with ‘the ruling elite’ does not serve to characterise long-standing 
histories of social divisions or post-colonial legacies. By encouraging everyone’s participation 
without addressing questions of power, influence and political representation, international 
donors risk to destabilise representative democratic systems of recipient countries in non-
intentional and undesirable ways. 
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Finance (VIPFE) 
 
Government Agencies and Semi-Autonomous Bodies 
Diego Zavaleta Reyles Technical Secretary of the 
Dialogue 
Technical Secretariat of the 
National Dialogue 2003/2004 
Gabriela Toranzo  Responsible for Eastern 
Logistics  
Technical Secretariat of the 
National Dialogue 2003/2004 
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Carlos Toranzo Roca Former Coordinator Former Technical Secretariat 
of the National Dialogue 2000 
Carlos Carafa Former Coordinator Former Technical Secretariat 
of the National Dialogue 2000 
Iván Arias Consultant Former Technical Secretariat 
of the National Dialogue 2000 
Javier Medina Consultant Former adviser to the 
government on the Law of the 
National Dialogue 
Juan Carlos Requena Former Coordinator Former EBRP Elaboration 
Team 
George Gray Molina Director Analysis Unit of Social and 
Economic Policies (UDAPE) 
Roberto Ribero Adviser Analysis Unit of Social and 
Economic Policies (UDAPE) 
Ricardo Paz  Director  Coordination Unit for the 
Constituent Assembly  
Franz Barrios Suvelza Programme Coordinator Coordination Unit for the 
Constituent Assembly 
Waldo Albarracin  Ombudsman Office of the National 
Ombudsman  
Ana Maria Romero de 
Campero 
Former Ombudswoman Office of the National 
Ombudsman 
Apolinar Gómez Franco  General Coordinator Secretariat for the Fight 
against Corruption and Special 
Policies 
José Luis Carbajal Executive Director National Statistics Institute  
Non-Governmental Interviewees (11) 
 
Civil Society Originations and Research Institutions 
Marta Lazo Suarez  President  Mechanism of Social Control  
Diana Urioste  Director Coordinadora de la Mujer 
Ramiro Molina Rivero Vice-Chancellor University of the Cordillera 
Rosario León  Director Centro de Estudios de la 
Realidad Económica y Social 
(CERES) 
Tom Kruse Programme Coordinator Centro de Estudios para el 
Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario 
(CEDLA) 
 
Independent Consultants / Academics 
James Blackburn Consultant 
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Roger Cortez Academic / consultant 
Scarlet Escalante Carrasco Consultant  
Evan Meyer Consultant  
Inigo Retolaza Consultant 
Antonio Rodríguez Consultant 
 
 
I n t e r v i e w s  i n  G h a n a  ( 6 3 )  
Multilateral Cooperation (10) 
 
World Bank Group 
Alphecca Muttardy  Resident Representative International Monetary Fund 
Mats Karlsson Country Director  World Bank 
 
Dan Boakye PRSP Advisor World Bank 
Smile Kwawukume  Public Sector Management 
Specialist 
World Bank 
 
United Nations System 
Christophe Bahuet  
 
Deputy Resident 
Representative 
United Nations Development 
Programme 
Kamil Kamaluddeen 
 
Head, Poverty Reduction Unit United Nations Development 
Programme 
Joe Boateng External Consultant United Nations Development 
Programme 
Fred Ampiah Strategic Partnerships and 
Resource Mobilization 
Analyst 
United Nations Development 
Programme 
Violet Baffour Civil Society Support United Nations Development 
Programme 
George Laryea-Adjei  Project Officer, Planning and 
Co-ordination, ICBD 
United Nations Children's 
Fund 
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Bilateral Cooperation (23) 
 
European Union 
Wim Olthof  Economic Adviser Delegation of the European 
Commission 
Klaus Handschuh Team Leader, Institutional 
Strengthening of National 
Authorising Officer’s Office 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, ACP-EU 
Unit 
 
Germany 
Dorothea Groth Counsellor, Development 
Cooperation 
German Embassy 
Wolfram Fischer 
 
Programme Leader, Local 
Governance - Poverty 
Reduction Support Programme
Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ) 
Mechthild Ruenger Programme Manager Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ) 
Wolfgang Weth Director Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) 
Johannes Rey Country Representative  Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
Jörg Bergstermann Country Representative Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
Ernst Specht Country Representative, West 
Africa Director 
Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation 
 
United Kingdom 
Paul Walters Economic Adviser Department for International 
Development  
Kirsty Mason  Social Development Advisor Department for International 
Development  
Nana Arhin  Private Sector Development 
Advisor 
Department for International 
Development  
 
France 
Jean-François Arnal Resident Manager Agence Française de 
Développement 
 
Netherlands 
David Kuijper First Secretary, Deputy Head 
of Development Cooperation  
Royal Netherlands Embassy  
Jan van der Horst First Secretary, Health and 
Gender Development Advisor 
Royal Netherlands Embassy 
 
  246
Denmark 
Eric Rasmussen  First Secretary Royal Danish Embassy 
Poul Nyborg  Counsellor on Development Royal Danish Embassy 
Fred Pappoe  Senior Programme Officer Royal Danish Embassy 
 
Switzerland 
Philippe Sas  Counsellor, Economic Advisor Swiss Embassy 
 
United States  
Ted Lawrence  Legislative Specialist US Agency for International 
Development 
 
Canada 
Heather Cruden  First Secretary, Counsellor on 
Development 
Canadian High Commission 
Stephen Sandiford  Planning Liaison Officer Canadian International 
Development Agency - 
Programme Support Unit 
 
Japan 
Mikio Masaki Project Formulation Advisor Japan International 
Cooperation Agency 
Government of Ghana (22) 
 
Ministries 
Juaben-Boaten Siriboe Advisor and Coordinator, 
Multi-Donor Budgetary 
Support and Consultative 
Group Secretariat and National 
Economic Dialogue Secretariat
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Joe Amoako-Tuffour Former Coordinator MDBS  Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Clement Anyomi 
 
Director External Resource 
Mobilisation Multilateral 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Michael Ayesu 
 
Head, World Bank Desk Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Ati Sawyer  Head, African Development 
Bank Desk 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Joseph Chognuru  Head, Millennium Challenge 
Corporation Desk 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Robert Adu-Mante  
 
Lead Consultant in the Public 
Sector Reform Secretariat 
Senior Minister’s Office 
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Mr. Danquah Planning, Budgeting, 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Department 
Ministry for Local 
Government and Rural 
Development 
Kwame Owusu Decentralisation Secretariat Ministry for Local 
Government and Rural 
Development 
Hans van Rijn Decentralisation Secretariat Ministry for Local 
Government and Rural 
Development 
Regina A. Apotsi Chief Director of the Ministry 
of Justice and Attorney 
General's Department 
Ministry of Justice and 
Attorney General Department 
Sam Afrane Head, Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Ministry of Education  
Kobi Bentley Economist Ministry of Education  
Edward Addai Head, Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Ministry of Health  
Joana Adzoa Opare 
 
National Programme 
Coordinator  - UN System 
Programme for Promoting 
Gender Equality 
Ministry of Women and 
Children's Affairs 
 
 
Government Agencies and Semi-Autonomous Bodies 
George Gyan-Baffour Director General National Development 
Planning Commission 
Angela Farhat Brown Programme Coordinator, 
GPRS Implementation, 
National Capacity Building 
Programme for Wealth 
Creation and Social 
Development 
National Development 
Planning Commission 
Jerry Odotei Deputy Director  National Development 
Planning Commission 
Patrick Donkor Acting Director National Development 
Planning Commission 
Winfred Nelson  Senior Planning Analyst National Development 
Planning Commission 
Leonora Kyerematen  National Programme 
Coordinator 
National Governance 
Programme 
Yaw Asamoa Programme Officer, 
Democratic Governance  
National Governance 
Programme 
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Non-Governmental Interviewees (8) 
 
Civil Society Originations and Research Institutions 
Prof. Emmanuel Gyimah-
Boadi 
Executive Director Center for Democratic 
Development (CDD) 
Kwesi Jonah 
 
Head of Governance Institute of Economic Affairs 
Robert Osei Economist Institute of Economic Affairs 
Moses Agyemang  Senior Economist Private Enterprise Foundation 
(PEF) 
Abrar A Sattar  Chief of Party – National 
Economic Dialogue Facilitator
Sigma One Corporation 
 
Independent Consultants / Academics 
Samwilliam Quaye Consultant to the donor community on GPRS review 
Sena Gabianu Consultant / gender coordinator during GPRS formulation 
Christian Potyka Consultant 
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A P P E N D I X  2   –  Q U E S T I O N N A I R E S  
The interviews conducted for this research were semi-structured.  This means that the 
questionnaire was adapted to the particular interviewee as well as his/her organisation or 
professional background. The questionnaires below outline the standard sets of issue areas 
that every interview tried to explore, albeit in different ways and to different extends 
depending in the interviewee.  
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  B o l i v i a  
Decentralisation 
What is your impression of the Law of Popular Participation?    
Is decentralisation in Bolivia successful?  
What are the problems with decentralisation that Bolivia is confronted with today?  
Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Was the PRSP a government initiative or did it result out of the HIPC initiative?  
From your point of view, will the PRSP alleviate poverty in Bolivia?  
National Dialogues  
Why where the Dialogues initiated?  
What do the National Dialogues aim for?  
In what way did the Dialogues influence the formulation of the PRSP?  
Constituent Assembly, Referendum 
What do you think of the Constituent Assembly?  
What’s your opinion of the Referendum?  
Donor-Recipient Relationships 
What are donor-recipient relationships like in Bolivia?  
How do programmes or funding get agreed on? Who decides? 
Position 
What projects are you currently involved in? 
What’s a typical day of work? 
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Contacts 
Can you recommend anyone else that I should talk to?   
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  G h a n a  
Multi-Donor Budget Support 
Do you expect that the Multi Donor Budget Support is going to improve 
government ownership of reform programmes?  
How is the HIPC money going to be used? Does its use relate to the MDBS? 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
How did the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy come about? 
Was the PRSP a government initiative or did it result out of the HIPC initiative?  
From your point of view, will the PRSP alleviate poverty in Ghana?  
National Economic Dialogues  
Why where the Dialogues initiated?  
What do the National Dialogues aim for?  
In what way did the Dialogues influence the formulation of the PRSP?  
Donor-Recipient Relationships 
What are donor-recipient relationships like in Ghana?  
How do programmes or funding get agreed on?  
From your point of view, how does the work of the international donor community 
influence political decision-making of the Ghanaian government? 
Donor-Recipient Relationships 
What are donor-recipient relationships like in Ghana?  
How do programmes or funding get agreed on? Who decides? 
Position 
What projects are you currently involved in? 
What’s a typical day of work? 
Contacts 
Can you recommend anyone else that I should talk to?  
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A P P E N D I X  3   –  M E T H O D O L O G I C A L  N O T E S  
I have conducted semi-structured interviews to collect the qualitative data used in my thesis. 
These interviews have informed my analysis generally and are frequently employed as 
illustrations of particular arguments. All in all, 140 persons have been consulted. After four 
preliminary interviews in Europe, I have conducted 73 interviews in Bolivia and 63 in Ghana. 
Most interviews have been recorded on tape, unless the interviewee objected to recording.  
Q u a l i t a t i v e  D a t a  A n a l y s i s  
 
To analyse the empirical data collected, I either transcribed the interviews or used written 
notes, usually whenever recording was not possible. These .rtf files have been transferred to 
NVivo 2.0, a qualitative data analysis programme.  
NVivo allows for the freehand coding of the text, irrespectively of the terminology or 
the language used. I thus created my own hierarchical keyword structure which I oriented 
according to the thesis sections. Having coded all the interviews, I was then able to obtain a 
document for each keyword with all citations highlighted in all interviews.   
Processing the interviews through NVivo has allowed me to directly compare all 
involved actors’ opinions on a particular topic. It has proven a useful means to better inform 
the conclusions derived from the empirical research.   
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Screenshot of a Coded Document in NVivo 2.0 
 
Screenshot of a Keyword Document with Interview Fragments in NVivo 2.0 
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A n o n y m i t y   
 
All the interviews conducted for this thesis are used anonymously. Neither the person’s name 
nor the organisation to which he or she is attached are disclosed, because the information I 
am using might be sensitive in the country context.  
In order to put a person’s statement or information into the context of donor-
recipient relationships, I refer to the person as either donor, government or civil society 
representative, or as intellectual. I have classified interviewees according to how they 
understand themselves and where they mostly draw their experience from. Particularly in the 
Bolivian context, several Bolivians regularly switch from working for the government to 
working for a donor agency, for a civil society organisation, as a consultant or as intellectuals. 
Because if this, I found it problematic to classify someone as donor representative who has 
acquired most of his expertise on a particular subject in a governmental organisation or as an 
acknowledged intellectual. I have tried to classify interviewees according to the origin of their 
expertise. Inevitably, this sometimes leads to a certain degree of overlap and imprecision but 
I still found it the most accurate way to analyse donor-recipient interaction at the country 
level. 
E x a m i n a t i o n   
 
I have assigned a random number to each interviewee. I hold a coding key with which each 
reference can be matched to the particular individual. The examiners are receiving a DVD  
with the coding key and the audio files of all the interviews conducted for this research. For 
reasons of anonymity, the DVD is not part of the thesis copy submitted to the University of 
London Library at Senate House. Upon request, it is available to other researchers.  
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